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Abstract
The first topic this thesis examines is that of firms which enter and leave cartels without
affecting the existence of the cartel. The first chapter predicts which firms in markets
will choose to join and leave cartels. The findings align with a group of theoretical
models identified in the literature review, indicating that cartel membership is explained
by firms’ individual preferences for collusion, which are consistent over time. The firms
most likely to join and leave cartels are small firms in large cartels.
The second chapter questions what effect this behaviour by firms has on the survivabil-
ity of cartels. Theory is ambiguous on this, since entry and exit by firms could signal poor
discipline among cartelists which prevents the cartel from raising prices substantially due
to undercutting by outsiders or it could signal a structurally stable cartel which marginal
firms take advantage of in their membership decisions. Cartels which experienced more
entry and exit by firms had a lower risk of breakdown in each period than cartels
with more static membership, indicating that member firms recognise when cartels are
strong and take advantage of this by constantly re-evaluating their membership decisions.
The final chapter discusses a different topic: the types of agreement formed by cartels.
All cartels must agree to either fix prices, restrict the output of its members, allocate
exclusive territories, allocation customers, or rig bids in order to fulfil their objective
of raising member profits. Many cartels engage in more than one of these practices
simultaneously. Structural variables are poor at predicting the presence of agreement
types in the cartels studied, but distinct strategy profiles where certain agreement types
substitute for each other or complement each other are present. These strategy profiles
appear to be associated with particular industries and cartels of common geographical
scope.
i
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Introduction
The Citric Acid cartel was founded during a meeting of members of the European Citric
Acid Manufacturers Association, a trade association, in Basel on 6 March 1991.1 The
four largest European producers of citric acid were present at the meeting where they
fixed prices and assigned target shares of world output to the four producers present and
to one producer which was not present at the meeting: Cerestar Bioproducts. Cerestar
was the smallest of the major manufacturers of citric acid, having only recently entered
the market and not yet being a member of the trade association. Cerestar was present at
the next meeting of the ECAMA, having since joined the trade association, in Brussels
on 15 November 1991 but was not informed of the existence of the cartel or of the quota
the other producers had assigned to it, though the General Manager of Cerestar was
invited to meet with the World Head of Marketing Vitamins and Fine Chemicals of
Hoffman-Roche, a ringleader firm of the cartel.
The meeting took place in Basel on 12 February 1992 and the mechanisms of the cartel
were explained to the Cerestar manager: Producers were to charge a uniform price and
aim to produce the share of world output they have been assigned. Each producer’s output
was to be monitored closely by the other firms so that at meetings held every six months
any discrepancies between quotas and actual output could be corrected by compensation
payments from the overproducers to the underproducers. This set of mechanisms would
later become known as the Lysine Strategy Profile, due to its use by the Lysine cartel
which was active in parallel with the Citric Acid cartel with which it shared several mem-
bers. Cerestar attended the next meeting of the cartel in Jerusalem in May 1992 where
it formally agreed to the 5% market share which the other members had agreed upon
previously. It had produced close enough to 5% of world output in the months preceding
its entry to the cartel that no compensation payments were deemed necessary. The cartel
agreement continued until 1995, though it suffered from repeated cheating by the rela-
tively small producer Jungbunzlauer. The ringleader producers regarded the agreement as
1This information is from the EC’s decision document for the Citric Acid cartel, OJ L 239, 06.09.2002,
p. 18 - 65. It presents one of the most readable cartel narratives in the sample. Connor [2008] also
provides a detailed narrative of the Citric Acid cartel and several related conspiracies.
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slowly coming to an end due to cheating and the loss of market share to fringe producers,
mostly in China, when the existence of the cartel was revealed when US authorities
raided the offices of member Archer Daniels Midland in connection with the Lysine cartel.
Evidence of the Citric Acid cartel was found in records of the Lysine cartel because
a representative of Archer Daniels Midland had repeatedly talked of his involvement
in the Citric Acid cartel to employees of other Lysine producers in order to convince
them to form the cartel. The exact system of price fixing, quota allocation, formal and
informal monitoring of output, and compensation payments used in the Citric Acid car-
tel was adopted by the Lysine cartel at the urging of the Archer Daniels Midland employee.
Narratives of cartels reveal a great amount of detail about cartelists’ behaviour which
falls outside of simple accounts of collusion between firms. There is a high-quality
body of theoretical research into many of these aspects individually: the formation
of cartels, incomplete cartels, the loss of cartel market share to fringe firms, the use
of different techniques for collusion, the defection of firms from agreements, and the
breakdown of cartels, for example. However these topics are difficult for economists
to analyse empirically, especially econometrically, because of the difficulty in finding
detailed quantitative data on cartels and the complexity of the theoretical models around
them. This thesis focuses on investigating such topics empirically.
Firms which join cartels which are already in progress or leave cartels without the
cartels breaking down are the first phenomenon considered. Their behaviour and identi-
ties may allow theoretical models of cartel behaviour to be tested empirically. Chapter 1
surveys the literature on cartel membership. The cartel membership literature includes
research into the choice made by firms to become cartel members. It encompasses the
part of the theory of incomplete cartels where the firms are assumed to be heterogeneous,
and also the theory of the process of cartel formation. What empirical evidence there is
on the nature of firms which collude compared to those which do not is also summarised.
Theoretical models of collusion broadly agree that firms with high costs, low capacities
or low discount rates compared to other firms in the same market will tend to be cartel
outsiders.
Two distinct trends in the theoretical modelling of cartels are also identified, which are
termed the marginal firms and the balanced temptations-based approaches. Marginal
firms models see each firm as constantly re-evaluating their membership decision in
2
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order to maximise their profits. Cartels will be only as large as is necessary for their
continued existence and all firms which may be outsiders will choose to be so. Firms
on the margin between being a cartel member and being an outsider may change their
membership decision multiple times, joining the cartel when necessary to ensure its
survival but then leaving when it has an opportunity. Balanced temptations models
see cartel formation in a similar way but differ in their conception of the exit of firms.
These models see cartels as allocating profits among members such that each member
has an equal incentive to defect from the agreement, in order that the cartel does not
have ‘weak links’ in the form of marginal firms.
The descriptive statistics and details about the collection and background of the data
used in the thesis are presented in Chapter 2. This chapter is intended to show the
reader the level of detail and quality of data provided by the European Commission’s
decision documents, and provide an overview of the nature of the cartels and firms in
the sample. Where these descriptive statistics have direct relevance to the research
questions considered in the substantive chapters, they are discussed in those chapters.
The first topic this thesis examines is that of firms which enter cartels which are
already active or which leave cartels without causing their breakdown or discovery.
Chapter 3 attempts to predict which firms will choose to join and leave cartels and
what this indicates about the success of theoretical models of incomplete collusion.
The findings align with many theoretical models, indicating that firms’ preferences for
colluding are consistent over time and that the firms most likely to leave and join cartels,
therefore spending time as outsiders, are small firms in large cartels.
With the motivations of the firms who choose to alter their membership decisions
better understood, another question is prompted: What does this indicate about the
cartels which these firms are members of? What a large amount of entry and exit by
member firms may signal about a cartel is ambiguous. A cartel which experiences entry
and exit may be a cartel with weak internal institutions which was unable to encompass
all of the firms in its market, and which is unable to prevent its members from defecting.
Alternatively it could be a cartel which is structurally robust, meaning its firms are able
to switch between the fringe and the cartel in order to achieve the best possible profits.
Chapter 4 approaches this question by testing whether entry and exit by firms is
associated with cartels’ risk of breakdown. The analysis finds that cartels in the sample
3
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which experienced entry and exit were less likely to break down in each period of
operation than those with more static memberships. This lends support to the view
that firms in a cartelised market recognise the strength of the cartel and are willing to
change membership decisions in order to maximise their profits while preserving the
cartel.
Chapter 5 focuses on predicting the strategies of cartels, in particular what aspect of
firm behaviour the cartel members choose to coordinate. Five broad agreement types are
identified by the European Commission: price fixing, bid rigging, territorial allocation,
customer allocation and quota allocation. Many cartels engage in more than one of these
practices simultaneously. Data on the number of firms in each cartel, the asymmetry in
the market shares of the cartel members, the geographical scope of the cartels, and the
industrial sector of the cartel is used to predict the presence of all five agreement types
in the sample of cartels. The correlations between the agreement types are also of interest.
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Literature Review on Cartel Membership
Cartel outsiders are firms which remain outside of a cartel in their market. Many cartels
do not comprise all of the firms in their market and so have these fringes. This chapter
aims to review the literature on which firms in a market will be in a cartel and which
firms will not be. The first two substantive chapters of this thesis are concerned with
interpreting the behaviour of firms which choose to join or stay outside of cartels and
on considering what this behaviour signals about the strength of a cartel agreement.
This research builds on the theory of incomplete cartels since, if anything is to be
learned about cartel membership, situations in which firms face a meaningful member-
ship choice must be examined. A recent and comprehensive survey of the literature on
incomplete cartels is provided by Bos [2009]. Because of this, I shall limit my discussion
of the theory of symmetric incomplete cartels to a summary, and to the literature
published since Bos [2009]. Other strands of economic theory examine collusion among
firms which vary by capacity, cost or discount factors, the initial formation of cartels
and the reaction of cartels to firms entering their markets. Some work brings together
more than one of these strands, such as the model of endogenous cartel formation with
heterogeneous firms and differentiated products of Paha [2010].
The heart of this chapter is a review of the literature on incomplete collusion between
asymmetric firms. I shall also discuss what empirical work there is about the differences
between colluding and non-colluding firms. I argue in this chapter that there are two
main methodological approaches to modelling cartel membership: A ‘marginal firms’
approach which sees firms as having different levels of commitment to the cartel and
being able to change their membership decisions on the basis of self interest, and the
‘balanced temptations’ approach which sees cartels as choosing their allocation rules
to eliminate the problem of firms exiting and entering on the margins. The tension
5
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between the predictions made by these two theoretical approaches is the subject of
Chapter 3.
1.1. Agreements Among Identical Firms
The simplest models of collusion are those where all firms in the market are assumed to
be identical in their costs, capacities and other attributes. The most directly relevant
conclusions of theory are drawn from more complex models where firms are heteroge-
neous but models of firms with identical costs still provide useful stylised facts about
the behaviour of colluding and non-colluding firms. That firms will generally prefer to
be outsiders rather than insiders, given that a cartel exists, is a stylised fact which is
central to the models discussed later since it leads to the conclusion that cartels are
likely to be only as large as they need to be to raise prices and remain stable.
Bos [2009] examines several models of oligopoly and provides a survey of the literature
around incomplete cartels. The paper identifies the proportion of firms and output
controlled by the cartel in each model.
The five models of oligopoly considered by Bos are:
1. Simultaneous Bertrand competition with homogeneous products;
2. Sequential, collusive price leadership;
3. Simultaneous Bertrand competition with product differentiation;
4. Simultaneous Cournot competition with homogeneous products;
5. Collusive quantity leadership.
Incomplete cartels are impossible in the first case, inconclusive in the second and
third, require ∼80% market share in the fourth and ∼50% in the fifth case.
In the simultaneous Bertrand game any outsider, or group of outsiders, is capable of
completely and perfectly replacing the output reduction by firms attempting to found a
cartel. This means that no incomplete cartel is viable because outsider firms will always
undercut the cartel and take all of their output.
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In models based on sequential price leadership, the cartel is assumed to be the price
leader and the fringe firms price takers. Unlike the simultaneous version of the Bertrand
game, outsiders may find it profitable to restrict their own output (though not by as
much as cartel members) in order to ensure that the cartel is profitable for the member
firms. If the outsider firms were not to restrict their output then the members would
not maintain the cartel and the outsiders would lose the high profits they gain from
the cartel’s existence. That firms compete a` la Bertrand is an assumption which is
appealing to modellers since it makes the existence of a cartel certain with a finite
number of firms (as proved by D’Aspremont et al. [1983]) since even a small, weak cartel
will make the profits of the firms involved non-zero and so be worthwhile for those firms
involved, compared to zero-profit Bertrand equilibrium.
Deneckere and Davidson [1985] model mergers among firms producing differentiated
products and competing in price. The paper’s findings on mergers may equally be
applied to cartels. Here, any cartel able to charge a price higher than the fringe may
exist, but the profitability of any given incomplete cartel will depend upon the degree of
product differentiation. The more differentiated the products, the smaller the drop in
cartel members’ market shares when they raise their prices because consumers will be
less willing to substitute to the products of the fringe members. This makes relatively
small cartels profitable where products are strongly differentiated. Since greater profits
are possible as an outsider than as an insider, firms will not choose to join a cartel
which is already profitable and stable without their membership. This conclusion, that
cartels will tend to be smaller when the market is more amenable to collusion, is perhaps
counter-intuitive and it makes an important point which is central to Chapter 4: that
structurally strong cartels may be small and comprised of opportunistic, profit-chasing
firms.
When firms simultaneously choose quantity, rather than prices, the ‘merger paradox’
identified by Salant et al. [1983] applies. A cartel among identical firms will only be
profitable if it comprises at least 80% of firms in a market. If fewer than 80% of the
firms attempt to form a cartel then the remaining outsiders will find it most profitable
to expand their output to such a level that the cartel is no longer profitable for its
members. Similarly to the reasoning in price-competition games, a reduction in output
by a cartel’s members will only be profitable if the higher prices outweigh the sales lost
to the outsider firms.
7
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Martin [1990] shows that when a cartel is able to act as a Stackelberg quantity leader,
a cartel requires only at least half of the firms to be members. The fringe’s best response
function is very soft due to its strong incentive to keep the cartel in existence. More
precisely, the smallest cartel possible is k = n+12 . Taken together, these models show
how the size of the smallest viable cartel in a market will depend on the response of the
cartel’s outsiders to changes in output by the cartel.
1.1.1. Incentive and Participation Constraints
All of these results are true where firms are identical and symmetrical. Bos discusses in-
complete cartels among heterogeneous firms briefly, concluding that the critical discount
factor necessary to maintain a given cartel is higher where firms are more asymmetric,
because the incentive and coordination problems associated with collusion will be more
severe.
At the centre of Bos’ view of incomplete cartels is that cartels are bound by both an
incentive constraint and a participation constraint (in addition to needing to solve a
coordination problem). The incentive constraint must be satisfied for all firms and it is
familiar from the theory of complete cartels. It requires that the discounted value of
future collusive profits exceed the payoff which a firm would receive for secretly cheating
on the cartel agreement and suffering whatever punishment the cartel can muster as
a result of this. The constraint represents the requirement that cartel membership be
individually profitable for every member.
The participation constraint applies to particular potential cartels containing combi-
nations of firms in the market. It requires that no cartel member would prefer to be a
member of the fringe in equilibrium and that no fringe firm would prefer to be a member
of the cartel. This concept is named cartel stability by D’Aspremont et al. [1983]
and is discussed in greater detail in section 1.1.1. That the participation constraint is
satisfied means that it is profitable for a particular cartel to be formed. That the incen-
tive constraint is satisfied means that no member will wish to deviate from the agreement.
Models of collusion which assume all firms in a market must be members of a cartel
for a cartel to be formed focus on the incentive constraint entirely since it is assumed
that the firm which is most marginal about participation may not leave the cartel for
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the fringe without destroying the cartel. Where incomplete cartels are assumed to be
possible, satisfying the participation constraint becomes important.
Cartel Stability and the Participation Constraint
D’Aspremont et al. [1983] defined the conditions under which a cartel is considered
stable. Let k be the number of firms in a cartel, pic(k) the single-period profits of a
member of a cartel containing k firms and pio(k) the single-period profits of a cartel
outsider in a market containing a cartel with k members. Note that this implies that
the fringe of cartel outsiders consists of n− k firms where n is the total number of firms
in the market. pio(k) > pic(k), meaning that outsiders earn more profits than insiders
for cartel of a given size since they are not obliged to restrict their output as members are.
A cartel may be considered internally stable if no member prefers to be outside the
cartel instead. A cartel is internally stable where:
pic(k) >= pio(k − 1)
A cartel may be considered externally stable if no outsider would like to join the cartel.1
A cartel is externally stable where:
pio(k) >= pic(k + 1)
These constraints illustrate a solution to the apparent paradox of collusion still occur-
ring given the profitability of being an outsider. A firm in a cartel of size k is aware
that they could be making greater profits as an outsider to a cartel with k firms but
realises that they cannot attain these profits since their leaving will allow only them the
profits of an outsider in a market with a cartel of size k− 1. The intuition of this model
is shared by other models in the ‘marginal firms’ strand of the literature.
While the number of firms in the market is finite there will always exist a stable cartel,
though that cartel may consist of only one firm. This follows from the assumption in
the model that the profitability of the cartel’s members, pic will always be increasing in
the size of the cartel k. This means that a cartel of size k = 0 will never be externally
stable and a cartel of size k = 1 will always be internally stable. If a continuum of firms
1An all-inclusive cartel (i.e., where k = n) may trivially be considered externally stable.
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is assumed rather than a finite number of firms then the internal stability of a cartel
of size k = 1 cannot be guaranteed to be internally stable, since an individual firm’s
membership decision will not affect pio or pic. This reasoning also applies to markets
with a large but finite number of firms, meaning that cartels are more likely to be
internally unstable and so stable cartels likely to be smaller, depending on the specific
cost assumptions made.
This model, with the additional assumption of quadratic costs, is expanded upon by
Donsimoni et al. [1986] who prove that there exists a unique stable cartel where firms
are not too cost-efficient relative to market demand, and two stable cartels otherwise2.
They also show that the incomplete stable cartel is smaller where the size of the market
is large relative to the size of the firms in the market. This is true because where firms
are small each firm recognises that its own membership decision has a small effect on the
market price and will suffer less penalty from choosing to be an outsider. Thoron [1998]
makes a further extension to the model by proving that a unique coalition-proof stable
cartel exists. This coalition-proof equilibrium is unique even under the circumstances
that Donsimoni et al. found there would be multiple equilibria if defection were limited
to a single firm.
A flaw in this view of cartel stability is pointed out by Diamantoudi [2005]: that it
assumes firms are myopic with respect to the membership decisions of the other firms in
the market. In these models, a firm will anticipate the new price which will be reached
in equilibrium once it has changed its membership status. What firms do not consider in
these models is the effect that their membership decisions will have on the membership
decisions of other firms. For example, a firm may consider it advantageous to join a
cartel assuming that the cartel will be of size k + 1 after its entry. However its entry
may prompt a firm which was already a member firm to leave, meaning the entrant firm
faces a cartel of the same size as before but is now earns the lower profits of an insider.
Similarly a firm may choose to leave a cartel to become an outsider without considering
that this may prompt further exit by member firms, eroding the profits the firm gained
by exiting. They show that a unique stable equilibrium exists with farsighted firms.
2One complete cartel, and one incomplete cartel.
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1.1.2. Supergame-Based Models of Collusion
D’Aspremont et al. [1983] forms the basis for a large amount of literature on collusion.
This group of models sees the cartel as acting as a leader and the fringe as followers.
This approach is tractable because it allows the cartel and market to be modelled
statically. The alternative is modelling cartels where both the cartel members and
fringe firms strategically choose their membership and production choices simultaneously.
Friedman [1971] and Friedman [1974] launched another strand of literature. These
models see collusion as a game-theoretic supergame which must be solved for all players.
This makes the model less tractable but avoids treating the cartel firms as fundamen-
tally different kinds of entity to the fringe firms through the structure of the model.
Eaton and Eswaran [1998] contrast a leadership model with a supergame model in
order to illustrate the differences and show that in leadership models fringe firms will
choose a higher output and fewer firms will be cartel members than in supergame models.
Friedman and the Balanced Temptations Equilbrium
Friedman [1971] noted that non-cooperative supergames may have a very large number
of equilibria 3. In the specific case of an oligopoly this represents there being a large
set of prices and distributions of output among firms which would be preferred by all
firms to the static Cournot price and output. In a situation of repeated interaction, the
static Cournot equilibrium is not pareto-efficient in that all firms could increase their
profits through collusion. The set of agreements which are stable is limited only by the
patience of the firms involved (that they would not prefer to undercut the other firms
for an immediate large payoff) and the need for all firms to earn more than they would
under static Cournot.
Friedman sees this abundance of feasible equilibria as the key reason why static
Cournot remains the most tractable model of oligopoly, despite all firms being able to
increase their profits in a repeated game. He proposes an equilibrium which he believes
is a focal point for tacit coordination, being both Pareto-optimal and non-cooperative
(in the game-theoretic sense). This is the Balanced Temptations Equilibrium, elaborated
upon in Friedman [1974].
3This is the well-known ‘folk theorem’ result.
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In standard models of incentive-compatibility, a given cartel is viable where all firms
are patient enough that their discount factors exceed their critical discount factor, δ∗.
Firm i’s discount factor is
δi∗ =
pi
′
i − pi∗i
pi
′
i − pici
where pi∗i is the payoff to firm i from colluding, pi
′
i the payoff to firm i from defecting
from the agreement and pici the payoff following defection (often assumed to be the
competitive level of profits, following the breakdown of the cartel). The Balanced
Temptations Equilibrium equalises the critical discount rates for all firms assuming a
grim trigger strategy is used to punish defectors.
Outsiders in Supergame Models
Martin [1993] provides a model of incomplete collusion as a supergame. He calculates
the common critical discounts factor necessary to maintain a given incomplete cartel,
making that cartel a subgame-perfect equilibrium, given various market sizes where the
cartel uses either a grim trigger strategy or an optimum punishment strategy. Martin
shows that for both of the cartel strategies considered, a smaller fringe requires a lower
industry-wide discount rate in order to be stable.
Allowing the common assumption of a grim trigger punishment strategy to be re-
laxed, Eaton and Eswaran [1998] instead allows firms to leave the cartel and join
the fringe without the cartel necessarily breaking down as a result. The only pun-
ishment firms face for defection in the model is ejection from the cartel. The cartel
is assumed to continue after the ejection has taken place, subject to it still being
profitable for the remaining member firms to continue colluding. This model exemplifies
the phenomenon of opportunistic exit from cartels by marginal members. The result
of such a punishment strategy is that the largest possible stable cartels tend to be
relatively small since where cartels contain a relatively large number of firms, each firm
faces a large incentive to defect due to the high prices and output possible as an outsider.
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1.2. Asymmetry and Cartel Agreements
Questions of membership are almost entirely arbitrary when identical firms are consid-
ered and questions of agreement types or collusive technologies mostly trivial. Since
firms lack individual identity in such models, equilibria of incomplete cartel models
are non-unique with respect to the identities of the firms involved. It is in the study
and modelling of collusion in markets with asymmetric firms that stylised facts about
which firms are more likely to be cartel members and which firms outsiders may be
obtained. The main axes of differentiation which have been studied are where firms vary
by capacity or by cost. Firms with varying discount factors have also been considered.
1.2.1. Capacity Asymmetry
Models in which firms have asymmetric capacities are considerably more tractable than
those in which firms’ costs are asymmetric. Where firms have different costs: allocation
has implications for productive efficiency, and therefore joint profits; also, colluding
firms will each desire a different price to be set by the cartel, with more efficient firms
desiring a lower price. These effects also have the implication that a cartel’s members
may reject the addition of a new member under certain conditions.
By contrast, in models of capacity asymmetry: the allocation rule does not affect
joint profits given a particular cartel; all members of a cartel wish the price charged
to be the same. The cartel’s price is strictly increasing with its size so the addition
of a new firm to the cartel is always desirable to the members. Bos and Harrington
[2010] provide a model of cartel formation with capacity asymmetry. Their model is
one in which a cartel sets a price and the competitive fringe undercuts it by a negligible
amount. Cartels which are stable in a static setting are assumed to be stable over time.
The model relies upon a crucial piece of reasoning. The members of a cartel must
be making a profit in order for their cartel to exist, and they must be charging a price
above the Bertrand competitive level of P = MC. This implies that the combined
capacities of the fringe firms is less than the quantity demanded at the price set by the
cartel. Fringe output is therefore equal to fringe capacity. Given this, cartel may be
considered to be a follower, setting both price and quantity to maximise profits given
the residual demand left after the fringe’s output. A proportional allocation rule is used,
meaning that each member firm receives the same share of their capacity in output quota.
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Of interest in this model is each firm’s incentive to join the cartel. A cartel will consist
of the largest firms in an industry under the equilibrium proposed. The reasoning
behind this is that a firm, joining the cartel, will lose profits from the reduction in
output it must suffer but gain profits from the increase in price this causes (note that
all other firms in the cartel will also reduce their output when a new firm enters). A
proportional allocation rule is assumed to hold in all cartels, meaning that all members
of the cartel will produce the same proportion of their capacity. Since firms of any
size have to reduce their output by the same proportion in order to join the cartel but
larger firms will have a greater effect on price from the same proportional reduction,
this implies that larger firms will gain more from joining a cartel.
1.2.2. Cost Asymmetry
Cost asymmetry is unlike capacity asymmetry since the allocation of output between the
firms affects the average efficiency of production and therefore the cartel price. Models
of asymmetric costs are therefore less tractable than models of asymmetric capacity
since it is not possible to calculate an optimal price for the cartel and then proceed to
allocation - the two are interdependent.
Donsimoni [1985] models cartel stability (as defined by D’Aspremont et al. [1983])
where firms have varying increasing marginal costs. She finds that more efficient firms
join the cartel while less efficient firms will remain outsiders. The cartel will contain a
greater proportion of the firms in the market where firms are more cost efficient overall
relative to market demand, where consumers are more willing to pay for the product,
where there are many firms in the market and where demand is relatively price elastic.
The paper’s model sees the outsiders choose their level of production first and leave
a residual demand curve facing the cartel. This is a similar technique to that which
Bos and Harrington [2010], above, use to find the levels of output for the cartel and
the fringe. Small outsiders will leave a large amount of residual demand for the cartel,
causing the cartel to choose a higher price and make more profits than if they were left
with a smaller amount of residual demand from a larger fringe. For a given cartel size,
it may be seen that both small and large firms benefit from the larger firms joining
the cartel and the smaller firms staying out, rather than the other way around. Total
14
Literature Review on Cartel Membership
industry profits increase with the size of the cartel but its size is limited by the incentives
of the marginal firms. This logic may be examined in simple terms in a two-firm model
where one may choose to become the leader: both firms earn higher profits where the
high-cost firm is the leader (analogous to being the outsider in the cartel model).
1.2.3. Discount Rate Asymmetry
Asymmetry between firms’ discount rates may be seen as representing differences in firms
inherent preferences for collusion derived from characteristics which are unobservable
or idiosyncratic. A firm with a low discount rate is modelled as being one which is
relatively impatient and prefers short-term to longer-term profits, and so is more likely
to defect from an agreement for a short-term payoff. This could either be considered
as reflecting directly the culture among decision makers at the firm in question or it
could be seen as representing a more abstract distaste for collusive behaviour at the firm.
Harrington [1989a] shows that firms with lower discount factors (meaning they are
more impatient) have a stronger bargaining position and so are likely to receive a larger
share of cartel output than firms with higher discount factors should they be members.
This result differs from the above results on capacity and cost asymmetry because it
assumes that the cartel will be all-inclusive if it exists, and that firms will use the
Nash Bargaining Solution in allocating production within the cartel4. Firms with lower
discount factors require greater shares in order to prevent them from deviating from
the agreement than firms with high discount factors do. Low discount factor firms may
be seen as threatening the existence of the agreement in the negotiation stage of the
game in order to extract profits from the high discount factor firms. Note, however,
that firms with low discount factors do reduce the likelihood of a cartel forming at all,
harming the expected profits of all firms in the market.
1.2.4. Asymmetry and Allocation Rules
When asymmetric firms are modelled, it is necessary to consider how the output produced
and profit gained by the cartel is allocated among the member firms. Such concerns are
frequently de-emphasised by papers which wish to focus on different aspects of collusion
4This is because the set of stable allocations may be large. The Nash Bargaining Solution means a
unique equilibrium will be selected.
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and sometimes other assumptions determine allocation within the model. For example,
models which assume Balanced Temptations Equilibrium necessarily imply that the
cartel will distribute profits among its members to ensure each faces an equal incentive
to defect. Fulfilling this objective implies a specific allocation for any given cartel and
leaves no space for other allocation considerations.
Models of cost asymmetry face a further methodological problem in their treatment
of allocation that models of capacity and discount rate asymmetry do not. In models
where the allocation of profits within a given cartel does not affect the joint profits
of the cartel it is possible to calculate first the joint profit-maximising level of overall
cartel output, and then to consider how these profits are distributed. Where costs
are asymmetric, the allocation of output will affect the joint profits of the cartel so
allocation and total cartel output may not be considered separately. Patinkin [1947]
proposed that a cartel which contained members with varying though increasing costs
should allocate output such that the marginal cost faced by each firm be equalised,
thus maximising joint profits.5 A similar assumption of joint profit maximisation by
colluding firms with heterogeneous and increasing costs is made by Donsimoni [1985].
It is still possible for models of cost-asymmetric cartels to assume allocation rules
which are not based purely on joint profit maximisation. Schmalensee [1987] is concerned
with cost asymmetries between firms and the implications this has for the agreement
types possible. However, it concerned itself only with complete cartels and the ‘baseline
case’ used in the allocation rules was the competitive equilibrium. Take the example
of the Nash Bargaining Rule, which maximises the products of the gains of all firms
within the constraints imposed (in this case by the collusive technology). Let Π∗i and Π
c
i
be firm i’s profits under collusion and Cournot competition, respectively. The relevant
expression to be maximised when only complete cartels are viable is then:
(Π∗1 −Πc1)(Π∗2 −Πc2) . . . (Π∗N −ΠcN ) for i = 1, . . . , N
Other cooperative solution concepts, such as Kalai-Smorodinsky or Equal Gains, also
rely upon this comparison between collusion and competitive profits. If incomplete
cartels are possible these problems become much more complex. A firm’s ‘gains’ from
membership of a particular cartel must be calculated by comparing the profits from a
5Bain [1948] pointed out that in many circumstances, the resulting cartel may not be incentive-
compatible for the member firms without side payments to encourage the participation of some
firms.
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particular cartel and those from any potential subcartel which a firm could otherwise
be involved in. The full range of possible agreement types considered by Schmalensee
are detailed in Section 5.2.1.
Berg [2012] considers this in his model of three firms, two efficient and one inefficient,
which may form complete or incomplete cartels and use the Nash Bargaining Theory to
decide allocation. A cartel will consist either of the two efficient firms or of all three
firms. Given the grand coalition, any firm has the choice to deviate unilaterally or
in coordination with another firm (the only possible coordinated deviation is where
the two efficient firms form a subcartel, ejecting the inefficient firm). Both unilateral
and coordinated deviation are represented by incentive constraints in terms of firms’
discount factors. Whether the grand coalition is bound by the possibility of unilateral
deviation (and reversion to competition) or coordinated deviation (and the creation of
a subcartel plus an outsider) will determine the allocation.
1.2.5. Balanced Temptations and Asymmetry
Some models of collusion between asymmetric firms use the balanced temptations
equilibrium. In addition to the argument that this equilibrium is a focal point which
tacitly colluding firms may use, some authors argue that it is a logical allocation rule
for an explicit cartel to follow in order to maximise the stability of the agreement.
Bae [1987] uses the balanced temptations equilibrium in the process of showing that
improvements in technology can decrease social welfare if it leads to greater collusion.
He emphasises the attractiveness of the balanced temptations equilibrium as a focal
point at which firms may arrive with a minimum of negotiation or no negotiation at all,
and suggests that actual cartels are likely to follow or approximate such a rule in practice.
This choice of equilibrium is criticised by Harrington [1991]. Harrington argues that the
balanced temptations equilibrium places such great constraints on the price and output
quotas chosen by the cartel that models which use it are limited in the results they
can produce on firm behaviour. He suggests that models use more basic assumptions,
such as negotiation according to the Nash bargaining solution. This assumption does
not require assuming that the cartelists choose to maximise joint profits, as Bae does,
or to use ad-hoc assumptions where a joint profit-maximising balanced temptations
equilibrium does not exist, as it is not guaranteed to exist.
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The argument that the balanced temptations equilibrium is a likely outcome of
explicit collusion is made by Verboven [1997], who shows that such an equilibrium is
Pareto-efficient within his framework of repeated duopoly and constant marginal costs,
and may be the only Pareto-efficient equilibrium. The balanced temptations equilibrium
is a possible outcome of bargaining between cost-heterogeneous firms in this framework
according to the Nash bargaining solution. Verboven also emphasises the tractable
nature of the equilibrium, since it is possible to perform comparative statics in costs
with heterogeneous firms.
Correia-da Silva and Pinho [2016] also argue that cartels are likely to arrive at the
balanced temptations equilibrium. They identify the critical discount rate of the firms
in the collusive agreement as representing the stability of the cartel to defection caused
by external shocks. They argue that in a heterogeneous cartel there will be a single
firm which has the strongest propensity to defect from the agreement and that the
stability of the cartel in its present structure will depend solely on the decision of this
firm. The cartel may always be made more stable by allocating more profits to this firm,
until all firms face the same propensity to defect from the agreement and the balanced
temptations equilibrium is reached. Where cost asymmetry between members prevents
the balanced temptations equilibrium from being reached by the allocate of output, side
payments between members may be necessary.
1.2.6. Side Payments
Simple lump-sum payments made between cartel members solve many of the problems
associated with collusion among heterogeneous firms. Firms whose participation con-
straints mean they do not wish to be members of a cartel may be paid a sufficient
amount so the reward for being a cartel member is greater than the reward for being an
outsider.
The potentially important role of side payments in cartels was first pointed out by Bain
[1948] in his response to Patinkin [1947]. Patinkin models a cartel with heterogeneous
and increasing costs as a single firm with multiple plants of varying efficiency. He shows
that the best strategy for such a cartel is to minimise costs by dividing production
among the firms such that all firms face equal marginal cost. This implies that low-cost
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firms should produce a disproportionately large amount of the industry’s output. Bain
points out that, unlike a multi-plant firm, a cartel must be privately profitable for each
of its members and the disproportionate share of output allocated to the low-cost firms
is detrimental to this. The practical difficulties in implementing a ‘perfect cartel’ such
as the illegality of such transfers in most circumstances and the need for firms to commit
credibly to levels of output in order for a system of side payments to work make it
unlikely that any cartelised industry would be able to minimise its joint costs.
It is important that side payments, which are very rarely observed in real cartels, are
not confused with compensation payments, which are frequently seen. A side payment
is a payment made ex ante to a firm which would not otherwise participate in a cartel.
A compensation payment is made after levels of revenue are known in order to correct
an unintended misallocation of profits between firms which are willing to participate
in a cartel. The direction and amount of compensation payments may not be known
before firms’ profits are realised, unlike side payments which must be agreed in advance.
1.3. Changes in Cartel Membership Structure
The theoretical models previously discussed may hint at the mechanism by which a
cartel forms but they do not allow for changes in market structure over time or provide
an account of how a cartel can form in a market which was previously competitive.
Given that any incomplete cartel structure must have been reached through either the
formation of an incomplete cartel or the defection of a cartel member from a complete
cartel, these theories are crucial to understanding incomplete cartels.
1.3.1. Members’ Attitude to Cartel Size
The profits of firms in a market containing a cartel will depend on the size and com-
position of the cartel. In the majority of theoretical models of collusion, the profits of
cartel members and outsiders are increasing in the size of the cartel. However, it is
often observed that cartels will not permit an outsider to join the cartel. This implies
that the member firms believe that the outsider firm becoming a cartel member will
harm their expected profits. One explanation for this is that the members are concerned
that accommodating entry will induce further entry to the market, but even in a static
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context it is possible for an increase in the size of the cartel to decrease members’ profits.
Where symmetrical firms compete according to Bertrand competition, the profits
of cartel members are increasing in cartel size. This is shown numerically by Bloch
[2002]. However when firms compete according to Cournot competition the profits
of cartel members are U-shaped with respect to cartel size, initially declining as the
cartel increases in size before increasing. This is because when firms which choose
quantities collude they must decrease their output in order to raise prices. This cost is
proportionally greater when the cartel is small, and outweighs the gains from higher
prices initially.
Where firms are asymmetric in their costs there is an additional complication to
collusion in that firms will prefer the cartel set different prices. More efficient member
firms will desire a lower price than less efficient member firms and the increase in cartel
price necessary to induce a less efficient firm to join a cartel may harm the profits of the
more efficient members sufficiently that the less efficient firm will not be accommodated
in the cartel.
This argument is developed by Cave and Salant [1995] who model the internal decision-
making system of cartels. They observe that a commonly seen system in legal and export
cartels is for the cartel to operate on a quota system where member firms produce a fixed
proportion of their capacity, and vote democratically on the proportion they choose.
Larger-capacity firms will prefer that the proportion chosen by the cartel is smaller.
Given weak assumptions about the preferences of firms, the proportion preferred by the
median member will be chosen by a majority of the members. These results hold in the
presence of outsider firms.
The model may also be extended to situations where the cartel’s members have
differing marginal costs. More efficient firms will then prefer a lower cartel price than
less efficient firms. Because of the this, the price set by the cartel could exceed the
monopoly price which the efficient firms would prefer, as the price implied by the quotas
set by the majority including the median firm would bind the efficient firms. Donsimoni
et al. [1986] also make this point in their model of collusion between heterogeneous firms.
This model gives new depth to the matter of preference for entry. In addition to
directly changing the incentives faced by the cartel in deciding on a quota, the entry of
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a new firm could affect the majority decision reached by the cartel. The possibility of
gaining a vote in the cartel’s decision-making is an incentive to entry, and the possibility
that a new entrant could change the quota chosen by the cartel could cause cartel
members to oppose the entry of a new member.
Cartels’ Reaction to Market Entry
The possibility of firms entering a market greatly affects the ease of collusion and the
behaviour of colluding firms. Broadly speaking, the possibility of market entry will
make collusion difficult to sustain and will affect the cartel’s optimal treatment of cartel
outsiders. If a policy of permitting outsiders to enter the cartel will induce further entry,
then cartels may choose to not permit the membership of an outsider even when it
would immediately increase the profits of the cartel members.
Harrington [1989b] models a cartel in a market where barriers to entry are arbitrarily
small. He considers a cartel which is able to commit to various reactions to entry
and potential entrants consider the implications of the reaction to their entry when
making their entry decision. The three broad strategies are to discontinue collusion
upon entry, to accommodate entrants or predation against entrants. The problem the
cartel members face is that accommodating entrants in order to preserve the cartel and
their own profits will trigger further entry and ultimately erode cartel profits. On the
other hand, predation or the discontinuation of collusion may deter entry but is directly
costly to the incumbent cartel members. Harrington concludes the best strategy is to
predate at first and then accommodate entrants in order to deter entry but sustain
collusion and profits in the long run.
Scott-Morton [1997] empirically examines British shipping cartels and their reac-
tions to new entrants. Both accommodation and predation were practised against
different entrants. Entrants which had less funds, were active in fewer markets, had
less experience, and which entered at times of weaker demand were more likely to
be predated against by the incumbent cartel than stronger entrants. This suggests
that predation was the preferred strategy for this cartel, attempted unless incum-
bents believed it would not be effective in forcing the outsider to exit. Podolny and
Scott Morton [1999] examined the same group of cartels but considered also the social
class of the new entrants. They discovered that this was a better predictor of the
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reaction of the cartel than the economic characteristics of the entrant. The (largely
upper class British) cartel was far more likely to accommodate entry by firms led by
other upper class British people and far more likely to predate against lower class or
foreign-owned entrants. The authors speculate this is because the incumbents trusted
those of a similar background to them to abide by the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ the cartel
relied upon. Contrary to the former finding, this seems to indicate that the driving
force behind the accommodation/predation choice was the defence of the agreement
from cheating and that they were not loathe to accept new, well-behaved cartel members.
1.3.2. Cartel Formation
Models of cartel formation consider the means by which a stable cartel, of the kind
modelled in D’Aspremont et al. [1983] might actually come about. The difficulty in
formation in such models is that small cartels are unlikely to be stable to defection so
the cartel must consist of a large portion of the market immediately upon its creation.
Where cartels must be complete to be stable this problem is relatively simple. However
if the cartel is able to support outsiders then each firm in the market will wish to be an
outsider, greatly reducing the probability of a stable cartel being formed if communica-
tion or precommitment is impossible. Where pre-commitment is possible the cartel will
form at its smallest stable size, with the firms able to pre-commit to non-cooperation
being outsiders.
Simultaneous Cartel Formation Games
Selten [1973] was the first to consider the means by which a cooperative equilibrium
in a market might arise from a competitive starting point. Starting with the intuition
that small groups of firms will find coordination easier than larger groups, Selten aims
to find the point at which a group of firms becomes ‘large’ and cooperation becomes
untenable. Within his model, where symmetric firms in a Cournot market with linear
demand and costs simultaneously choose to join a coalition which will set binding output
quotas, complete cartels are certain to be formed in markets with four or fewer firms and
suddenly become very improbable with five or more firms.6 Interestingly, it is the desire
6More precisely, with five firms each firm has a probability of 0.5263 of choosing to join a cartel
(firms play mixed strategies in these cases) leading to a probability of 0.0404 of a complete cartel
being formed and of 0.1817 of a cartel with four members being formed (note that under Cournot
competition such a cartel is stable, see Salant et al. [1983]). With six firms the probability of any
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of each firm to become an outsider when n > 4 which drives this sudden unwillingness
to cooperate. Selten concludes it is credible that similar sudden dividing lines exist even
under relaxed assumptions about the nature of demand, costs and symmetry.
Prokop [1999] considers both simultaneous and sequential games in which firms com-
mit to join a cartel or not. He develops the simultaneous treatment by considering the
case where firms have quadratic costs. Collusion is easier in such a situation because the
sharply increasing costs which accompany increased production both restrict the extent
of chiselling at members’ profits by outsiders and restrict the profits of outsiders. Like
Selton, the probability of cartel formation is certain for low n before dropping suddenly
(the exact figure at which this happens depends on the precise cost and demand functions
used). Unlike Selton, the probability of stable cartel formation decreases slowly with n
after this point. In the numerical example Prokop gives the probability of stable cartel
formation is 1 when n = 5, 0.2936 when n = 6 and 0.1405 when n = 300.
Sequential Cartel Formation Games
Prokop’s sequential move game has players commit to join or not join a cartel in sequence
before price and quotas are decided upon for the cartel which results. The result of this
game is simple given that firms know the decisions of firms who moved before them
and the unique cartel size, k, which is both internally and externally stable. That no
more than k firms will choose to join a cartel is clear from the stability constraints. By
backwards induction, the subgame perfect equilibrium is that the first n− k firms will
choose not to join the cartels and the last k firms will have no choice but to do so if
they wish for a stable cartel to be formed (and all firms do).
This result is mirrored by Bloch [1996] which examines the sequential formation of
coalitions where payoffs to members are dependent on the structure of the coalitions.
Cartels of firms are an examples of such coalitions. In Bloch’s model of sequential
bargaining, firms propose cartels to the other firms in the market in turn and these
propositions are either rejected or accepted. Acceptance of the proposed coalition must
be unanimous among the prospective members, and if a proposition is rejected by a
single prospective member then that member becomes the next proposer. Once the
cartel has been agreed and formed, members are committed to their membership and
stable cartel drops to 0.013. For ten or more firms, the probability is below 0.0001.
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non-members to non-membership. Bloch shows that when firms are identical the size of
the cartel, k, will be the first integer following: (2n+ 3−√4n+ 5)/27.
These models of sequential cartel formation are informative about real life cartels
because they emphasise pre-commitment. A firm which is capable of signalling and
committing to non-participation earlier than other firms stands a greater chance of
becoming an outsider. A firm which enters a market containing a cartel or is for some
other reason excluded from the cartel upon its formation will have the same advantage.
This has implications for many aspects of an outsider’s strategy: they may be unwilling
to communicate with member firms at all, or to acknowledge that the existence of a
cartel benefits them.
1.3.3. Cartel Breakdown
Collusion may stop for a variety of reasons and it is not always clear when cooperation
between firms has ceased, even when the behaviour of firms is more consistent with
cooperation than collusion. Collusion is frequently observed to occur in ‘episodes’
punctuated by periods of higher output and lower prices than would be expected in
collusion. There has been considerable debate on whether these ‘price wars’ should
be regarded as a breakdown in collusion, and therefore each episode of collusion as a
separate cartel within the same industry, or as a continuation of collusion by different
means, so the full span of episodes should be regarded as a single cartel.
Leniency programmes allow firms who are cartel members to avoid punishment by
revealing the existence of the cartel to the authorities. Firms who cooperate extensively
with the authorities during the ensuing investigation are also eligible for fine reductions
but only the first firm to reveal the existence of the cartel receives full immunity from
punishment. The decision of whether to cooperate with the authorities is made after
the discovery of the cartel rather than while the cartel is in progress. Zhou and Ga¨rtner
[2012] note that applications for leniency frequently are made after a cartel has ended.
That a cartel was detected through leniency therefore cannot be taken as an indication
that the cartel was ended because of a leniency claim.
7Note that where n = 4 this expression equals 3.21, meaning the cartel will contain all four firms
in the market, and where n = 5 this expression equals 4. This is mirrors the result of Salant et al.
[1983].
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Some leniency programmes, such as that of the USA and the EU before 2002, exclude
cartel ‘ringleaders’ from leniency programmes, preventing them from receiving such
immunity. Ringleaders are defined as firms which founded cartels or brought other firms
into the cartel. The conduct of such firms is seen as particularly heinous and there are
concerns that the leniency system could be abused by firms, thus causing increased
cartel conduct.
1.3.4. Endogenous Formation with Heterogeneous Firms
Paha [2010] combines many of the concepts discussed above in a single model and
uses a methodology of simulation followed by regression analysis in order to examine
endogenous cartel formation with cost-heterogeneous firms and differentiated products.
The model of cartel formation used assumes that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is
used, with each firm choosing a probability of participation. Paha finds that inefficient
firms chose a higher probability of participation than more efficient firms. While this
may seem contrary to the above results, it is precisely because efficient firms derive
a greater benefit from the cartel that this result is reached. Efficient firms prefer the
cartel to be larger than inefficient firms, who will prefer the fringe if the cartel is
already relatively large. In order to prevent the inefficient firms using a pure strategy of
staying out of the cartel and letting the efficient firms form a cartel of sufficient size to
be profitable for the inefficient firms, the efficient firms will lower their participation
probabilities in order to induce the inefficient firms to play a mixed strategy. This may
be seen as another way of approaching the balanced temptations equilibrium view of
cartel formation described above. It also emphasises the power of pre-commitment to a
strategy in determining the eventual composition of the cartel.
A model in which the size of the cartel varies according to the amenability of the
market to collusion may be found in Bos and Harrington [2015]. The basic model is that
of incomplete collusion among firms which vary by capacity in Bos and Harrington [2010],
discussed in section 1.2.1, with an anti-cartel enforcement policy of varying strength.
Their model finds that as antitrust penalties become stricter, the most inclusive stable
cartel possible becomes smaller. The intuition behind this is simple - antitrust enforce-
ment adds an additional cost to joining a cartel on top of the cost of reducing output.
Since lower capacity firms gain less from joining the cartel than higher-capacity firms,
they are the first to change their membership decision as enforcement becomes stronger.
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This process of a cartel becoming internally unstable until enough of its members leave
the fringe that the cartel once again becomes internally and externally stable provides
the fundamental intuition of ‘marginal firms’-type models of cartel membership, along
with the observation that the order in which firms leave the cartel is strictly determined
by their capacity. If a firm of a given capacity is a cartel member, along firms with
larger capacity will be members. If a firm is not a cartel member, all firms with smaller
capacity will also not be members.
1.4. The Marginal Firms and Balanced Temptations
Approaches
The marginal firms and balanced temptations approaches described above represent
one way to divide the theoretical literature on cartels. The predictions of models
using the two approaches are not necessarily contradictory but they lend themselves
to different ways of considering cartel membership. In models which use the marginal
firms approach the stability of a cartel is constrained only by the firm with the strongest
propensity to deviate. This marginal insider firm will limit the decisions of the cartel,
for example by preventing it from setting too high a price without defecting. In models
which use the balanced temptations equilibrium the cartel is instead constrained by the
incentive compatibility constraints of all members. Decisions such as the cartel price
will be constrained by all firms simultaneously reaching the limits of their incentive
compatibility constraints.
This distinction is a salient one in the context of cartel membership because each
approach focuses on a different source of the cartel membership decision. The marginal
firms approach centres individual firms as making decisions on cartel membership
given the strategy of the cartel, whereas the balanced temptations approach focusses
on the role of the cartel’s allocation of profits in determining the membership of the cartel.
A similar grouping of papers is identified by Correia-da Silva and Pinho [2016]. They
summarise the reasoning underlying the papers which use a marginal firms approach
as ‘the sustainability of the cartel only depends on the behaviour of the firm with the
strongest propensity to deviate.’ They point out that in some circumstances a balanced
temptations equilibrium may only be achieved through the use of side payments. Such
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a scenario is modelled in the paper, where firms are assumed to have heterogeneous
and quadratic cost functions and must transfer profits after members have received the
profit from their outputs in order to achieve balanced temptations.
1.4.1. Combining the Two Approaches
These approaches are not necessarily opposed to one another, nor are their predictions
irreconcilable. It is possible to combine the two approaches, considering the propensity
of each firm in a market to join a cartel individually while assuming that that cartel al-
locates profits between cartel members such that the temptations of each cartel member
to deviate once a member are balanced. This approach is taken by Bos and Harring-
ton [2015] in their model of endogenous cartel formation with capacity-asymmetric firms.
As discussed in section 1.2.5, balanced temptations equilibria imply a specific allo-
cation rule must be followed by a cartel. A model which follows the marginal firms
approach in centring the constraint placed upon the cartel by the firm with the strongest
incentive to deviate may also assume that an allocation rule which implies balanced
temptations will be followed. This is the case in Bos and Harrington [2010], who show
that when firms are allowed to vary by their capacity a proportional allocation rule,
where members’ allocation of cartel output is directly proportional to their capacity, has
the effect of balancing temptations. The paper argues that a rule which has the effect
of balancing temptations will be preferred by members because it will maximise the
joint profits of the cartel. This is because the joint profits of the cartel are maximised
when the output of each cartel member is minimised to the point where its incentive
compatibility constraint just binds. A member’s slack incentive compatibility constraint
represents a further cut in output, and so increase in price, which is possible.
1.5. Empirical Investigations into Membership
1.5.1. Narrative Studies of Individual Cartels
In-depth studies of cartels frequently describe asymmetry and cartel incompleteness
since they are facts of real industries and cartels. Such studies provide a valuable way to
witness the behaviour of colluding firms directly and the narrative form of such studies
means this view is not blinkered by what a theoretical or empirical model may choose
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to focus on. Genesove and Mullin [2001] is among the most influential cartel narrative
studies, examining the American Sugar Institute cartel of 1927 to 1936. Central to the
narrative is how the cartel chose to react to deviations by its members from the cartel
agreement. Suspected cheating was not met with massive retaliation, as some models of
collusion assume, but with cautious communication in order to establish that the activity
was not accidental followed by threats then limited sanctions. Full-scale price wars were
eventually launched in some geographical areas but only when communication between
firms had broken down completely. This willingness to engage in massive retaliation to
combat complete defection from the cartel sustained collusion. This tolerance of minor
deviations and intolerance of defection is an example of the kind of cartel institution
which may allow asymmetric cartels to maintain large memberships.
Wang [2008] and Clark and Houde [2013] both studied retail petrol cartels, focusing
on price leadership as a test of theoretical models of dynamic oligopoly (such as that of
Maskin and Tirole [1988]). The order in which firms are informed of an upcoming price
change and the order in which they must do so is highly informative in understanding
the importance of commitment to cartel membership. It was necessary for low-cost
firms to raise their prices before the high-cost firms would follow and for the ringleader
to focus their efforts on convincing the low-cost firms to participate. High-cost firms
did not need as much persuasion to raise their prices to the cartel level as the low-cost
firms. In the cartel studied by Clark and Houde [2013], a large low-cost firm was able to
be a cartel outsider because it invested heavily in marketing a ‘lowest price guarantee’.
This allowed it to commit credibly to low pricing and to force the cartel firms to take
on the burden of raising their own prices.
Johnsen [1991] describes the unusual and controversial Socony-Vacuum case. Petrol
refiners were accused of buying fuel from retailers and storing it before reselling it to
retailers. The judgement of the Department of Justice at the time, that the purpose
of purchases was to drive up prices, was widely criticised by economists at the time.
Johnsen suggests that the purpose of the purchases was to allow for the reallocation
of cartel rents among members in order to induce cooperation by small firms. For
independent refiners to be willing to join the cartel, major refiners needed to reduce
their output by a larger proportion. However retailers were unwilling to substitute the
branded petrol of the major refiners for the unbranded, possibly lower-quality, petrol of
the independents. It was necessary for major refiners to purchase large quantities of the
independents’ product in order to make this side payment and overcome the participa-
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tion constraints of the independents. The prevalence of this strategy of accommodation
in cartels is discussed in Havell [2011].
The international Vitamins cartels of the 1990s are described in great detail by Connor
[2008], along with the related cartels in Citric Acid and Lysine. Collusion progressed
very differently across different markets despite the similar nature of the products and
the common firms present in each. Some Vitamins markets contained a fringe of Chinese,
Indian and Russian firms which undercut the cartel’s price and resisted all attempts by
the cartel to moderate their output or include them in cartel negotiations. By the time
of the cartels’ discovery, Chinese non-cartel firms produced more than a third of the
global output of Folic Acid, up from less than 3% just two years before. Similarly sharp
increases in fringe production happened in other markets and hampered the ability of
the cartel to raise price in these markets. Part of the reason for the non-participation of
the fringe firms is that their small sizes and ability to rapidly expand capacity made
participation incentive incompatible. However, this does not adequately explain why
when the market price began to crash due to their rapidly expanding production they did
not chose to moderate their output or join the cartel. It is believed that the managers
of the Chinese firms were simply uninterested in colluding.
The actions of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) in the Vitamin B2 market are also
of interest. ADM was a keen cartelist in many markets when they entered into the
B2 market, including being a member of several cartels with firms which were already
present and colluding in the B2 market at the time. ADM refused to participate in the
cartel and was able to seize a very large market share from the incumbent firms, even
when they attempted to launch a coordinated price war against ADM. ADM was an
extremely cost-efficient and high-capacity producer upon their entry and it is likely that
it was more profitable for them to have a high market share in a competitive market
than a low market share in a collusive market, despite their willingness to collude if
profitable.
1.5.2. Statistical Studies of Colluding Firms
In jurisdictions where collusion between firms is legal more detailed and complete data
on cartels is available. Frequently, detailed records of the existence of cartels and
their agreements are kept by government departments. Hyytinen et al. [2011] examine
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such a dataset of cartels registered with the Finnish government between 1951 and
1990. They use this dataset to estimate the rate of cartel formation in uncartelised
industries to be 20%, and the rate of cartel breakdown in cartelised industries to be
10%. Given these figures, and the assumptions underlying the hidden Markov model
they use to estimate them, the proportion of Finnish industries containing cartels was
roughly 90%. That collusion was so pervasive when it was not prohibited indicates
that cartels are incentive-compatible in the vast majority of markets, and that the
sanctions of competition authorities likely play a large role in reducing the number of
cartelised industries where they are illegal. Fink et al. [2015] examine a similar dataset
of registered legal cartels in Austria. Their study focuses on the characteristics of the
agreements formed by these cartels, and is discussed in section 5.2.2.
Asch and Seneca [1975] study a sample of 51 firms convicted of colluding and compare
it to a sample of 50 randomly-chosen non-colluding firms. They observe that colluders
tend to have lower profit rates and lower rates of sales growth, tend to be more diversified,
are more likely to manufacture homogeneous ‘producer’ goods rather than differentiated
‘consumer’ goods, and be situated in more concentrated markets than non-colluding
firms. Interestingly, that a firm operates in a market with very few firms only increases
the likelihood of that firm colluding if the firm’s (and possibly the industry’s) profit rate
is low. Small firms in very concentrated markets are very unlikely to collude, possibly
indicating a tendency for small firms to be cartel outsiders. However, this study is
problematic because it studies firms in isolation rather than whole markets and its
technique of comparing characteristics of firms across very diverse markets is unreliable.
A contemporaneous study is that of Hay and Kelley [1974] into 65 US cartels and
the features of the markets they existed in which economic theory indicates may have
facilitated collusion. They note that in the 32 cartels in their sample which were not
all-inclusive it tended to be the smallest firms which were not members of the cartel.
In some cases these firms were isolated from the other firms in terms of geography or
product characteristics, in others “. . . it might be assumed that they were willing silent
accomplices living under the price umbrella provided by the conspirators.”(pp. 21) Bos
[2009] points out Hay and Kelley provide the CR4 in 14 incomplete cartels for which
they knew the total number of firms in the market. The mean CR4 is 75% and the
mean number of firms 12: this implies a high degree of asymmetry in market shares in
the markets which contained incomplete cartels.
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Posner [1970] also notes that a cartel is likely to comprise the “most important”(pp.
410) firms in an industry because otherwise the colluding firms would not be capable of
raising prices reliably. This is an observation made of his sample of US antitrust cases
since 1890, though he considers this to be a very obvious conclusion.
1.6. Conclusions
The findings of most interest from the literature on asymmetric incomplete cartels are
those which relate to which firms will be cartel members and which outsiders. That
outsiders tend to be smaller firms is well-supported by the empirical literature but it is
difficult to know which firm characteristics in particular are causing this. Theory sheds
more light on this, suggesting that the reason that smaller firms become cartel outsiders
because they have high costs or low capacities, meaning that they are able to commit
to non-membership better than other firms in the market. That firms with low discount
rates are likely to become outsiders provides an account of how maverick firms which
otherwise would become cartel members can still commit to non-participation. Despite
this it should be emphasised that market structures with low-cost or high-capacity cartel
outsiders may be stable, even without these firms having any ‘maverick’ characteristics.
Such membership structures may result from firms entering the market after the cartel’s
formation, the characteristics of the firms changing after formation, or the outsider
simply not joining the cartel on formation by chance.
This review has identified two broad theoretical approaches to modelling the mem-
bership decisions of firms and cartels. While these two approaches are not mutually
exclusive, in that some papers apply a balanced temptation equilibrium to a model
where firms have consistent preferences on collusion which determine their membership,
this distinction is useful in considering questions of cartel membership. Marginal firms
models see the individual firms which choose whether to join the cartel as the primary
determinant of the eventual size of the cartel, whereas balanced temptations models see
the cartels’ collective decision on allocation between members as the primary determi-
nant. It is in changes to membership where the predictions of the approaches can be
seen to diverge. Marginal firms models indicate that a firm’s preference for collusion is
due to its characteristics and that these characteristics are consistent over time. Given
this, if the market changes and the stable cartel becomes smaller then the identity of
the firm which defects from the agreement and joins the fringe will be the member firm
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with the least preference for collusion. The balanced temptations approach predicts
that the cartel will choose its allocation rule to make all members equally marginal
about their membership, meaning the identity of the defector will be random. Chapter
3 is dedicated to testing these predictions empirically.
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E.C. Cartel Decisions 2001-2011
The empirics in the three substantive chapters of this thesis are based on the cartel
decisions made by the European Commission between 2001 and 2011. This totals 91
cartels and 478 firms1. This chapter presents summary statistics on these cartels and
firms, details on how the dataset was compiled and limitations which the nature of the
data put upon their analysis.
Data on the duration of each firm’s involvement with the cartels and their entry
and exit behaviour is novel and receives specific attention because of this, and because
analysis of this behaviour is an objective of two of the substantive chapters of this thesis.
Section 2.1 details the process of gathering each variable. Section 2.1.1 discusses
problems encountered with the data and the limitations they put on the use of the
data. Section 2.2 presents descriptive statistics about the durations of cartels and firms’
involvement in them. Section 2.3 presents the structural characteristics of the cartels
and the firms within them. Characteristics of those firms which entered their cartels
late and exited their cartels early are discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5.
2.1. Source of Data
Information about cartels and firms was obtained from decisions and summary decisions
published in the Official Journal of the E.U. Appendix A provides a list of all cartels
studied and their references. In some cases a single decision relates to multiple cartels
which are treated separately in the analysis. Examples of this include the twelve Vita-
mins cartels, the separate cartels in the production and processing of Italian and Spanish
1Some firms have been members of multiple cartels during the time period. This figure counts recidivists
once for each cartel they were involved in.
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tobacco and the three Elevators and Escalators cartels covering different geographical
markets.
This section will describe the nature of the information available from decision docu-
ments published by the European Commission and how it was turned into the dataset
used for this thesis.
Duration, Entry and Exit
This dataset is unique — to the best of my knowledge — in containing data on the
dates of participation of individual firms in cartels fined by the European Commission.
Because the fines given to cartelists are based on the exact proven duration of a firms
participation in a cartel the published decisions provide the exact dates when each
member firm began colluding and ceased colluding. These dates are supported by
documentary evidence of cartel meetings and other contact between member firms.
The dataset of legal cartels in Austria from 1973 until 2002 gathered by Fink et al.
[2014] also describes changes in the composition of the cartels over time. The legal
system governing cartels during the sample period required cartels to submit their
agreements to a central registry. If these agreements required updating as a result of
firm entry or exit, then the membership change is noted in the dataset. The authors
give the caveat that they observe only the number of cartel members in the old and
new agreements rather than the identities of the firms, so if entry and exit happened
simultaneously then this will not be noted. The data gathered on firm entry and exit is
not analysed in the accompanying paper Fink et al. [2015], which focusses on collusive
technologies used by the cartels.
Because of how central it is to the E.C.’s fining process, duration of participation and
dates of entry and exit are available for every firm and cartel in the sample.
Cartel Share
The primary source of information on each firms’ share of the cartel’s output is the
figures on turnover used by the E.C. in calculating fines. The exact figures are redacted
from publicly published decisions because of the commercially sensitive nature of the
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information and ranges are reported instead. The midpoint of these ranges is used
in calculating each firms’ share of total cartel output. Where such information is not
provided or reacted to such an extent that it is unusable, data on cartel and market
share is missing.
In 16 cartels data on each firms’ share of cartel output is unavailable. These cartels
are marked by an asterisk ∗ in the list of cartels in Appendix A.
Cartel Coverage
Cartel coverage is reported inconsistently in decision documents. It is sometimes simply
given as a part of the decision’s narrative description of the cartel. Occasionally, the
size of the market is given and the cartel’s coverage may be calculated by adding up
the turnovers of the cartel’s members and dividing.
Coverage data is unavailable for 20 cartels in the sample. These cartels are marked
by a dagger † in the list of cartels in Appendix A. Cartels for which turnover data are
unavailable are more common in recent decisions. A systematic reason for this reporting
practice is not obvious but it could be connected to the adoption of the settlement
process for cartels. The settlement process, described in Stephan [2009], was adopted
in 2008 and was first used against the DRAM cartel in 2010. Laina and Bogdanov
[2014] describe how in 2013-2014 over half of cartel decisions used the settlement process.
Geographical Scope
The countries affected by the cartels are carefully listed by the published decisions. The
European Commission concerns itself primarily with cartels spanning multiple European
countries but does sanction some agreements which are confined to a single country.
This may be because the country lacks a competition authority of its own (for example,
Luxembourg and its cartel among brewers), where national subsets of a wider agreement
are considered separately (as in the Elevators and Escalators cartels), or when national
competition authorities are not willing to pursue a case (as in the French Beef cartel,
where the French minister for agriculture was an initiator of the agreement).
The cartels have been divided into four categories of geographical scope:
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Global cartels affecting the entire world or multiple major economics other than the
European Union;
Europe-wide cartels affecting all or almost all European countries;
Regional cartels affecting a group of European countries such as Scandinavia or Eastern
Europe; and
National cartels affecting an individual European country.
Agreement Types and Collusive Technologies
The types of conduct which cartels engaged in is central to their punishment and are
well-documented in the published decisions. These activities may be divided into those
directly used to raise firm profits and those used to maintain the agreement.
The collusive technologies used to coordinate behaviour in order to raise firm profits
I term ‘agreement types’ and are analysed in detail in chapter 5. The decisions are
consistent in their categorising of types of conduct and I follow them in identifying five
types of agreement:
Price fixing where a price is set below which member firms may not charge;
Bid Rigging where the firms manipulate the results of an auction;
Customer Allocation where firms agree to sell to particular customers and not to
others;
Territorial Allocation where firms agree to confine their activities to set geographical
locations; and
Quota Allocation where firms are set fixed limits for the quantities of goods they can
sell.
Cartels may use multiple agreement types simultaneously. Detailed descriptive statis-
tics on the use of agreement types in combination are discussed in chapter 5.
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2.1.1. Limitations of Data
Duration
It is possible that cartels in fact began before the start of the offence stated by the
E.C.; De [2010a] notes that in 20 of the E.C. decisions she analysed (approximated
a fifth of her sample) the E.C. noted that they suspected a duration of 2.5 times the
prosecuted duration. This is problematic for the analysis of duration since the duration
of some cartels will be underestimated. However the E.C. needs to be convinced of a
firms’ non-attendance at meetings or lack of compliance with a cartel agreement to a
high standard of certainty in order to acknowledge that a cartelist was not following a
collusive agreement, meaning the data of late entry and early exit by firms are reliable.
Also, the leniency programme of the E.C. gives a strong incentive to firms to reveal the
true duration of the cartel: firms are not fined for any stretches of collusion which they
reveal to the authorities and firm which extend the provable duration of a cartel are
eligible for a fine reduction of between 50% and 70%.
This issue has been noted by many users of cartel duration data. Abrantes-Metz
et al. [2013] compare the reported durations of the same international cartels in different
jurisdictions. They note that the competition authorities of the USA and European
Union tend to report the longest durations and earliest start dates for cartels compared
to the competition authorities of developing countries. That the competition authorities
of wealthier jurisdictions are likely to have greater investigative resources and be able
to use a higher quality of evidence is suggested as the reason for this.
The approach of some authors is to make clear that their reported durations represent
lower bounds on the total duration of collusion. Combe et al. [2008] take this approach,
noting that colluding firms have an incentive to reduce the proven duration of the cartel
in order to limit the fines they receive.
Bryant and Eckard [1991] point out this problem in their sample of illegal US cartels.
The source documents in some cases state that a cartel has operated since ‘at least’ a
given date. Their data also suffers from a lack of accuracy with the beginning dates of
some cartels, with only the month, season or year of establishment being recorded in
some cases. The authors deal with the latter problem by calculating two durations for
each cartel, equal to the maximum and minimum durations possible for each cartel based
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on the information available2. This technique depends on treating the information on
cartel starting dates as accurate. The authors note this and caveat that their duration
estimates should be regarded as lower bounds, though they do not attempt to correct
for this problem in their analysis.
Zimmerman and Connor [2005] also note the problem, though contrary to others
claim that competition authorities choose to overstate durations most frequently, rather
than understate it. They cite Dick [1996] as evidence of this. Dick claims that when
competition authorities do not have evidence of collusion for a period of time they will
assume that collusion continued unabated. He argues that his own dataset of legal
cartels is not susceptible to this issue.
Another possible reason to suspect that duration is overestimated is noted by Lev-
enstein and Suslow [2006b]. They point out that some cartels are believed to have
had no noticeable effect on prices for some of their duration. These periods of cartel
ineffectiveness could occur immediately after the formal establishment of the cartel,
immediately before its measured breakdown, or represent a hiatus in collusion. In the
European Union, cartels are treated as a ‘single continuous infringement’, meaning
that cartels are treated as lasting from the time of their first meeting until their break-
down or discovery. Joshua [2009] criticises the EC for treating cartels as having the
longest duration provable on this basis, despite the gaps in collusion which may exist.
If periods of cartel ineffectiveness should not considered part of their duration, or if
multiple episodes of collusion should be considered separate cartels for the purposes of
measuring duration, then the measured durations of the EC may be argued to be too long.
While these issues with data on cartel duration are widely noted, no author has
attempted to account for this uncertainty in their empirical modelling.
Entry and Exit
While the duration of each firms’ participation in the cartel is documented to the day
as described above, what an ‘entry’ or ‘exit’ represents is potentially problematic. A
merger in the industry may mean that a given firm’s participation in the cartel is listed
as having ended at a specific date when in fact all of that firm’s assets in the market now
2For example, if a cartel is noted as beginning in 1973 then one measure will treat it as beginning on 1
January 1973 and the other measure as beginning on 31 December 1973.
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belong to another firm whose participation in the cartel continues. The criteria used
for dealing with this problem is that a cartel entry or exit should represent a strategic
decision on the part of that firm to begin or cease collusion. Detailed descriptions
of the contact between the cartel members are given by many of the published deci-
sions and these were examined to ensure that the entries and exits observed were genuine.
Additional research in corporate websites and histories was useful in establishing
when a firm’s legal exit or entry constituted an actual strategic decision rather than
representing a merger, change of name or divestiture. The focus of the analysis is firms’
decisions of entry and exit into and from cartels so in such cases care was taken to
ensure that each incident of entry or exit represents a strategic decision by the firm,
rather than being an artefact of a change in name or ownership.
Market Share
Due to limitations on the availability of market share data it is necessary to exclude
some cartels for which this information cannot be found from model specifications where
these variables are used and to amalgamate certain groups of cartels which involve
a common set of firms and the same set of agreements.3 These amalgamated cartels
represent cartels which the E.C. sanctioned in single decision documents and so reported
turnovers for the groups of cartels.
The data on shares give a static snapshot of the size of each firms market share at a
given point of time. The actual shares of firms likely fluctuated over time though the
figures used were taken as representative by the E.C. when they were calculating fines
for the firms. The most common approach is to use the firms’ turnovers in the relevant
market for the last full year of the infringement. Sometimes, the total turnovers of the
cartels members in the cartelised market are summed over the duration of the cartel.
The 1998 Fining Guidelines4 specify only that the ‘best available figures’ (paragraph
16, 1998) should be used for calculating the basic amount of the fine. The 2006 Fining
Guidelines do not update this point.
3These amalgamations are of the Hard Haberdashery cartels, the Isostatic and Extruded Speciality
Graphite cartels, the Elevators and Escalators Cartels, and the Industrial and Automotive Thread
Cartels
4Readable online at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/fines.html
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Size of Fringe
Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with the movement of firms between the fringe of
non-members and the cartel. While the entry and exit of firms to and from the cartels
is observable, the entry and exit of firms to and from the market is not. The size of the
cartel fringe at any given time is not reported by the European Commission. Outsider
firms are very occasionally mentioned in published decisions, for example when they
are targeted for coordinated exclusion by the cartel, but not consistently enough to be
useful in analysis.
This is also a problem when interpreting firms’ actions. If a firm were to fail —
perhaps due to factors unrelated to the cartelised market — and leave the market then
the published decision would consider the duration of that firm’s participation in the
cartel over. This appears identical to a firm deciding to defect from the cartel to the
fringe. Information on whether an exit is to the fringe or out of the market entirely is
not consistently available from the decisions and could not be ascertained from external
sources.
Sample Selection Bias
A problem associated with all empirical studies of cartels is that the sample is limited
to cartels which were detected by the authorities. Detected cartels may well be system-
atically different in their characteristics to undetected cartels, meaning that the findings
of studies which use datasets of detected cartels may not be generalisable to all cartels.
Ormosi [2014] estimates that 10% to 20% of active European cartels are discovered by
the European Commission each year.
The cartels which are under-represented in the sample are likely to be those which
are the most successful at avoiding detection. There is no way of telling which types of
cartels these might be.
Market Definition
This dataset follows the market definitions adopted by the EC in their decisions. These
market definitions could be flawed, either in geographical or product terms. For example,
a cartel may be seen to control only a fraction of the European market for a product,
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Table 2.1.: Cartel and firm involvement duration in days
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Cartel duration 91 8 yrs 5.9 yrs 6.5 yrs 0 34.9 yrs
Firm duration 478 7.5 yrs 5.9 yrs 5.6 yrs 0 34.9 yrs
Late Entrants 478 0.28 0 0.45 0 1
Early Exiters 478 0.2 0 0.4 0 1
Table 2.2.: Industry type of cartels
Industry Frequency
Chemicals 37
Food and agriculture 11
Manufacturing 30
Metals 7
Other 6
but may in fact control a group of countries completely. Similarly, a cartel may appear
to control a small proportion of the output of a certain product category, but in fact
may control entirely a narrower set of products. Taken to an extreme, it could be argued
that the incomplete cartels identified in this dataset and in other empirical literature in
fact represent cases where the market has been defined too widely and the identified
cartels are in fact complete.
That firms leave and join cartels while still producing the same products and being
active in the same geographical areas as when they were cartel members suggest that
incomplete cartels do indeed exist, however. That many of the incomplete cartels
produced homogeneous products, for example in the chemical and pharmaceutical
industries, shows that incompleteness is possible in cases where there is little possibility
of the product market being defined too broadly.
2.2. Cartel and Firm Duration
Table 2.1 gives data on the durations of the cartels in the sample and the durations of
the firms’ participation in those cartels. Cartels lasted for a mean of 8 years, with the
longest-lasting cartel enduring for 35 years. The longest-lasting cartel was the Animal
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Feed Phosphates cartel, founded in March 1969 and ended by the E.C. in February
2004. The participants in the French Beer cartel were fined by the E.C. before their
agreement could be implemented, meaning the duration of the cartel was zero.
Mean firm duration is 7.5 years. This is necessarily lower than the mean cartel dura-
tion since the duration of a firm’s involvement in a cartel cannot exceed the duration of
that cartel, but will be less if the firm is an late entrant or early exiter.
133 firms entered the cartels they were members of after the founding of the cartel
and 97 firms left the cartels they were members of before the end of the cartel. 186
firms, 39% of the total, either entered late or exited early. Characteristics of these firms
are presented in sections 2.4 and 2.5.
Table 2.2 lists the industrial sectors which the cartels occurred in. Particularly notable
is the large number of cartels in the chemicals sector. A large number of such cartels
were detected in the Vitamins industry (which accounts for 14 of the chemicals cartels)
and other chemicals industries which the same firms were active in. The industries of
the cartels included in ‘Other’ are finance, energy, auction services, foreign exchange,
removals services, and airlines. The apparent overrepresentation of certain industries
could represent a real phenomena, where those industries with many detected cartels
have more collusion than those industries which are less represented, due to those
industries tending to be structurally amenable to collusion, or through a spate of cartels
spreading through markets in an industry through contagion. Alternately, it could
represent a bias in the sample due to programmes such as the USA’s Amnesty Plus,
or particular attention paid by regulators to industries with recently detected cartels,
leading to cartels being detected in groups within the same industry.
2.3. Structural characteristics of cartels and firms
Table 2.3 gives data on structural characteristics of the firms. Share data is only available
for 75 of the cartels (comprising 379 firms) and coverage data is available for 75 cartels.
The share quoted is each member’s share of the total cartel output.
Cartels tend to have between 3 and 6 members. Very large cartels are rare. Six
cartels have more than ten members, and the largest cartels are Bathroom Fittings and
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Table 2.3.: Structural characteristics of cartels and firms
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
For firms:
Cartel share 379 0.2 0.15 .17 .915 0.0022
For cartels:
Number of members 91 5.3 4 3.2 2 17
Coverage 71 0.86 0.9 0.15 .15 .39
Range of cartel shares 75 0.32 0.31 0.15 0.83 0
Cartel HHI 75 0.37 0.31 0.14 0.84 0.076
Figure 2.1.: Duration of cartels
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Figure 2.2.: Duration of firms’ participation in cartels
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Table 2.4.: Geographical scopes of cartels
Geographical scope Frequency
Global 30
Europe-wide 31
Regional 10
National 20
Fixtures and Prestressing Steel, both with 17 members.
Cartel coverage is high, with 16 cartels have complete coverage of their markets. The
lowest cartel coverage in the sample is the German Bank Exchange Rates cartel, which
controlled only 39% of its market.
The concentration of cartels is moderately high, with a mean Herfindahl Index of 0.37.
Note that because many cartels are incomplete the HHI of the cartel is an upper bound
on the HHI of the market containing the cartel. The European Commission’s Merger
Guidelines (2004) define a threshold at an HHI of 0.2 above which they consider a
market to be highly concentrated. Only 10 of the 75 cartels with known HHIs (13%) had
an HHI of less than 0.2, indicating that cartels tend to occur in relatively concentrated
markets.
2.3.1. Organisational features of cartels
Table 2.4 shows the distribution of cartels across geographical scopes. Global and
Europe-wide cartels are most abundant in the sample but smaller cartels make up a
substantial amount of the dataset. The 20 national cartels are particularly worth noting
because of the relatively strange nature of these cartel compared to the international
cartels which led the European Commission to sanction them.
Table 2.5 shows the frequency of use of different agreement types. Note that 64 out
of 91 cartels (70%) used multiple agreement types. Price fixing is present in the vast
majority of cartel agreements. Bid rigging and especially territorial allocation are far
less common in this sample of detected cartels.
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Table 2.5.: Agreement types used by cartels
Agreement type Frequency
Price fixing 78
Bid rigging 19
Customer allocation 35
Territorial allocation 14
Quota allocation 33
Table 2.6.: Characteristics of late entrant firms
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Lateness of entry 133 5 yrs 2.6 yrs 5.5 yrs 7 days 24.6 yrs
Firm duration 133 6.2 yrs 5.6 yrs 4 yrs 95 days 24 yrs
Cartel share 94 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.0022 0.4
Early exiters 133 0.33 0 0.47 0 1
2.4. Characteristics of late entrant firms
Table 2.6 shows statistics about the 133 firms which joined cartels which were already
active. The mean lateness of entry is five years and the mean duration of collusion for
a firm which entered a cartel late is lower than the mean duration of all firms. Late
entrants tend to be small, with a mean cartel share of 9%, and a third of them end up
exiting a cartel early.
Table 2.7.: Characteristics of early exiter firms
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Earliness of exit 97 387 days 257 days 405 days 1 4.6 yrs
Firm duration 97 7.9 yrs 8.1 yrs 5.4 yrs 95 days 34.7 yrs
Cartel share 76 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.0022 0.5
Late entrants 97 0.45 0 0.5 0 1
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Figure 2.3.: Lateness of entry for late entrants
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Figure 2.4.: Earliness of exit for early exiters
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2.5. Characteristics of early exiter firms
Table 2.7 shows statistics about the 97 firms which left cartels without the cartel
breaking down. Mean earliness of exit is only 387 days, with many firms leaving only
weeks before the end of a cartel. Early exiters are also relatively small, with an average
cartel share of 12%. 45% of early exiters had entered the cartel after its start.
2.6. Conclusion
The first stylised fact which may be drawn from the sample is that entry and exit to and
from cartels by firms is relatively common. 39% of all firms in the sample were not in
their cartels for that cartel’s full duration. 57% of all cartels in the sample experienced
one of its member firms joining late or leaving early. That the phenomenons of cartel
entry and exit are so common and yet do not play a significant part in other empirical
research into cartels is notable. That entry and exit is prevalent also indicates that many
cartels do indeed cover only a proportion of firms in their markets and that observed
incompleteness is not a result of mistaken market definition: a firm which has been a
member of a cartel is certainly a part of the same market as the cartel.
Care should be taken in applying conclusions drawn from this sample to other groups
of cartels, but the cartels in this sample are not dissimilar in duration to samples of
cartels used in other research. De [2010a] reviews the literature on cartel duration and
reviews several samples used in cartel research. Mean duration of cartels is found to be
6.3 years in the sample of international cartels discovered between 1990 and 2004 used
by Zimmerman and Connor [2005], 7.5 years in the varied sample of cartels used by
Levenstein and Suslow [2006b], 7.5 years in the sample of American cartels discovered
between 1890 and 1969 used by Posner [1970], and 7.6 years in the sample of European
cartel between 1969 and 2007 (which partially overlaps with my own sample but over a
longer time span) used by Combe et al. [2008]. The average duration of 8 years in this
sample is similar in size to these other, very varied, samples indicating that my sample
is not unusual in this respect.
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Chapter 3.
Predicting the Exit of Marginal Firms from
Cartels
The existence and prevalence of incomplete cartels are well-understood theoretically and
well-documented empirically. A question this prompts is which firms in a market will
be members of the cartel and which firms ‘outsiders.’ Theoretical models of collusive
markets with heterogeneous firms, discussed in Chapter 1, address this question. Those
models in the ‘marginal firms’ paradigm hold that firms with high capacity, low marginal
costs and high discount factors will be members of the cartel and those firms with low
capacity, high marginal cost and impatient firms will choose to be outsiders. These mod-
els share a basic paradigm about cartel behaviour which sees firms leaving and joining
cartels in order of their individual preferences for collusion. This contrasts with a popular
game-theoretic approach to modelling cartels where the cartel chooses an agreement
such that the temptations of each firm to defect from the cartel agreements are balanced.
These two models of collusion see cartels as functioning in very different ways, and
the choice of which approach to use in creating a theoretical model of collusion is largely
arbitrary on the part of the author. The marginal firms model suggests firms join the
cartel sequentially and that the cartel follows an allocation rule where the allocation of
output within the cartel follows a similar ranking to the allocation of output which would
exist if the market were competitive. The balanced temptations model, however, sees
cartels as using their allocation rule to minimise the probability of any firm defecting
from the cartel by equalising the critical discount factor of all firms.
If the balanced temptations model is correct, then any defections from cartel agree-
ments must be unpredictable, otherwise the cartel did not equalise the temptations
of members to defect. If defection is predictable then cartels must follow some other rule.
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Testing whether a firm’s late entry predicts its early exit from its cartel tests the most
general form of the marginal firms model. If firms which join cartels after they start
are more likely to defect later then this indicates that some latent variable is driving
the firms’ preference for collusion, and that this preference is persistent over time. No
claim may be made about what this latent variable may be from this simple test since
only the behaviour of the firms with respect to their membership decision is considered,
rather than their characteristics.
The introduction of market shares to the model specification sheds a little more light
onto the mechanisms involved. Market share is again a consequence of the cartels’ own
decisions and of the firms’ behaviour within the cartel and cannot directly be taken to
infer directly any attribute of a firm, such as its discount rate, capacity or marginal
cost. However, if firms with large market shares are tending to defect then this would
indicate that the cartel is practising a policy of accommodation in order to convince
firms to join who would not under other circumstances, but not to a sufficient extent
that temptations become balanced. If firms with smaller market shares tend to defect
then that would indicate that allocation rules where cartel shares are proportional to
competitive shares are being followed.
This chapter analyses a group of 478 firms who were members of 91 cartels fined by
the European Commission between 2001 and 2011. Data on the dates on which colluding
firms left and joined the agreements are available and analysed in all 91 cartels, data on
colluding firms’ share of cartel output are available and analysed in 75 cartels. This is
the dataset described in Chapter 2. Probit models predicting exit and entry from cartels
are estimated and matrices showing the order of entry and exit in cartels are constructed.
The marginal firms and balanced temptations approaches are expressed in a form
which is tractable for empirical modelling in section 3.1. The determinants of firm early
exit are analysed in section 3.2, using descriptive statistics in section 3.2.2 and using
probit analysis in section 3.2.3. Determinants of late entry by firms are examined in
section 3.2.5. The order of entry, exit and firm size are presented in matrix form in
section 3.2.6 as a complement to the other analysis performed. Section 3.3 concludes
and considers the policy implications of the findings.
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3.1. Models of Cartel Membership
A firm’s cartel membership decision may be modelled as a binary choice by firms: to
be a cartel member or non-member. Theoretical models of cartel membership assume
that the individual firm will choose whichever option maximises their future discounted
profit stream given the present size of the cartel and the structure of the market. Should
the individual circumstances of the firm or the characteristics of the market change over
time, the firm may have cause to switch their membership decision.
The theory of binary choice is outlined in Greene [2011] and is frequently applied
to models of consumer behaviour where consumers assess the utility of a consumption
choice, switching to an alternative product should it offer greater utility. The intuition
of a binary choice model of cartel membership is similar to that of D’Aspremont et al.
[1983], with firms choosing cartel membership or non-membership on the basis of which
offers higher profits.
When a cartel j exists in a market, a firm i knows its discounted profit stream
associated with being a cartel member, picij , and with being an outsider to the cartel,
pinij . These profit streams are determined by a set of explanatory variables specific to
the individual firm such as their cost and capacity, xi, according to a set of coefficients
on these variables, β; a set of explanatory variables common to all firms in the cartel
and market such as the nature of the industry and geographical scope of the cartel, z,
according to a set of coefficients on these variables, γ; and a random error term, ij ,
reflecting idiosyncratic shocks affecting a firms’ wish to participate in a particular cartel.
The characteristics of the cartel and both vectors of coefficients are allowed to change
depending on whether the firm is a member or non-member of the cartel.
picij = β
cxi + γ
czcj + 
c
ij (3.1)
pinij = β
nxi + γ
nznj + 
n
ij (3.2)
A firm will choose to be a cartel member if its expected profits from being a cartel
member are greater than those from being an outsider, taking into account the effect of
its own membership decision on the profitability of the cartel1. Similarly, a firm will
1The membership structure of the cartel is a variable specific to the market, rather than the firm, and
so is included in z
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choose to be a non-member if its net profit from membership is negative.
Net profit from membershipij = pi
c
ij − pinij (3.3)
Given this, a member firm’s probability of exiting the cartel is:
Pr(Firm exiti) = Pr(pi
n
ij > pi
c
ij) (3.4)
A non-member firm’s probability of entering the cartel is:
Pr(Firm entryi) = Pr(pi
c
ij > pi
n
ij) (3.5)
Substituting the (3.1) and (3.2) equations into (3.4):
Pr(Firm exiti) = Pr(β
cxi + γ
czcj + 
c
ij > β
nxi + γ
nznj + 
n
ij) (3.6)
= Pr((βc − βn)xi + γczj − γnznj + cij − nij > 0)
= Pr(β∗xi + γ∗z∗j + 
∗
ij > 0) (3.7)
Where the vector of coefficients γ∗ represents the vectors γc and −γn appended,
and the matrix of variables z∗j represents the variables γ
c
j and γ
n
j appended. The
vector of coefficients β∗ represents the net effect of the βc and βn coefficients on the xi
firm-specific variables, βc − βn.
And substituting (3.1) and (3.2) equations into (3.5):
Pr(Firm entryi) = Pr(β
nxi + γ
nznj + 
n
ij > β
cxi + γ
czcj + 
c
ij) (3.8)
= Pr((βn − βc)xi + γnznj − γczcj + nij − cij > 0)
= Pr(β†xi + γ†z
†
j + 
†
ij > 0) (3.9)
Where the variables denoted by † similarly represent appended vectors of coefficients
and matrices of variables: γ† represents γn and −γc appended, z†j represents zn and zc
appended, and β† the net effect of βn and βc on xi.
This process may be modelled empirically as a probit model, as I do in section 3.2.3.
The two views of firm entry and exit which I have identified may be considered in terms
of binary choices.
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3.1.1. Marginal Firms and Binary Choice
The literature review chapter argued that theoretical models of incomplete cartels could
be categorised into two broad approaches: marginal firms and balanced temptations.
If the distinction between these classes of models is to be investigated empirically, it
is useful to write down a broad version of each of those so the theoretical version may
be operationalised into a model to which data may be fitted. Broadly, I characterise
the marginal firms models as claiming that the behaviour of firms may be predicted
through covariates reflecting their characteristics and the balanced temptations models
as claiming that the behaviour of firms appears non-determinated.
According to marginal firms models, there will be a member firm which is closest to
exiting the cartel and an outsider firm (if the cartel is incomplete) which is closest to
joining the cartel. Any entry or exit to or from the cartel will involve one of these two
firms.. These two firms may be called the ‘marginal firms’. Entry could be prompted by
a change in market demand or in the circumstances of any of the firms in the market
which makes being an outsider more appealing to the insider marginal firm or cartel
membership more appealing to the outsider marginal firm.
This proposition, that entry must come from the largest outsider firm which will
then become the smallest insider and is most likely to be involved in any subsequent
exit, is testable. If this is the case, a firm’s entry into a cartel after the formation
of that cartel should be a good predictor of its exit before the cartel’s demise. This
relationship need not be perfect since firms’ circumstances and preferences may change
during their membership and because many cartels either lack entry or lack exit. The
number of firms in a market will also play a role in determining the possibility and
extent of entry and exit. Whether or not the behaviour of firms is consistent with this
theory is investigated in Section 3.2.
3.1.2. Balanced Temptations and Binary Choice
An alternative group of models of cartels sees them adjusting the allocation profits
among firms in order to ensure that all firms have an equal incentive to defect from
the agreement. Friedman [1971] suggests this as a possible non-cooperative equilibrium
in repeated games and Friedman [1983] applies it to the case of a cartel, suggesting
it as a point on the profit frontier which could be arrived at by firms with a min-
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imum of communication. In supergame models this involves equalising the critical
discount rate among all member firms. In the binary choice framework outlined above,
firms’ discount rates are included in the terms representing discounted future profit flows.
In the binary choice framework I have outlined balanced temptation models do not
make any specific claims about the pattern of entry. A firm’s decision to join a cartel
could be determined by a set of covariates similar or identical to those in a marginal firms
model of entry. It is therefore impossible to falsify either model using the probability of
cartel entry as a test. For the probability of cartel exit, however, balanced temptations
models do make a prediction: that the allocation within the cartel be such that all firms
have equal incentive to leave and become an outsider. This prediction is testable using
the data on cartel membership in European Commission-sanctioned cartels 2001-2011.
3.2. Analysis
The theory of marginal firms outlined above suggests that the most recent firm to
join a cartel will be the first to leave it, excepting when changes in costs, capacity
discount rates or other firm characteristics cause a different firm to be the most marginal
about participation. It also indicates that cartels with more member firms are likely to
experience more entry and exit.
The predictions of models of cost and capacity asymmetry are not directly testable,
since these attributes are not directly observed. Firms’ shares of cartel output are
observed for many cartels but these could reflect many attributes of the firms involved.
More importantly, they could also represent the allocation rule chosen by the cartel.
3.2.1. Predicting Firms’ Early Exit
That a firm entered late should be a strong indicator that it has a relatively weak
preference for collusion and so is likely to leave the cartel. It is a very direct observation
of a firm’s conduct and so is unlike the other variables, which relate to the conduct of the
cartel as a whole and the structure of the marketplace. If late entry is a strong predictor
of early exit then this is a confirmation of the most general form of the marginal firms
hypothesis: that firms’ preferences for collusion determine cartel membership and are
56
Predicting the Exit of Marginal Firms from Cartels
persistent over time.
The theory of incomplete collusion among asymmetric firms discussed in Section 1.2
suggests that markets may only contain outsiders where firms are sufficiently numerous.
Markets with greater numbers of firms are better able to support both a cartel and a
fringe. If the number of firms in the market is too few then it may not be possible for
both a cartel which is profitable for all of its members and one or more fringe firms to
coexist — in the simple, symmetric Cournot model this boundary is at five firms in the
market. The balanced temptations and marginal firms models do not differ in their
predictions of the effects of cartel size on the entry and exit of firms to and from cartels.
The theories of incomplete collusion predict that firms with higher costs or lower
capacities will be less inclined to join a cartel but the links between these attributes
and market shares are not firm. In a competitive market, firms with higher costs and
lower capacities will tend to have lower market shares and cartel allocation rules are
commonly assumed to reflect competitive market shares. Firms’ share of cartel output
is used rather than their market shares because of the limited data on cartel coverage.
Whether this variable is able to predict entry or exit should be considered a test of a
more specific form of the marginal firms hypothesis: that firms’ preferences for collusion
are based on economic, profit-maximising concerns.
The role of cartel coverage in predicting exit is clear: a cartel must be less than
all-inclusive in order to support a fringe. However, coverage data is not available for all
cartels, and there is a possible endogeneity problem associated with the variable. The
possible endogeneity problem is that the cartel may have incomplete coverage because
of the exit of the firm under observation. A cartel which already supports a fringe is
less likely to require the participation of all firms
The relationship between a firm receiving full leniency from punishment by the Euro-
pean Commission and early exit is unclear. It is a legal requirement that firms cease
collusion immediately following a leniency application to the Commission. This raises
the uncomfortable possibility that leniency-claiming firms classified as early exiters may
be identical in their behaviour to other firms besides the fact of the leniency claim.
The geographical scope of the cartel and the broad industrial sector in which the
cartel operated may affect the tendency of firms to leave and join cartels. Theory
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makes no predictions as to the direction of strength of such effects. Still, there may be
systematic differences in the characteristics of a group of cartels which spans different
industries and geographical scopes which may affect their structural strength or the
behaviour of the member firms.
3.2.2. Descriptive Overview
While general descriptive statistics for the sample of cartels and firms were given in
Chapter 3, it is useful to address some of the points listed above by directly questioning
the data.
The mean size of a cartel with static membership is 3.3 firms. The mean size of a
cartel with membership which is at all variable is 6.9 firms. The smallest cartel to
experience a change in membership during its lifespan has 3 members (the largest, 17
members). The largest cartel to have a static membership has 8 members (the smallest,
2 members). These figures differ from those given in Table 3.1 because the figures given
in the table are the sizes of the cartels of which the firms are members, meaning larger
cartels are overrepresented.
Firms which enter cartels late or leave them early are, on average, smaller than firms
which do not. The mean cartel share of a late entrant is 8.8% and mean cartel share for
an early exiter is 12%, compared to a mean of 24.3% for firms which are members of
cartels for their full duration.
44 firms both entered their cartels late and exited them early. The Spearman correla-
tion coefficient between them is 0.1975, a positive and significant correlation.
The variability of membership stasis found in different industries and levels of ge-
ographical scope is not consistent with any particular account. The manufacturing
sector has a notably high amount of cartels with varying membership, with 22 out of 30
cartels experiencing a change in membership. Europe-wide cartels also experience a lot
of membership variability: 22 out of 31 have variable membership.
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Table 3.1.: Descriptive statistics for firms
All firms Static firms Late entrants Early exiters
Mean size of firm’s cartel 7.2 5.9 9.9 8.4
Median size of firm’s cartel 6 5 9 8
Mean cartel share 0.2 0.24 0.09 0.12
Median cartel share 0.15 0.21 0.06 0.09
3.2.3. Probit Analysis
The probit model is a suitable model for predicting the probabilities of binary events
using parameters. The marginal firms model predicts that an unobserved latent variable
explains firms’ preferences to participate in cartels so the probit model is preferred over
the odds ratio-motivated logit model.
Recall the prediction of the marginal firms model discussed in section 3.1: that firms’
cartel membership decisions are determined by a vector of firm-specific covariates, xi,
and cartel-specific covariates, zj , with a random disturbance, 
c
ij . These variables,
combined with the coefficients in the vectors β and γ, determine the relative profitability
of a firm choosing to be a cartel insider or outsider and so its membership decision.
With the data which is available to us, the actual underlying profitability of membership
and non-membership is not observable.
Equations (3.7) and (3.9) are presented in an ideal form, with all relevant variables
assumed to be observable. There are many variables which will affect the relative
profitability of a firm’s membership decision which are not observed in the dataset,
for example the firms’ exact costs, capacities and discount rates. Allowing x and z to
refer to firm- and cartel-specific characteristics which are observed in the data, β and γ
to their respective vectors of coefficients, and relaxing the ∗ and † notation, a firm’s
probability of exiting a cartel may be written as:
Pr(Firm exiti) = Pr(β
∗xi + γ∗z∗j + 
∗
ij > 0) (3.10)
Assuming that the random disturbance is described by a symmetric normal distribu-
tion: ∗ij ∼ N [0, 1], then the marginal firms account of cartel membership may be tested
through estimating probit models:
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Pr(Firm exit) =
∫ β∗xi+γ∗z∗j
−∞
φ(Li)dLi = Φ(β
∗xi + γ∗z∗j ) (3.11)
Where φ is the standard normal distribution and Φ is the cumulative density function
of the standard normal distribution.
Table 3.2 shows the results of five probit model specifications predicting a firm’s early
exit from a cartel with its late entry and the size of its cartel. Each observation in
this estimation is an individual firm. Dummy variables of the geographical scope and
industry of the cartels are used as controls and are omitted from these tables. They are
included in Table B.1 in Appendix B. Standard errors given in these tables are robust
to heteroskedasticity.
Model 1 includes all of the explanatory variables of interest as covariates. The number
of observations which may be used to estimate each model specification is limited by
the availability of data. Data on cartel coverage is available for only 328 firms in the
sample.
Model 2 excludes cartel coverage in order to expand the number of observations used
for estimating the model to 379. In order to see if there is a sample selection bias
caused by the cartels for which data on coverage are available being different from those
without data on coverage (but with market share data), Model 2 is estimated again
using only the observations for which coverage data are available. Model 2 (b) therefore
uses the same 328 observations which Model 1 was estimated with.
Late entry is peculiar among the variables used to predict early exit because it is
purely behavioural. The number of members in a firm’s cartel, the cartel’s coverage
and each firm’s share of cartel output are structural variables which are hypothesised
to proxy the latent variable which determines a firm’s tendency to collude. If this is
the case late entry will be collinear with the structural variables, since firms’ latent
tendencies to collude will also affect their late entry behaviour For this reason, Model 3
is estimated without using firms’ late entry as a covariate.
Model 4 excludes the cartel coverage and firm share of cartel output variables. This
allows all 478 observations in the dataset to be used to estimate the model specification.
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Table 3.2.: Probit models predicting early exit for firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 (b) Model 3 Model 4
Late entry 0.637∗∗ 0.595∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗
(0.204) (0.190) (0.203) (0.169)
Number of members 0.0771∗ -0.0117 0.0637∗ 0.0855∗∗ 0.00518
(0.0317) (0.0253) (0.0304) (0.0308) (0.0198)
Cartel coverage -1.635∗ -1.922∗∗
(0.706) (0.698)
Firm share -1.074 -1.910∗∗ -1.032 -1.851∗
(0.708) (0.687) (0.660) (0.740)
Full leniency 0.287 0.199 0.259 0.241 0.317
(0.273) (0.246) (0.274) (0.285) (0.205)
Constant -0.332 -0.908∗∗ -1.715∗∗∗ 0.0711 -1.133∗∗∗
(0.731) (0.344) (0.396) (0.753) (0.237)
Observations 328 379 328 328 478
Psuedo R2 0.184 0.124 0.172 0.155 0.0747
log pseudolikelihood -136.7 -166.5 -138.7 -141.5 -223.1
χ2 57.87 52.23 60.14 48.78 40.19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Geographical scope and Industry controls not reported
The baseline for geographical scope is that the cartel is of national scope, and may be
of regional, Europe-wide or global scope. The baseline for industry is that the cartel is in
the chemicals sector, and the alternative categories are cartels in the food & agriculture,
manufacturing, metals or ‘other’ sectors. The coefficients for these variables are omitted
from the models given in the main body of the text since they are intended merely to
serve as controls. For geographical scope, Model 3 finds that firms in Europe-wide cartels
are more likely to exit early compared to the baseline of national scope, significant at
the 10% level. For industry, firms in cartels in the Metals industry are found to be more
likely to exit early in models 1, 2 (b), 3 and 4, all significant at the 5% level.
The coefficients in these models indicate that firms which entered a cartel late are
more likely to leave early than firms that did not and an increase in the number of firms
61
Membership, Stability and Internal Institutions in European Cartels
in a cartel will increase the probability of early exit. Firms which are members of less
inclusive cartels are more likely to exit early, as are firms which have small shares of
cartel output.
Where coefficients in these three models are significant, they are quite similar in
magnitude indicating robustness of results across the specifications. In discussion of the
findings of these models I shall use the coefficients of Model 1 for Late Entry, Number
of Members and Cartel Coverage and those of Model 2 for Cartel Share. Model 1 is the
most inclusive of variables and is the preferred model overall but the larger sample size
of Model 2, along with the fact that the coefficient on Cartel Share is significant and
similar to that of Model 3, means that Model 1’s coefficient on Cartel Share is less useful.
3.2.4. Interpretation of Marginal Effects
The coefficients of a probit model are difficult to interpret directly in more depth due
to the non-linear functional form of the model. Still, it is essential to know the relative
importance of each of these factors. Marginal effects may be calculated for the covariates
used in the model, allowing the effect on the probability of exit from a change in the
value of covariate to be seen. Table 3.3 gives Average Marginal Effects for the covariates
reported in Table 3.2 for all five estimations.2 Average Marginal Effects are calculated
differently from the more commonly used Marginal Effects at Means. Marginal Effects
at Means are calculated for a covariate by setting all other covariates at their mean
values and reporting the change in the predicted probability implied by a change in the
covariate in question. This is problematic because the means of the other covariates do
not represent any individual firm which could exist: No actual firm could be a member
of a cartel with 5.3 members, or be 0.28 of an early entrant. The method of Average
Marginal Effects avoids this problem.
Calculating Average Marginal Effects utilises the individual observations in the dataset
used to estimate the model specification. For every covariate a marginal effect is to be
calculated for, estimated probabilities are calculated for each observation in the dataset
where the covariate in question is varied and all other covariates retain their actual
values. The difference between the probabilities calculated is that observation’s marginal
effect. The mean of all of the observations’ marginal effects is the reported Average
2Marginal effects for the Industry and Geographical Scope control variables may be found in the
unexpurgated Table in Appendix B
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Table 3.3.: Average Marginal Effects for models predicting early exit from cartels
(1) (2) (2 (b)) (3) (4)
Late entry 0.148∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗
(0.0451) (0.0443) (0.0451) (0.0429)
Number of members 0.0179∗ -0.00286 0.0149∗ 0.0206∗∗ 0.00134
(0.00720) (0.00618) (0.00704) (0.00723) (0.00513)
Cartel coverage -0.378∗ -0.463∗∗
(0.159) (0.163)
Market share -0.249 -0.467∗∗ -0.242 -0.446∗
(0.162) (0.165) (0.153) (0.174)
Full leniency 0.0664 0.0486 0.0605 0.0580 0.0823
(0.0630) (0.0599) (0.0641) (0.0688) (0.0530)
Observations 328 379 328 328 478
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Marginal Effect. The calculation and interpretation of various types of marginal effects
are discussed in Williams [2012].
It is also possible to calculate the predictive margins associated with chosen values
of covariates in a similar way. A predicted probability is calculated for all of the
observations in the dataset with the covariate in question set to the chosen value. The
mean of all of these values is then reported, and the process repeated for the next chosen
value of the covariate of interest. This technique is used to calculate the predicted
probability of exit associated with specific values of dependent variables, rather than to
provide a headline marginal effect for a dependent variable.
Late Entry
If firms’ cartel membership decisions are motivated by a latent variable then the clearest
indication should be a behavioural one. Firms which are on the margins of participating
in the cartel may choose to be outside of the cartel initially, then join the cartel later
following a change in market circumstances or a small change in individual preference
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Table 3.4.: Predictive margins for early exit of firms in cartel sizes from 2 to 10
(1) (2) (2a) (3) (4)
2 Firms 0.122 0.217 0.133 0.111 0.194
3 Firms 0.136 0.214 0.146 0.127 0.196
4 Firms 0.151 0.211 0.159 0.143 0.197
5 Firms 0.167 0.209 0.172 0.162 0.198
6 Firms 0.184 0.206 0.187 0.181 0.200
7 Firms 0.203 0.203 0.202 0.202 0.201
8 Firms 0.222 0.200 0.218 0.225 0.202
9 Firms 0.243 0.197 0.235 0.249 0.204
10 Firms 0.264 0.194 0.253 0.274 0.205
for collusion. When market circumstances change to make the optimal cartel larger
or the firm’s characteristics change to make them less amenable to collusion this late
entrant should be the first firm to leave the cartel.
The Average Marginal Effect of a firm being a late entrant on the probability of their
early exit is between 13.2% and 16.1%. This is the amount by which the probability of
early exit is estimated as increasing by if a firm is a late entrant, as opposed to it joining
its cartel at the foundation. Intuitively, the technique of Average Marginal Effect may
be thought of as comparing the probabilities of early exit between two populations of
firms; one of which is entirely late entrants and the other of which is entirely non-late
entrants, but which are otherwise identical.
Number of Cartel Members
The structural characteristics included in the model indicate what the latent variables
indicating a firm’s preference for collusion may be. It is possible to calculate the
predicted probability of early exit for a member of a cartel of any given size, holding
other variables at their means. Using Model 1, the probability of a firm in a cartel of
size four, the median cartel size, leaving the cartel early is 12%. Due to the members of
larger cartel being overrepresented in the dataset the median firm in the sample is in a
cartel of size seven. A firm in a seven-firm cartel has a predicted probability of leaving
early of 17%.
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Table 3.4 shows the predicted probabilities of early exit for a firm in a cartel with
two to ten member firms. The probabilities are calculated using the predictive margins
technique described above. The largest cartel in the sample has 17 members, with
six cartels having more than 10 members, but the range of 2 to 10 firms includes the
majority of the sample used to estimate the models. Note that the number of member
firms is insignificant in Models 2 and 5. In the models where number of member firms
is significant, the predicted probabilities are robust across specifications. A firm in a
cartel with the median size of 4 firms is predicted to have a probability of early exit of
14.6% to 15.9%.
Cartel Coverage
The median firm is in a cartel with a coverage of 90%. Using the technique of average
marginal effects, a firm in such a cartel has a 15% probability of early exit. This sharply
increases as coverage decreases, with a firm in a cartel covering 70% of its market having
a 24% probability of early exit.
Firm Share of Cartel Output
For the predictions around firm’s shares of cartel output, the coefficients estimated in
Model 2 are used. A firm with a cartel share of 10% is predicted to have a 22% probability
of early exit, holding other variables at mean values. A firm with a 50% share of cartel
output has a predicted probability of 6%. A very small firm, with a cartel share of 1%,
has a predicted probability of early exit of 27%. Several firms have such low cartel shares.
Industry and Geographical Scope
None of the coefficients estimated for the geographical scope variables are consistently
significant in any of the estimated models. In model 3 there is weak (p value¡0.1)
evidence that firms in cartels of Europe-wide scope are more likely to exit early than
firms in cartels of national scope by roughly 11%, but no other coefficients in any of
the models are found to be significant. Among the industry variables, one coefficient is
significant across four of the five specifications. Compared to the baseline of firms in
cartels in the chemicals sector, firms in cartels in the metals sector are approximately
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17% more likely to exit early.
3.2.5. Predicting Firms’ Late Entry
Analysing the entry of firms to cartels which are already in progress is more problematic
than analysing early-exiting firms. When a firm leaves a cartel they are making a
decision to become a part of the fringe, even if they later exit the market altogether.
On the other hand, a firm which is observed as joining a cartel may have been present
in the market for an extended period of time or may have entered the market very
recently. This entrant problems limits the extent to which the results can be seen to
test the models of collusion discussed above: a new entrant which quickly joins a cartel
may be a very keen or a reluctant cartelist.
Following the form of the equation predicting firm’s early exit from cartels in equation
(3.11), a firm’s probability of entering a cartel depends on the sets of observable firm-
specific characteristics, xi, observable cartel-specific characteristics, z
†
j , the respective
coefficients corresponding to these sets of variables, β† and γ†, and the error term †ij
Pr(Firm entryi) = Pr(β
†xi + γ†z
†
j + 
†
ij > 0) (3.12)
Assuming that the random disturbance is described by a symmetric normal distri-
bution: †ij ∼ N [0, 1], then the probit model estimating firms’ probability of entering a
cartel late may be written:
Pr(Firm entry) =
∫ β†xi+γ†z†j
−∞
φ(Li)dLi = Φ(β
†xi + γ†z
†
j) (3.13)
Where φ is the standard normal distribution and Φ is the cumulative density function
of the standard normal distribution.
Model 1 is the most inclusive of variables and least of observations. The cartel
coverage variable is the limiting one, leading to it being estimated with 328 observations.
Model 2 excludes cartel coverage in order to expand the number of variables to 379.
Model 3 is estimated with the full sample of 478 observations. Estimated coefficients
and other information about the model specifications are given in Table 3.5.
As in the models predicting early exit, the number of observations used by each model
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specification is limited by the availability of data for certain variables. The set of market
and cartel structure variables used is the same as that used in the earlier models. The
full leniency variable is not used because these models do not share the concern that
an exit actually represents a leniency claim. Also the decision to join a cartel is made
before the action of claiming leniency, so the idea that it may be used to predict entry
is faulty. For the same reason, early exit is not used to predict late entry. Industry and
geographical scope control variables are included in the models. The coefficients of the
geographical scope variables are reported here in the main text because they produce
interesting results. The coefficients estimated for the industry variables are given in
Table B.3 in Appendix B.
Results and Marginal Effects
Table 3.6 gives the average marginal effects calculated from the estimated coefficients of
the models. The method of calculating average marginal effects was discussed in section
3.2.4. The full table, with average marginal effects for the industry control variables, is
given in Table B.4 in Appendix B.
The signs on the coefficients are the same as those in the models which predict early
exit. Firms which have smaller share are more likely to enter late, as are firms which
are members of larger cartels and cartels which cover less of their markets.
The geographical scope variables are consistently significant and the sizes of the
marginal effect are large. For example, a firm in a Europe-wide cartel is as much as
91% more likely to have entered its cartel late than a firm in a cartel of national scope.
That all of the regional scope variables are significant in some models indicates that
the occurrence of late entry in cartels of national scope (the baseline for the other
geographical scope variables) is particularly low. That late entry of firms to the cartel is
less likely in cartels which cover a smaller geographical area can be ascribed to several
reasons. Where firms are more dispersed, both geographically and culturally it may be
more difficult for firms to communicate with each other during the process of formation,
leading to some firms being excluded from the cartel on its formation but integrated
later, once the cartel is more established. It is also likely that broader geographical
areas will experience a greater quantity of new firms entering the market, which then
go on to join the cartel.
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Table 3.5.: Probit models predicting late entry for firms
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
Number of members 0.0476 0.0503∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0254) (0.0193)
Cartel coverage -1.991∗∗
(0.726)
Market share -4.898∗∗∗ -4.757∗∗∗
(1.088) (1.039)
Global 0.594† 0.624∗ 0.547∗
(0.326) (0.297) (0.268)
Europe-wide 0.754∗∗ 0.783∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.272) (0.244)
Regional 0.109 0.556† 0.627∗
(0.383) (0.300) (0.260)
Constant 0.806 -1.039∗∗ -2.210∗∗∗
(0.789) (0.384) (0.308)
Observations 328 379 478
Psuedo R2 0.232 0.247 0.183
log pseudolikelihood -135.5 -159.8 -230.9
χ2 47.46 61.51 89.85
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Industry controls not reported
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Table 3.6.: Average marginal effects for probit models predicting late entry for firms
(1) (2) (3)
Number of members 0.0112 0.0121∗
(0.00769) (0.00605)
Cartel coverage -0.467∗∗
(0.166)
Market share -1.149∗∗∗ -1.141∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.220)
Global 0.131† 0.137∗ 0.0729
(0.0704) (0.0615) (0.0522)
Europe-wide 0.173∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.0571) (0.0557) (0.0520)
Regional 0.0204 0.119† 0.406∗∗∗
(0.0730) (0.0652) (0.0760)
National 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Observations 328 379 478
Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.2.6. Matrices of Ranks of Entry and Exit
Probit analysis is an appealing method because it is multivariate but it fails to take into
account a potential information dimension of the data: the order of entry and exit. If a
firm is the last to enter then it should be the first to exit (providing the characteristics
of the firms do not change too much between entry and exit). Matrices are an intuitive
way of representing and analysing the presence of this ”Last In, First Out” behaviour.
Hart and Prais [1956] conduct a classic analysis of changes in business concentration
over time in which they display the change in the sizes of a sample of firms between two
years in a matrix. Firms are divided into size classes, each row of the matrix represents
firms in a particular size class in the initial year of the study and each column the firms
in a size class in the final year: Each element was the number of firms which started
and finished in particular classes.
The inverse rank of entry is used. This means that the final firm to join a cartel is
denoted ‘1’, the penultimate firm to join ‘2’, and so on. Exiters are ranked in order, so
the first exiter of a cartel is denoted ‘1’, the second ‘2’ and so on. This means that a
firm which is the last to join and then the first to leave its cartel will be ranked as ‘1’ in
both entry and exit. Table 3.7 shows the entry and exit ranks of the 44 firms in the
sample which both entered their cartel late and exited their cartel early.
If firms do indeed behave as the marginal firms theory would predict then one would
expect firms to be positioned on the diagonal in this matrix. Firms on the diagonal
indicate follow last in-first out perfectly. Firms which are just off the diagonal may
also be consistent with marginal firms models if the latent preference of the firms have
shifted after their entry, meaning the marginal cartel member is a different firm by the
time exit occurs. 14 out of 44 firms are on this diagonal (32%) and 25 are within one
space of it (56%).
Matrices of Cartel Share
Similar matrices may be constructed ordering a firms’ cartel share with its rank of
entry and exit. If propensity to collude is associated with a firm’s cartel share and the
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Table 3.7.: Ranks of Entry and Exit for Fully Fluid Firms
Inverse Rank of Rank of Exit
Entry 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
1 7 5 2 1 15
2 2 4 1 1 1 9
3 4 1 2 7
4 3 1 1 1 6
5 1 2 1 1 5
6 1 1
7 0
8 0
9 1 1
Total 19 13 4 5 1 2 44
marginal firms theory holds then the expectation is to find a tendency for firms to be
on the diagonal in these matrices. If the balanced temptations view of cartels is more
accurate then no tendency towards the diagonal should be noted. A grouping towards
the upper right corner of the matrix should be expected and does not indicate anything
of interest, because most cartels have fewer than six members.
The matrix of cartel share rank and exit rank is in figure 3.8 and the matrix of cartel
share rank and entry rank is in figure 3.9. Each matrix displays only observations of
firms which entered late or exited early, but the ranks of cartel share were calculated
including all firms.
In the exit rank and cartel share rank matrix 18 firms fall directly on the diagonal
(28% of all early-exiting firms) and 38 firms are within one space of the diagonal (59%).
In the entry rank and cartel share rank matrix 27 firms are on the diagonal (36% of all
late-entering firms) and 47 are within one space of the diagonal (63%). This indicates
that there is a tendency for firms to leave and join cartels in accordance with their
relative sizes. The 18 firms which were the smallest firms in their cartels and which
entered late are especially notable.
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Table 3.8.: Rank of Exit and Cartel share for Early Exiters
Rank of Rank of Inverse Market Share
Exit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
1 12 2 9 7 2 3 35
2 5 3 2 1 1 12
3 1 3 1 5
4 2 2 2 6
5 2 2
6 1 1 2
7 1 1
8 1 1
Total 20 6 13 14 2 1 4 2 1 1 64
Table 3.9.: Rank of Entry and Cartel Share for Late Entrants
Inverse Rank of Inverse Rank of Market Share
Entry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Total
1 18 4 2 3 1 1 1 30
2 4 4 2 1 1 12
3 1 1 2 3 1 1 9
4 1 3 1 1 1 7
5 2 2 1 1 6
6 1 1 1 3
7 1 1 2
8 1 1
9 1 1
10 1 1 2
11 0
12 1 1
13 1 1
Total 28 9 9 10 4 2 2 4 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 75
3.3. Conclusions
The analysis supports the conjecture that the last firm to join a cartel is likely to be
the first to leave. This suggests that a firm which joined the cartel (and therefore was
evidently the marginal outsider) became the marginal insider and was the first to leave.
The finding is consistent with the theory of marginal firms driving entry and exit and
suggests that cartel membership decisions are made by firms aiming to maximise their
72
Predicting the Exit of Marginal Firms from Cartels
profits through their membership decision.
The findings are consistent with the theory that membership changes are explained
by marginal firms. The relationship is not perfect because firms’ preferences and circum-
stances may change during the time the firm is in the cartel, meaning it does not stay
the marginal firm. This means that models such as Bos and Harrington [2010] which
utilise the assumption that entry and exit will only be by marginal firms are justified.
That firms are willing and able to leave and join cartels easily is also consistent with
the view of stability endorsed by D’Aspremont et al. [1983]; that firms will choose their
cartel membership status based purely upon maximisation of their own profits, rather
than membership being dictated by cartel institutions.
3.3.1. Policy Implications
This chapter has not analysed directly any cartel policies. Still, firms which leave and
join cartels are encountered by competition authorities which sanction cartels and their
treatment has apparently not received any academic discussion. That cartel membership
decisions are determined by economic considerations indicates that the way in which
sanctions are designed to deter and detect cartels should be designed with marginal
firms and outsider firms in mind.
The European Union fines firms which have been in cartels on the basis of the duration
of their participation in the cartel3, multiplied by the estimated cartel overcharge. This
means that firms which spent a part of their cartel’s duration as outsiders are not fined
on the basis of the excess profits they make, even when they are provably aware of the
cartel’s existence due to their past membership. The fining guidelines do specifically
state that a firm having participated in an undertaking for a shorter period of time than
the other cartel firms does not constitute a mitigating factor leading to a percentage
reduction in the total fine.
A marginal firm which is considering joining a cartel may take into account the fact
they may later leave the cartel to become an outsider once more, safe in the knowledge
that it will only face the possible confiscation of the excess profits gaining during
3The most recent version of the European Commission’s methods for setting fines in com-
petition cases was published in 2006. Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006, p. 2-5.
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/fines.html
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its participation in the cartel. This reduction in deterrence could lead to a greater
probability of participation in cartels by marginal firms, increasing the overall harm
to consumers from collusion. An outsider which is aware of the cartel’s existence will
have less incentive to report the cartel’s existence to the authorities because it will gain
less from the reduction in fines from leniency. On the other hand, a firm which is a
cartel member could be tempted to leave the cartel by the possibility of gains which will
not eventually be appropriated by the competition authority. Whether this increased
incentive to leave cartels is detrimental to their stability, and therefore the size of their
total harm to consumer welfare, is the subject of the next chapter in this thesis.
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Chapter 4.
The Effect of Membership Variability on
Cartel Survival
Data on the duration of cartels is widely used in analysis of the success and survivability
of cartels. Rarely, however, is the duration of individual firms’ participation in cartels
examined empirically. Firms frequently join cartels after their founding and leave cartels
without the cartel breaking down. The main aim of this study is to establish whether
firms joining and leaving a cartel is a signal of that cartel’s strength or weakness. A
high degree of variability in a cartel’s membership could be an indication of an institu-
tionally weak or a structurally strong cartel. Conversely, a cartel whose membership is
unchanging over time (‘static’) could be one with a well-developed agreement which
discourages its members from deviating or could be a fragile cartel which would not
survive any exit nor is attractive enough to outsiders to prompt entry.
There are two aspects of this theory I wish to test: the idea that entry and exit to
and from cartels is driven by marginal firms and whether firms leaving and joining a
cartel signals that cartel’s strength or weakness.
Providing they can maintain a level of overcharge, cartels will aim to be as stable
as possible in order to maximise joint profits. The question then is whether firms
with changing membership are more or less likely to break down in each period. If
cartels with static memberships are more robust then this indicates that institutions
which prevent members from defecting from the cartel and which prevent new firms
from entering the market are effective in maintaining collusion. If, however, cartels
with changing memberships are more stable then this indicates that firms in markets
containing strong cartels are free to choose their membership status on the basis of
expected profit maximisation.
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The previous chapter of this thesis examined the individual choice of a firm to move
from the fringe into a cartel or from the cartel to the fringe. The findings indicated
that the firms which choose to change their membership status are constrained by the
incentive compatibility of their decision and motivated by the economic concerns of the
firms, rather than the individual preferences of the managers and salespeople involved
in the cartel. This chapter examines the effect this behaviour among firms has on the
cartels these firms are members of.
The sample of cartels examined is those prosecuted and fined by the Director General
of Competition of the European Commission between 2001 and 2011, comprising 91
cartels and 482 firms (double-counting recidivists) in total. Descriptive statistics and
other details of this dataset may be found in Chapter 2.
I use Cox hazard models with and without time-varying coefficients along with three
different metrics of cartels’ membership variability. This analysis will discover whether
firms leaving and joining a cartel are associated with a longer duration. I find that
cartels with varying memberships tend to last longer than cartels with static member-
ship. Controlling for time-related biases, cartels with static memberships are roughly
25% more likely to break down at any given time than cartels with varying memberships.
These findings indicate that a structurally robust cartel is recognised as such by firms,
who will choose to switch between the cartel and the fringe when it is profitable for
them to do so. This indicates that a cartel with institutions which aim to prevent the
movement of member firms into the fringe may be less stable than they may appear.
I discuss the previous literature on cartel durations and cartel survival in section 4.1.
I outline what predictions theory may make for the link between membership variability
and cartel survival in section 4.2. Analysis using survival models is performed in section
4.3. I discuss the results in section 4.4 and conclude in section 4.5.
4.1. Duration in Cartel Literature
Duration is widely used in the empirical literature on cartels. It is used most often as
a measure of cartel success. Cartel success may more accurately be measured by the
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total amount of abnormal profits gathered by the cartel over its duration. The ideal
way of measuring this is duration multiplied by average cartel overcharge. However
information on cartel overcharge is frequently unavailable and may change throughout
the cartel period. Duration is a useful proxy for cartel success because it is consistently
observed for each cartel in the sample whereas overcharge is not.
Connor and Bolotova [2006] gather the estimates of overcharge made by previous
studies of individual cartels. These studies range in type from economists’ reports to
courts for cartel damages cases, to government publications, to academic publications.
The methods they use are extremely diverse and some were published over one hundred
years ago. They find that cartel overcharge is significantly higher in longer-lasting
cartels. The intuition that firms will be more inclined to maintain a cartel which is
more profitable is clear. This kind of mechanism implies that the economic profits of the
member firms are an important determinant of the duration of a cartel. International
cartels also have long durations. This may be because of this increased difficultly of
prosecuting a conspiracy spanning multiple jurisdictions, the large resources of multina-
tional corporations allowing for high evasion effort, or simply the greater coverage of
the market implied by a global cartel. Of the sample in this study 71 out of 91 cartels
are multinational. If this represents a bias in the sample towards international cartels,
the cartels studied could be of longer duration and higher overcharge than an average
cartel.
4.1.1. Survival Analysis of Duration
De [2010a], Levenstein and Suslow [2011] and Zimmerman and Connor [2005] are just
three of the many papers which use survival analysis to model cartel duration. At their
most basic, survival estimates provide an overview of the distribution of duration data.
Models may also be built allowing the determinants of duration to be estimated. Kiefer
[1988] discusses broadly the use of hazard functions in analysing economic duration
data and De [2010a] provides a thorough summary of the literature on cartel duration
and its analysis.
The Cox proportional hazard model is the most common choice in cartel duration
data. This is a semi-parametric technique allowing the estimation of hazard ratios for
variables which estimate the effect that the explanatory variables of the model have
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on the risk of a cartel breaking down in each period. The model is explained in more
detail in section 4.3.3 on page 86.
De [2010a] and Zimmerman and Connor [2005] use a large number of explanatory
variables about the structure of the cartel’s market and the wider economic situation at
the time of the cartel. They both find that cartels are more likely to be successful in
more concentrated markets with fewer and more symmetrical firms and are likely to
break down in the presence of external shocks. De [2010a] also finds that several kinds
of cartel institution are associated with increased survival: market sharing agreements
and regular price wars between members aided the survival of cartels; trade association
involvement and compensation mechanisms had no effect; and market leadership and
price fixing agreements were detrimental to survival.
4.1.2. Limitations of Duration Data
Duration as a Measure of Cartel Success
Frequently cartel duration is used as a measure of cartel success. Cartel success may be
more accurately defined as the total excess profits made by the cartels’ members, which
may be calculated by multiplying the cartel’s duration by the mean amount by which it
raised prices above the counterfactual, competitive, level. Given that duration is an
important component of cartel profitability, and that a cartel’s members will be more
inclined to maintain a cartel that is profitable, it is a relatively strong proxy for cartel
success. However, a number of problems should be noted.
In addition to duration being an incomplete measure of cartel success in the absence of
information on overcharge, duration and overcharge may be related to each other in ways
which complicate the link between duration and success. Levenstein and Suslow [2006b]
point out that cartels which successfully raise prices and profits in their industries may
attract new entrants to the market. This may destabilise the cartel, shortening its
duration despite its short-term success. There is a similar risk that high overcharge
may attract the attention of competition authorities, leading to the breakdown of the
cartel through detection and punishment. Cartels may also choose a low overcharge
in order to make cheating on the agreement through undercutting less profitable, and
so the cartel more stable. In these cases, there will be a negative relationship between
overcharge and duration, though not necessarily between duration and success. Cartels
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will, to the best of their abilities, balance overcharge with the risk of breakdown in order
to maximise expected total profits.
Quality of Duration Data
In addition to these theoretical issues with the use of cartel data, there are practical
issues which arise while using data on cartel duration. A key problem is that the
duration of cartels may be longer than is measured by the antitrust authority due to
a lack of evidence of communication between firms in the cartels earliest days. Other
researchers using cartel duration data also encountered this problem. Their discussion
of this problem is detailed in 2.1.1. In light of this fact, it should be noted that the
cartel durations used in this chapter may represent lower bounds on duration, rather
than true durations. No statistical technique exists which allows this problem to be
solved, since it represents uncertainty around the true durations.
However, the institutional background in which this data was collected provides a ro-
bustness check. Under the EC’s cartel leniency system, firms which provide information
extending the provable duration of the cartel are eligible for a reduction in fines between
50% and 70%, in addition to full immunity for the time period which the firm extended
the duration of the cartel for. Also, firms receiving full immunity from the EC for
revealing the existence of a cartel must cooperate fully with the investigation of the cartel
in order to receive the reduction in fines. Satisfying the suspicions of the investigators
of the competition authority while maintaining cooperate to their satisfaction will make
concealing periods of collusion more difficult and less likely, especially given that the
leniency claimant firm has immunity from fines anyway.
4.2. The Theory of Institutional Strength and of Marginal
Firms
Spar [1994] analyses international cartels with the methodology of political science. She
outlines the Realist and Institutionalist views of cooperation, which were developed
to examine relations between nations. Spar claims that the theories may usefully be
applied to cartels since they represent scenarios where large organisations communicate
without a binding legal system, analogous to the situation of nations. The story of the
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Realist view is best summarised as a one-shot Nash Equilibrium game and the story of
the Institutionalist view as an iterated prisoners’ dilemma.
The Realist view of cooperation holds that individuals follow their immediate in-
centives when deciding whether to cooperate. If an agreement provides benefits to
all of its members then it will be stable. If a member decides it would be better off
outside of the agreement they will leave, and if a non-member prefers to be inside of
the agreement they will join. According to the Realist view the main way (according
to some theorists, such as Keohane and Nye [1977], the only way) that cooperation
can arise is if a hegemon, or ringleader, wishes cooperation to take place. In this case,
the ringleader will take on any fixed costs associated with cooperation in addition to
enforcing the agreement.
The Institutionalist view believes defection is the main threat to cooperation. Factors
which facilitate cooperation are therefore the ability of firms to commit credibly to
actions, guaranteed repeated interaction and regular punishment for defectors. The best
way to achieve these is through an institution.
Spar argues that the Realist account clearly cannot account for the many instances
of cooperation where there is not a powerful ringleader, though it is a simple way of
explaining those which do. Conversely, the Institutionalist view cannot explain the
lack of cooperation in situations where there are opportunities for large profits but
cartels failed, such as the markets for uranium and silver despite cartels’ great success
in the structurally similar diamond and gold markets. Institutionalism is therefore
useless if it cannot predict where cooperation will and will not arise. Spar analyses four
international cartels and concludes that the internal organisation of the firms involved
is most important, with highly-centralised, vertically-integrated firms able to control
themselves better and therefore make more credible commitments.
The research question which I test does not quite test the Realist and Institutionalist
views. Only 20 out of 91 cartels in the sample has an identified ringleaders so the strict
Realist view is immediately discredited. Rather, I hope to discover whether a changing
membership signals weakness or strength in a cartel. The most important concepts under-
lying this are those of cartel stability and of insider, outsider and marginal firms. These
models seem to indicate that a firm’s recent entry into a cartel makes it the most likely
firm to leave the cartel next and that larger cartels are likely to have more entry and exit.
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4.2.1. Marginal Firms and Cartel Stability
Marginal firms models of cartel membership, discussed previously in this thesis, hold
that firms’ cartel membership decisions are based on individual economic incentives. In
marginal firms models, firms are willing to change their membership if the alternative
membership choice is more profitable and the remaining firms in the cartel are willing to
maintain the cartel. A firm will not choose to leave a cartel if they know that they will
destroy the cartel by making it unprofitable for the remaining firms and a cartel will not
choose to punish a departing firm by destroying the cartel in retaliation. Such means
of retaliation are the kind of institution which the institutionalist view of cooperation
holds are necessary for successful cooperation.
A cartel is frequently able to support a competitive fringe of outsider firms. The rea-
sons why a firm may choose to leave or join a cartel include changes in market demand,
firm costs or preferences, entry or exit of other firms from the market and changes in
the internal organisation of the cartel. Changes in the structural characteristics of the
market which aid collusion will result in the exit of firms from a cartel to the fringe or
the entry into the market of new firms. The entry into a cartel of a fringe member may
indicate weakness. Entry or exit may also indicate a failure in a cartel’s strategic entry
deterrence or enforcement mechanisms.
Organisational tools and institutions used by cartels aim to solve problems such as
secret cheating and of allocation. They may also attempt to enforce stability in a cartel’s
membership in the hope of preventing the loss of cartel production to the competitive
fringe and the corresponding loss in cartel profits.
4.2.2. Institutions and Variability of Membership
Osborne [1976] suggests that the deterrence of external production is one of the central
problems which cartels must solve. This involves the punishment of any firm which
chooses to leave the cartel in favour of being an outsider. Harrington [1989b] finds that
accommodating new entrants to a market into the cartel is detrimental to the success of
that cartel since it encourages further entry to the market, leading to an over-abundance
of firms and diminishing profits for the original cartel members. Both of these accounts
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are arguments that a cartel with strong institutions and the means to punish outsiders
will have a membership which is unchanging over time.
This is contrary to marginal firms-based theories which suggest that firms decide their
cartel membership status and presence in the market based upon their own incentives.
Entry and exit to and from a cartel may signal that cartel’s structural strength. This is
the other question I hope to answer. If a cartel’s membership does not vary over time
then this could signal either a cartel with strong institutions or it could signal a cartel
which is unable to withstand entry and exit without collapsing. On the other hand,
a cartel whose membership is highly changeable could signal weak institutions which
are unable to deter entry into the market or its members defecting to the fringe. In
section 4.3 on page 82 the effect of variability of cartel membership on cartel duration
is estimated.
4.3. Survival Analysis
In the following sections I measure how the survival of cartels is affected by the behaviour
of their members. I will describe some general features about how likely the cartels in
my sample are to break down over time before specifying models with various measures
of cartel membership stability. The models specified are Cox hazard models, two with
time-varying coefficients and one proportional hazard model.
The more simple survival models give an overview of the nature of cartel failure over
time. The more complex models directly test the research question of this chapter
by testing the effect of firm entry and exit to and from cartels on the cartels’ risk of
breakdown. A variety of models are used to address the research question in order to
ensure the results are robust to possible time-based biases in the data.
4.3.1. Descriptive Survival Statistics
Kaplan-Meier and Nelson-Aalen plots allow the proportion of cartels which have broken
down by any given point in time to be seen. They also indicate whether the rate of
breakdown tends to increase or decrease with time. Simple hazard models allow these
trends over time to be quantified.
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Of the total 482 firms in the data, both firms in the French Beer cartel have durations
of zero meaning they are not included in the survival models. The total number of days
which firms spent in cartels (the sum of all firm durations) is 1,624,437. The sample
consists entirely of cartels which have been detected so all 480 observations ended in
failure.
Where each cartel is taken as a single observation the French Beer cartel is also
not included in the analysis meaning 90 cartels are included. The total number of
cartel-days is 269,158.
Survival and Hazard Functions
The two main kinds of function in survival analysis are survival functions and hazard func-
tions. Let duration be a random variable, T , with distribution function F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t)
and so density function f(t) = dF (t)/dt. A survival function, S(t) aims to predict the
likelihood that a random duration, T , will exceed a given value, t; S(t) = Pr(T ≥ t).
Note that S(t) = 1− F (t).
Figure 4.1 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve for the sample of cartels. This
shows the proportion of the sample (on the vertical axis) which survived to any given
duration (on the horizontal axis). The median duration of the sample of cartels is six
years: this is the point at which the curve crosses the 0.5 point, indicating that half of
the cartels in the sample have broken down by this point.
A hazard function, h(t), is the proportion of cartels which end at time t, given that
they have lasted until time t − 1. h(t) = f(t)/S(t). A cumulative hazard function,
H(t), is the total hazard which a subject has experienced by a given point in time. The
cumulative hazard function, H(t), is the integral of the hazard function: H(t) =
∫ t
0 htdt.
The cumulative hazard function may be interpreted as showing the expected number of
failures for a single cartel at each point in time. The Nelson-Aalen curve in figure 4.2
shows a cumulative hazard of one at a duration of eight years — the mean duration of
a cartel in the sample. Failure is not a repeated event so the rising expected number of
failures reflects the diminishing odds of a cartel surviving to longer durations.
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Figure 4.1.: Kaplan-Meier survival curve for all cartels
84
Membership Variability and Survival
Figure 4.2.: Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard curve for all cartels
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4.3.2. Hazard Models
The nature of the increasing hazard of cartels as their duration increases may be
measured by estimated a parametric model of hazard. The Weibull model is ideal for
modelling survival where hazard may increase or decrease with time.
The Weibull model assumes hazard to be of the form
h(t) = λptp−1
There are two parameters to be estimated here: the ‘scale parameter’ λ and the
‘shape parameter’ p. The relationship between hazard and time is captured by p. When
p > 1 hazard is increasing with time, when p = 1 hazard is constant with time and
when p < 1 hazard decreases with time.
Estimating the above model with the cartel data gives a value for λ of 0.0517 and
a value for p of 1.355. Both estimates are highly significant (with p-values of less
than 0.001). λ indicates the baseline probability of breakdown each year for a cartel,
independent of the time-varying component of hazard. The estimated Weibull model
may be written:
h(t) = 0.05171.355t0.355
Since p > 1 the indication of the cumulative hazard graph that hazard increases with
time is confirmed. To be precise, a cartel in its first year (so t − 1) has a predicted
hazard of 0.018, meaning it has a 1.8% probability of breaking down in the first period.
This probability rises to 2.3% in its second year and 2.6% in its second. A cartel in its
30th year (the longest duration observed in the sample is 34 years) has a 6% chance
of breaking down in that year. This increasing hazard produces a convex cumulative
hazard curve, as is seen in figure 4.2.
4.3.3. Cox Hazard Models
The Cox [1972] proportional hazard model is the most common choice of model in
studies using cartel duration data. A proportional hazard model allows explanatory
variables with estimable coefficients to be added to the model alongside a ‘baseline’
hazard. The baseline hazard is unaffected by the explanatory variable in a proportional
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hazard model. The advantage of the Cox model is that it allows the estimation of the
coefficients on the explanatory variables without specifying a a baseline hazard function.
A hazard function for an individual, i, in the Cox model takes the form
hi(t, x) = λ0(t)e
xiβ
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function which is common to all individuals and
is between 0 and 1 for all values of t, xi a vector of explanatory variables specific to
the i which may vary across time or individuals, and β a vector a coefficients describ-
ing the effect of xi on the baseline hazard function. β is also the same for every individual.
A convenient property of the Cox model (and the reason it is known as a ‘proportional
hazard model’) is that two individuals with differences in xi may be compared directly.
Taking two subjects named 1 and 2:
λ0(t)e
x1β
λ0(t)ex2β
=
ex1β
ex2β
= e(x1−x2)β
This is known as the ‘hazard ratio’ and it is a constant which does not change with t.
The baseline hazard function may take any form and is not non-parametric. Covari-
ates are assumed to affect the baseline hazard proportionally (as opposed to additively,
for example). The Cox model is there semi-parametric.
Parametric survival models such as the Weibull, described above, may also incorporate
covariates. The baseline hazard is estimated as parametric and the covariates allowed
to shift this baseline hazard. The proportional-hazards Weibull model is
hi(t, x) = λ
pptp−1exiβ
Testing the Proportional Hazards Assumption
The Proportional Hazards Cox model is by far the most common model used in survival
analysis, and the literature on cartel duration is no exception to this. De [2010b],
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Levenstein and Suslow [2006a], Zimmerman and Connor [2005], Suslow [2005] and Dick
[1996] all use Cox models in order to reach their conclusions about cartel duration.
Brenner [2009] uses a proportional hazards version of the Weibull model.
However, this assumption of proportional hazards may be violated. If this is the case
then the simple Cox model is inappropriate and an alternative model must be used.
The simplest indicator, for discrete covariates, is to draw the Kaplan-Meier curves for
each discrete group of observations on the same axis and check that the curves do not
cross. If the curves cross then the proportional effect of the covariate on hazard is not
constant with time.
If the change in hazard caused by a covariate is believed to change with time then
a Cox model may be estimated with time-varying coefficients. Hastie and Tibshirani
[1993] outline Cox models where the explanatory variables are interacted with other
variables, including time. Both time-varying and time-invariant coefficients may be
present in the same model. The Cox model with time-varying coefficients may be
written
hi(t) = λ0(t)e
xiβ+g(t)ziγ
where g(t) is a function of time and γ the vector of coefficients for the time-varying
explanatory variables, zi, which may or may not overlap with xi, the vector of variables
interacted with time.
A Cox model may be estimated including a time-varying and non-time-varying ver-
sion of a covariate. If the time-varying version is found to be insignificant then the
assumption of proportional hazards is upheld. This method of assessing the assumption
may be used with both continuous and discrete variables.
4.3.4. Static Cartels
The simplest way of examining the effects of the variability of a cartel’s membership on
its duration is to distinguish between those cartels whose membership was totally static
and those which experienced any late entry or early exit at all.
Drawing the Kaplan Meier curves for static and varying-membership cartels on the
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Table 4.1.: Cox proportional hazard models predicting cartel breakdown hazard by
cartel staticness, cartel completeness, and firm lateness and earliness of entry
and exit
Specification (model) number
1 2 3
Variable Haz. Ratio Coeff. Haz. Ratio Coeff. Haz. Ratio Coeff.
Cartel Static
1.821** 0.6** - - - -
(0.217)
Cartel Completeness
- - 13.28** 2.586** - -
(0.889)
Firm Lateness
- - - - 0.833*** -0.182***
(0.022)
Firm Earliness
- - - - 0.661* -0.413*
(0.168)
Firm Lateness*t
- - - - 1.005*** 0.0052***
(0.0012)
Firm Earliness*t
- - - - 1.031* 0.0306*
(0.0135)
Obs 90 90 476
Days at risk 266943 269158 264890
Log (pseudo)likelihood -314.62 313.33 -2442.2
LR/Wald χ2 7.36 9.95 142.82
Robust standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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Figure 4.3.: Kaplan-Meier survival curves for static and varying cartels
same axis, as in figure 4.3, finds that the two curves touch each other at high duration,
with the static cartels curve briefly peaking over the variable cartels curve. This indi-
cates that a greater proportion of static cartels than variable cartels were still active
at that point in their duration. If this had persisted for a longer period of time, then
the assumption that the effect of membership stasis on hazard was proportional could
not be sustained. Since it only applies to a very small number of cartels (those still
active at high duration) this is explainable due to random variation rather than the
assumptions about functional form being violated. This quick test of the proportional
hazards assumption is therefore inconclusive. There are several tests it is possible to
perform once a model has been estimated.
The model may be stated
hi(t) = λ0(t)e
cartelstaticiβ
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This model is estimated using each cartel as a single observation. Since one cartel
has zero duration and cannot be included in the survival model, this means there are a
total of 90 observations.
The estimated coefficients, hazard ratios and summary statistics of the model are in
the first column of Table 4.1 on page 89. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
The estimated model is
hi(t) = λ0(t)e
cartelstatici0.59
The hazard ratio between static and variable cartels implied by this model is 1.82.
This indicates that a static cartel is 82% more likely to break down in each time period
than a variable cartel. Testing the proportional hazards assumption post-estimation, by
analysis of the Schoenfeld residuals, finds that the hypothesis of proportional hazards
may not be rejected. Specifying the model with a time-varying version of the cartelstatic
version finds it to be insignificant, further suggesting that the proportional-hazards Cox
model is suitable.
A possible problem with the use of cartel stasis as a basis for a model of survival is
that of causation. The model aims to show that the entry and exit of firms experienced
by cartels is associated with their durations. However, longer-lasting cartels are, ceteris
parabus, likely to have experienced more entry and exit than cartels with shorter
durations: a cartel with a short duration may have experienced entry and exit had it
continued longer. A cartel which survived a long time with a relatively low propensity
for membership instability may have still experienced instability due to the large amount
of time in which entry or exit could have occurred. A measure of membership instability
which accounts for the duration of the cartel, and more directly measures membership
instability over time, is therefore desirable.
4.3.5. Cartel Completeness
An alternative way of quantifying incomplete membership is to calculate the proportion
a cartel’s duration each firm was a member for, a figure between 0 and 1, and to average
these figures for all the firms in a cartel. This variable is known as cartel completeness.
Descriptive statistics of firm and cartel completeness in the sample are presented in
Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2.: Completeness of cartels and firms
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm completeness 476 0.873 1 0.235 0.128 1
Cartel completeness 90 0.916 0.977 0.119 0.535 1
Rather than focussing on the fact of whether entry or exit has happened in a cartel, as
a measure such as cartel staticness does, this measure is concerned with the proportion
of time a cartel’s member firms spent as members. This more directly reflects the degree
of membership instability which a cartel has experienced over time. A firm joining the
cartel shortly after the cartel’s founding, or leaving shortly before the cartel’s breakdown,
will not affect the cartel’s completeness statistic by a significant amount. A cartel which
experiences a large amount of entry and exit over the course of its duration will have
lower completeness than one with a smaller amount of entry and exit.
It is not possible to assess the proportional hazards assumption by examining Kaplan-
Meier curves since the completeness variable is continuous. Estimation and post-
estimation-based techniques must be used. Once the Cox model has been estimated the
method of Schoenfeld [1982] may be applied, where partial residuals from the model
that may be plotted against model time are taken. If the assumption of proportional
hazards is appropriate, these residuals will have zero slope when plotted against time.
The model may be stated
hi(t) = λ0(t)e
cartelcompletenessiβ
The estimated coefficients, hazard ratios and summary statistics of this model are in
the second column in Table 4.1 on page 89. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity. Testing the slope of the Schoenfeld residuals it is found that the null hypothesis of
zero slope on time may not be rejected, indicating that the assumption of proportional
hazards is appropriate. The estimated model is
hi(t) = λ0(t)e
cartelcompletenessi2.586
Interpretation of the hazard ratio, 13.28, is here slightly more complicated since
cartelcomplete varies between 0 and 1 (though the smallest value observed is 0.535). The
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quoted hazard ratio is the difference in risk between a cartel with cartelcomplete 0 and
one with 1. This comparison is not meaningful because a cartel with a completeness of
zero is impossible. A comparison between a cartel with the mean value of completeness
of 0.913 and a complete cartel with value 1 (of which there are 38) is informative. The
ratio of hazards between a cartel with a completeness of 0.913 and a complete cartel is
e1×2.586
e0.913×2.586
= 1.252
The model therefore indicates that a complete cartel is 25% more likely to break
down in each time period than a cartel with mean completeness.
It is possible to compare the results of this model with the above, cartel staticness-
based, model in order to examine the effect of using cartel completeness as a variable in
order to control for the time bias. The mean completeness of a cartel with non-static
membership is 0.852. The hazard ratio between a mean non-static cartel and a static
cartel is 1.47, indicating a static cartel is 47% more likely to break down at any given
time than a cartel with varying membership. This is substantial but considerably less
than the estimate of 82% from the staticness-based model.
4.3.6. Firm Late Entry and Early Exit
Cartel completeness is a detailed measure of membership stability but it is a cartel-level
variable. A model which takes into account the entry and exit of individual firms could
be a very powerful means of testing the effect of entry and exit on duration. Descriptive
statistics and histograms of late entry and early exit are presented in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
Figure 4.4 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve by cartel duration for firms which
neither entered late nor exited early, firms which entered late and did not exit early, firms
which did not enter late and exited early, and firms which both entered late and exited
early. It must be noted that these curves indicate the survival of the cartels which these
firms were members of, not the firms themselves. It may be seen that firms which en-
ter late and exit early tend to be members of cartels which last for longer periods of time.
However, the Kaplan-Meier curves for firms which entered late, exited early and both
late entry and early exit cross over each other in places. This means that the assumption
of proportional hazards which underlies the Cox model is violated. The ratios of the
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Figure 4.4.: Kaplan-Meier Survival Curve, by late entry and early exit
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risks of the different groups are not constant over different durations.
A solution to this problem is to retain the same basic model as before but to discard
the assumption of proportonal hazards in favour of one of time-varying coefficients.
Using firmlateness, the number of days after its founding a firm joined its cartel, and
firmearliness, the number of days before the end of a cartel. The model is:
hi(t) = λ0(t)e
firmlatenessiβ1+firmearlinessiβ2+firmlatenessitγ1+firmearlinessitγ2
β1 and β2 act just as the β coefficients do in the previous models. Firm lateness
and earliness are also interacted with the time period which the cartel is in when the
hazard is being assessed. The coefficients for these time-varying explanatory variables
are enumerated γ1 and γ2. Note that a firm which has static membership has hazard
equal to the baseline hazard since both the β and the γ coefficients are multiplied by zero.
Like the completeness measure, this approach is not dependent on the occurrence of
the act of entry or exit by firms but the amount of time which each firm spent as a mem-
ber or non-member. The model assumes that the degree of lateness or earliness of entry
or exit is what determines the hazard of breakdown. By being estimated at the level of
the firm rather than the cartel, though the hazard is one of cartel breakdown, the model
avoids the biases which arise at the level of the cartel. These biases include the pos-
sibility of large and longer cartels experiencing a greater number of entry and exit events.
Fisher and Lin [1999] provide guidance on understanding the results of a Cox model
estimated with time-varying coefficients. Serious problems with such models occur
when a complex interaction between the time-varying covariate and time is specified,
where data is censored in a way which is caused by the time-varying covariates or
where the time-varying covariate is a direct indicator of the hazard, making the model
a self-fulfilling prophecy. The estimated model does not attempt to fit a very complex
interaction between time and a covariate and the time-varying covariates, reducing the
risk of overfitting the model. The cartels data is not censored so the second concern is
not a problem. For the third concern, it is possible that a firm which exits early does so
directly because of a leniency claim. This possibility was discussed previously and no
major concern was found, partly because the majority of leniency claims are made after
the death of a cartel. The final concern is in the use of the model. It is not possible to
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draw simple expected-time-to-breakdown curves for individual cartels or firms due to
the lack of fixed values for covariates. This does not present a barrier to understanding
the results of the model as they relate to the entire sample.
Particular care must be taken since the model attempts to predict the hazard of
the cartel each firm was a member of, though the covariates themselves relate to the
individual firms.
Estimation of this model is weighted by the number of firms in each cartel so each
cartel has equal weight in the calculation of the coefficients. Cartels vary in size between
2 and 17 members so there is a large risk that the results may be distorted by the over
representation of larger cartels if this is not done. The standard errors reported are
corrected for clusters since the probabilities of cartel survival between firms in the same
cartel are clearly related and so the errors correlated. Standard errors are also robust
to heteroscedasticity.
Care must be taken in interpreting the results of the model in that the covariates of
the model are not confused with the analysis time. This puts limits on the interpretation
of the model. It is impossible to consider the hazard of the cartel of a firm which enters
after 5 years in that cartel’s 2nd year, for example, even though it is possible to put
those numbers into the estimated model.
While the data on cartel breakdown and firm entry and exit are daily and the model
is estimated with this daily data, the coefficients are scaled to make them yearly. This
does not affect the results of the model or their significance but it aids interpretation
by stopping the estimated coefficients from being extremely small.
The results of this model are given the third column of Table 4.1 on page 89. The
estimated model is
hi(t) = λ0(t)e
−firmlatenessi0.182−firmearlinessi0.413+firmlatenessit0.0052+firmearlinessit0.0306
The signs on the β coefficients indicate that cartel hazard reduces relative to the
baseline as the number of days a firm enters late or exits early. The positive signs on
the γ coefficients indicate that, for firms which enter late or exit early, hazard increases
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relative to the baseline over the cartel’s lifetime.
In order to gain a meaningful hazard ratio, which is comparable to the hazard ratios
estimated by the previous models, it is necessary to input some representative numbers
in this model. Take a firm of average incompleteness in a cartel of average duration.
The mean member firm of a varying cartel enters its cartel 512 days (1.4 years) after its
start and exits 78 days (0.21 years) before its end. The mean duration of a cartel is 8
years so let half of this duration be the time at which the hazards of a cartel with a
static firm as a member and a representative varying cartel are compared.
The hazard ratio is calculated thus:
e0
e−1.4×0.182−0.21×0.413+1.4×8×0.0052+0.21×8×0.0306
= 1.263
The model therefore estimates that the cartel which a static firm is a member of
is 26% more likely to break down in its eighth year than the cartel which an aver-
age member of a varying cartel is a member of. This hazard ratio between a mean
member of a static cartel (i.e. a static firm) and an average firm may be compared to
the hazard ratio estimated between a cartel with completeness of one and a cartel of
mean completeness in the cartel completeness model. These hazard ratios represent a
comparison between the hazard of cartels which have experienced the same amounts of
membership instability, respectively being static and typical. The cartel completeness
model estimated this hazard ratio as being 25%, as calculated above in section 4.3.5.
That these hazard ratios are very similar in magnitude indicates that the result of entry
and exit by firms signalling cartel stability against breakdown is a robust one.
Note that there is a turning point in analysis time where the positive coefficient
on the time-varying coefficient exceeds the negative coefficient on the time-invariant
covariate. For late entry, this point is at 35 years and for early exit this point is at 13
years. This means that once a cartel has survived 13 years early exit by its members
start to increase the probability of cartel breakup. The turning point for late entry is
not meaningful because the longest duration in the sample of cartels is 34 years. Due to
the estimated hazard ratios being relative to the baseline hazard, Cox models may not
be used for out-of-sample predictions.
The negative coefficient on the time-varying covariate suggests an interesting effect
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Table 4.3.: Descriptive statistics of leniency-detected cartels
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Cartel duration 51 9.7 yrs 8.3 yrs 7.1 yrs 0.5 yrs 34.9 yrs
Firm duration 306 8.5 yrs 7.7 yrs 6 yrs 0.5 34.9 yrs
Late entrants 306 0.34 0 0.47 0 1
Early exiters 306 0.2 0 0.4 0 1
Number of members 51 6 5 307 2 17
Coverage 36 0.88 0.93 0.14 0.475 1
Cartel completeness 51 0.889 0.958 0.135 0.535 1
among cartels which have experienced entry or exit in the past. Take a firm which has
just entered a cartel which is in its fifth year. The hazard ratio of the cartel of such a
firm relative to a static cartel is a very high 2.19. Ten years later, in the same cartel,
the cartel’s hazard ratio will be 1.68. Note that the gradual increase in hazard for all
cartels observed in the Weibull model in section 4.3.2 is accounted for in the baseline
hazard function so this change in hazard over time is specific to cartels which have
experienced late entry or early exit.
4.3.7. Robustness Check for Uncertain Duration
That the secret nature of cartels may lead to a mistaken identification of the starting
date of a cartel and so an underestimation of its total duration was noted in section
4.1.2. This fact may bias the results reported above. As robustness check on these
results, it is possible to use the nature of the EC’s leniency programme. 51 cartels in
the sample were detected by a member firm revealing the cartel to the Commission
and receiving full immunity to prosecution and fining. Because full cooperation to the
satisfaction of the Commission’s officials is a necessary condition of full immunity these
cartels are less likely to be susceptible to this source of bias.
Table 4.3 shows descriptive statistics for the group of cartels which were detected by
the leniency programme. This may be compared to the tables of duration and structural
characteristics for all cartels in tables 2.1 and 2.3. There are 306 firms in the 51 cartels
of which 104 entered their cartel late, 62 exited early and 31 did both. 16 out of the 51
cartels experienced no entry or exit of member firms.
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Table 4.4.: Cox proportional hazard models predicting cartel breakdown hazard by
cartel staticness, cartel completeness, and firm lateness and earliness of entry
and exit, containing only cartels detected through leniency
Specification (model) number
1 2 3
Variable Haz. Ratio Coeff. Haz. Ratio Coeff. Haz. Ratio Coeff.
Cartel Static
1.708† 0.536† - - - -
(0.308)
Cartel Completeness
- - 8.874** 2.183** - -
(1.037)
Firm Lateness
- - - - 0.851*** -0.162***
(0.025)
Firm Earliness
- - - - 0.732 -0.312
(0.198)
Firm Lateness*t
- - - - 1.004*** 0.0044***
(0.001)
Firm Earliness*t
- - - - 1.025† 0.025†
(0.014)
Obs 51 51 306
Days at risk 180841 180841 179828
Log (pseudo)likelihood -151.04 -149.97 -1439.5
LR/Wald χ2 2.83 4.98 92.22
Robust standard errors in brackets † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Compared to the full sample of cartels, cartels detected through leniency tend to
be longer and larger. The mean duration of cartels which were detected through le-
niency is 9.7 years, compared to 5.9 years for cartel detected through other means,
and 8 years for the full sample of cartels. The median number of members for cartels
which were detected through leniency was 5, compared to 4 for cartels discovered
through other means and the full sample. In the leniency-detected subset 34% of
firms entered their cartels late, with 16% doing so in the non-leniency detected subset,
and 28% in the full sample. In both subsets and the full sample 20% of firms exited early.
The results of the three survival models estimated using only the cartels detected
through leniency are given in Table 4.4. The significance of the results has declined;
notably the cartel static measure is no longer significant at the 5% level in Model 1, and
the time-invariant firm earliness variable ceasing to be significant in Model 3. However,
the estimated coefficients and hazard ratios are very similar to those estimated using
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the full sample. This indicates that the results of the models, in terms of the effect
of membership instability on the hazard of cartel breakdown, are robust against the
potential for uncertainty in recorded cartel duration.
4.4. Discussion
The findings of Section 4.3 suggest that successful cartels are characterised by firms
leaving and joining. This is consistent with the above theory on marginal firms and
cartel stability (that firms will leave and join cartels according to their own immediate
incentives). In terms of the dichotomy in Spar [1994] between the Realist and Institu-
tionalist views of cooperation this tends towards the Realist view in that cooperation
needs to be in the personal interest of all firms in order to be sustainable rather than
relying on the commitments of all firms to cooperation. It does not confirm the more
extreme interpretation the Realist view that cooperation is only possible in the presence
of a hegemon, however.
Osborne [1976] and Harrington [1989b] argue that cartel institutions which aim to
control member firms enhance cartel survival. These findings do not suggest that this is
necessarily false. Indeed, for any given cartel it is likely the case that the addition of a
monitoring or punishment mechanism increases the robustness of the agreement. How-
ever, if a cartel rule makes a member firm prefer to break down a cartel when it otherwise
would have moved to the fringe without breaking up the cartel then such a rule is harmful.
It must be noted that the sample consists only of detected cartels. If all cartels have
an equal chance of being detected then the results of this study may be applied to
all cartels without worry. However, it may well be the case that cartels with certain
characteristics are more or less likely to be detected by the E.C. or to have a member
firm apply for leniency. Unfortunately, neither the true number of cartels in existence
is known nor the characteristics of undetected cartels. Care must therefore be taken
before too bold a claim is made about the nature of all cartels.
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4.5. Conclusions
The models estimated in this paper would seem to further the hypothesis outlined
throughout this thesis, that firms’ decisions on cartel membership are determined pri-
marily by their economic incentives, rather than by personal characteristics of people
involved in collusion or by random chance.. That cartel institutions which restrict firms’
entry and exit to and from the cartel may be harmful to the duration of the cartel is
a secondary hypothesis. The next chapter of this thesis examines cartel institutions
in greater detail in order to find whether their use may be determined by structural
characteristics.
The survival models indicate that cartels whose firms enter and exit tend to last
for longer than those cartels whose membership is static. Varying membership could
indicate a variety of structural characteristics or changes. If information on the existence
of outsiders and entry and exit to and from the market housing the cartel were available
in the published decisions, which do not give details on the non-colluding firms, then
the predictions of marginal firms models could more directly be tested. The problem
with the endogeneity of invariability with respect to cartel duration is present in these
models despite attempts to alleviate it.
The normative conclusions which can be drawn from this research are limited. If
anything, the main advice is aimed at cartelists rather than competition authorities:
institutions which aim to maximise the size of a cartel by preventing firms from leaving
or which aim to hoard profits by excluding fringe members which wish to join may harm
cartels by forcing firms which wish to leave to report the cartel to authorities or firms
which wish to join to produce externally to the cartel.
While the conclusion that cartels with variable membership are longer-lasting than
those with static or less variable membership may seem to be strange it must be noted
that variable membership only signals structural stability. It is highly likely that for
any given cartel, defection by members to the fringe is detrimental to the profits of the
remaining member firms.
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Chapter 5.
On the Use of Collusive Agreement Types
Economists have identified many mechanisms that allow firms to collude in order to
increase their profits at the expense of their consumers. Cartels must choose a means
by which to agree on the restriction of output in order to cause the rise in price they
desire. Price fixing, bid rigging, quota allocation, territorial allocation and customer
allocation are common examples of this type of mechanism. Cartels may also attempt
to increase the stability of these agreements using strategies such as the monitoring of
sales, the exchange of cost information and the imposing of punishment on defectors.
The set of collusive technologies which is dedicated to the setting of price and output
which forms the central basis of a cartel agreement, such as price fixing and bid rigging,
are known as ‘agreement types.’ Collusive technologies dedicated to monitoring firms
and punishing defection are known as ‘enforcement strategies.’ This paper focuses on
agreement types and the structural characteristics of cartels and markets which give
rise to various technologies.
Different agreement types are known to lead to different profit-possibility frontiers
and various kinds of conduct by firms. Robust agreements are also recognised as being
essential to cartel stability, to ensure that a change in economic circumstances will not
break a cartel down. However, beyond descriptive and narrative accounts, there has
been no systematic account of what leads a cartel to choose a particular agreement
type.
Identifying structural predictors of certain agreement types could not only enhance
our understanding of cartel stability and their welfare effects but could also be useful
in cartel screening. Different agreement types produce different behavioural collusive
markers. A competition authority engaged in screening could find it useful to know
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which collusive technologies are likely to be in use in a market, and so on which be-
havioural markers they should focus their efforts.
The estimated SUR model is moderately effective at predicting the use of price fixing,
bid rigging, customer allocation and quota allocation but performs poorly at predicting
the use of territorial allocation. The geographical scope of a cartel is found to be one of
the best predictors of the agreement type it will choose to use.
5.1. The Importance of Agreement Types
Levenstein and Suslow [2006b] argue that the main cause of cartel breakdown is the
failure to adjust cartel agreements following a change in economic conditions. That
effective collusive technologies dedicated to monitoring firms for defection from the
cartel agreement and enforcing cartel rules will make a cartel viable in a larger set of
structural circumstances is clear. Though they do not address the issue directly, it is
possible that a cartel’s agreement type will partially determine that cartel’s adaptability.
Harrington [2006b] details ‘collusive markers’ which may indicate to competition au-
thorities the use of a particular agreement type. For example, the offering of an identical
price to all customers in a market is a collusive marker for price fixing. Extremely stable
market shares over time is a collusive marker for output quota allocation. Literature on
screening for cartels makes a distinction between these behavioural markers and also
structural markers, such as the concentration of markets and the presence of barriers to
entry. Harrington [2006a] argues that structural markers are of limited use because of
their extremely high risk of false positives, whereas strong behavioural collusive markers
are unlikely to accompany legitimate, competitive conduct.
5.2. Comparing Different Agreement Types
5.2.1. Interaction Between Agreement Types and Allocation Rules
Schmalensee [1987] provides a comprehensive look at collusive technologies in the context
of firms which have varying costs (specifically, a single low-cost firm and a variable
amount of high-cost firms). For various numbers of firms and degrees of cost hetero-
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geneity he simulates the equilibrium which results from the combination of each of four
agreement types and four solution concepts. In Schmalensee’s model, an agreement
type provides a contract surface of Pareto-efficient allocations of cartel profits; firms
must then bargain over the exact allocation.
The single low-cost firm has costs C(q1) = (1− θ1)q1 where q1 is the output produced
by the low-cost firm. There are N high-cost firms, each having costs C(q2) = (1− θ2)q2
where q2 is each firm’s output. Market (inverse) demand is P = 1−Q. The degree of
cost asymmetry between the low-cost firm and the high-cost firms may be summarised by
the parameter R = θ1θ2 .
1 The market may effectively be described by the two parameters
N and R.
The mode of conduct among the firms in the market in the absence of a cartel is
assumed to be Cournot competition. Letting S represent the share of market output
produced by the low-cost firm in Cournot equilibrium, the parameters of the model may
be related to each other thus:
R =
N(1 + S)
(N + 1)− S
A larger S or a larger N (holding the other parameter constant) implies a larger cost
advantage for the low-cost firm. A larger share for the low-cost firm with a constant
number of high-cost firms requires a larger cost advantage. If there are a greater number
of high-cost firms, then the low-cost firm requires a larger cost advantage to maintain
the same share of output in equilibrium. The model assumes that a cartel must consist
of all firms in the market.
The collusive technologies studied by Schmalensee are side payments, where the
efficient firm is able to pay the less-efficient firms to not operate while it acts as a
monopolist; Market sharing, where firms are allocated quotas and produce up to those
quotas; Market division, where firms are allocated customers or geographical areas
and act as a monopolist over their allocation; and Proportional reduction, where firms
reduce their competitive level of output by the same amount.
Side payments are almost unheard of in modern cartels due to the impossibility of
1In order that the costs of the high-cost firms do not exceed the monopoly price set by the low-cost
firm, it is assumed that θ2 > θ3 > 2θ2 so 1 < R < 2.
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making a legally binding agreement to not produce and the egregiously illegal and
obvious nature of the activity. Compensation mechanisms which mandate transfers
between firms when output quotas are exceeded (as found in cartels such as the Lysine
cartel Connor [2008]), are not side payments of this type since they are uncertain
in their amounts and in their payers and instead may be considered an enforcement
mechanism. Still, the monopoly equilibrium provides a benchmark for comparison and
illustrates how much profit the cartel loses due to the inefficiency of their agreement type.
The crucial feature of market sharing is that all firms must charge the same price
to all customers. This implies an inefficiency since the low-cost firm’s profits will be
maximised at a lower price to those of the high-cost firm. The model assumes that
firms are sufficiently patient that any collusive equilibrium is incentive-compatible. Note
that this agreement type may be seen as encompassing price fixing as well as quota
allocation, though price fixing alone contains no obvious mechanism by which profits
may be allocated among members.
Market division overcomes the basic problem of market sharing by allowing firms to
charge which price they choose to their allocated customers or territory. Each firm may
then set prices as a monopolist. Because of this, this agreement type is strictly more
profitable. Note that this agreement type is still not as profitable as side payments since
the high-cost firms are forced to produce to gain profits, rather than this production
being performed by the low-cost firm and the resulting profits being transferred. Cus-
tomer and territorial allocation may be considered types of market division.
The final agreement type modelled by Schmalensee is proportional reduction, where
firms all reduce their output by an equal proportion. This is extremely restrictive
since the distribution of production is fixed at the same proportions as under Cournot
competition. At best, this technology may produce profits as large as those from market
sharing, but only for a particular allocation of profits.
The diagram in figure 5.1 illustrates the profit possibility frontiers implied by each of
the technologies2. The profits of an individual high-cost firm are designated Π2, on the
2Proportional reduction is excluded from this diagram because it is separate from the other technologies
in implying an allocation rule in addition to a technology. Its curve on this diagram would describe
the set of all possible profit combinations from the collusive technology, rather than a frontier
bounding the space of possible profit allocations. The profit curve for proportional reduction would
begin at the Cournot point, curve upwards, touch the Market Sharing frontier and then move towards
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Figure 5.1.: Collusive technologies in profit space
aThis diagram is a reproduction of that found on page 355 of Schmalensee (1987)
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vertical axis, and the profits of the low-cost firm are designated Π1, on the horizontal
axis. The diagram is drawn showing a moderate degree of cost asymmetry between
the high and low-cost firms; if costs were completely symmetrical, all of the curves
would be identical. In order to be incentive-compatible for all firms their profits must
be greater than under competition. The set of allocations of profits for which this is
true is enclosed by the dotted lines starting at the Cournot point.
For the incentive-compatible allocations, side payments strictly dominate all other
collusive technologies. This represents the low-cost firm producing all of the output in
the market and then redistributing a portion of the profits to the high-cost firms in
return for them not producing any output.
Market division in turn dominates market sharing across incentive-compatible alloca-
tions. This is because of the previously mentioned point that under market division
firms may charge which price is optimal for them given market demand whereas under
marketing sharing all firms must set the same price. The market sharing price will be
some combination of higher than optimal for the high-cost firms and lower-than optimal
for the low-cost firm, depending on the agreed allocation. The amount by which the
possible joint profits from market division exceed those from market sharing depends on
the degree of convexity of the market sharing frontier. The market sharing frontier is
strictly convex for any level of cost asymmetry and its convexity increases with greater
asymmetry.
The exact allocation of profits that the cartel arrives at depends on the bargaining
rule which is assumed. All bargaining rules will produce a pareto-efficient outcome
which lies on the profit frontier of the collusive technology used by the cartel. The
bargaining rules examined by Schmalensee are
Nash Bargaining Solution where the product of the parties gains from collusion relative
to Cournot competition
(Π∗1 −Πc1)(Π∗2 −Πc2)
is maximised. Π∗i designates the profits of firm i under collusion and Π
c
i the profits
of firm i with collusion.
Kalai-Smorodinsky where each participant receives the same fraction of the maximum
the origin.
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possible gains from collusion. Let Πmi represent the largest possible gains that
firm i could receive from the chosen collusive technology, if all other firms were
to be allocated only the profits they would have received under Cournot. Under
Kalai-Smorodinsky the cartel then sets Π∗1 and Π∗2 such that
(Π∗1 −Πc1)
(Πm1 −Πc1)
=
(Π∗2 −Πc2)
(Πm2 −Πc2)
Where the profit frontier of the collusive technology used by the cartel is linear, as
it is for side payments and market division, the solutions of the Kalai-Smorodinsky
and Nash bargaining rules are identical.
Equal Gains where the absolute gains made by all firms are set to be equal.
(Π∗1 −Πc1) = (Π∗2 −Πc2)
For side payments the solutions of Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky and Equal Gains all
coincide. For market division, the solution to Equal Gains will be to the left of
the solutions to Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky, reflecting greater profits for the
high-cost firms.
W ∗ = S applies only to the market division technology. It assumes that the firms retain
the same share of customers they did in Cournot competition (S) in the cartel
equilibrium (W ∗), but are able to charge a cartel price to them. This resembles
the proportional allocation rule assumed by models such as Bos and Harrington
[2010], within the context of market division.
Schmalensee takes a numerical simulation approach to examining the effects of changes
in R, N and S on the collusive equilibrium. While solutions may be calculated as
functions of N and S they are too complex to assess easily the effects of the variables
on firm profits, total output and consumer welfare. Consistent patterns may be seen in
the simulations, and these are the conclusions of the article.
Where there is cost asymmetry, the profits of the high-cost firms increase by a larger
proportion relative to Cournot than the low-cost firm. Collusion always reduces con-
sumer welfare and will reduce total welfare also, unless the asymmetry between firms is
extreme and the side payments technology is used. In this case, the rationalisation of
all production to the low-cost firm may cause a small increase in total welfare. If side
payments are impossible then collusion will necessarily cause decrease in total welfare.
109
Membership, Stability and Internal Institutions in European Cartels
As the number of firms in the market increase, the Cournot equilibrium becomes more
competitive so the harm to consumers and gain to firms from collusion increases with
N . Increases in N also increase the bargaining power of the high-cost firms relative to
the low-cost firm and so decrease the proportion of gains accruing to the low-cost firm.
Where asymmetry is large and side payments are impossible, the gains from collusion
to the low-cost firm are so low that collusion may be unlikely. Market division allows
significantly higher profits for high-cost firms compared to market sharing, especially as
the degree of asymmetry increases.
A prediction of the paper which is of particular interest to this chapter is that cartels
with greater asymmetry will prefer allocation-based agreement types over price fixing
because they firms will be able to choose appropriate prices. That some agreement
types dominate others is also important - dominated agreement types such as quota
sharing may not be powerful enough mechanisms to be used alone successfully.
5.2.2. Sharing Rules in Practice
A small number of studies have examined the use of agreement types in samples of
cartels, rather than as a part of a narrative of a single cartel. Two of these studies use
samples of legal cartels. Hyytinen et al. [2012] detail the contracts used by 109 legal
cartels in Finland between 1959 and 1988 and Fink et al. [2015] describe the agreements
of Austria legal cartels from 1972 to 1995. Both studies are able to examine the actual
contracts governing the cartels and so report on their agreement types accurately and
in great detail.
In their Austrian sample Fink et al. [2015] identify thirteen different varieties of price
fixing, five types of market division, two types of capacity restriction, two types of
coordinated vertical exclusion, three various ways of standardising norms, two non-cartel
types of cooperation and two methods of entry prevention. They also note the formal
structure of the cartels’ meetings and management. In total, over 200 fields of data are
gathered on each cartel in the sample. Among the 80 distinct horizontal cartels in their
sample, they find that 37 used quota fixing, 26 used customer allocation (in the form
of ‘specialisation’ agreements), 41 used price agreements, and 44 fixed the payment
conditions members could offer.
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Fink et al. [2015] note that over half of the cartels in their sample use multiple
agreement types simultaneously. 37 out of the 80 cartels used a single agreement type:
13 fixed payment conditions alone, 10 quotas, 7 fixed prices, and 7 agreed to allocate
customers, products or territories. The most common combination of agreement types
observed was that of price and payment conditions in 20 cartels, of which 11 also fixed
payment conditions.
5.2.3. Sharing Rules as a Constraint to Collusion
The legal Norwegian Cement cartel in the 1950s and 1960s had a rigorous sharing rule,
enforced through contracts. Ro¨ller and Steen [2006] models structurally the incentives
the chosen allocation rule created among the cartel’s members and how it led to the
cartel’s relative ineffectiveness. The allocation rule used was to allocate shares of cartel
output to firms proportional to their share of capacity. Total quantity to be sold in
Norway was decided by the cartel, but no restrictions were placed on capacity or total
production: production above the domestic quota was exported.
After the 1955 founding of the cartel, members invested very strongly in capacity.
Total production increased by 150% by 1968 while domestic production increased by
only 50%. Norwegian consumers of cement were still being charged a monopoly-level
price but each cartel member faced a constant incentive to increase capacity to gain a
greater market share. Much of the excess production being exported was sold at a price
below the marginal costs of the producers. The additional investment in capacity led
to a lower monopoly price set by the cartel so consumers did benefit somewhat from
the inefficiency of the allocation rule, but were still harmed considerably compared to
competition. The welfare loss to firms from this was so extreme that the paper’s model
estimates that total welfare was actually increased by the industry’s eventual merger to
monopoly - that is, the firms’ welfare gained through halting cheap exports exceeded
the consumer welfare lost through monopoly pricing and production.
The crucial reason why the allocation rule of the cartel led to its failure is that the
cartel agreement was incomplete: it did not constrain firms’ capacity decisions or the
export market. This example shows how semicollusion, where firms collude in some
factors under their control but compete in others, can harm the firms engaged in it and
explain why they would wish to choose an agreement type appropriate to their industry
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or multiple agreement types.
This case illustrates why a cartel which fails to coordinate on multiple aspects of their
strategy may collude sub-optimally. A successful strategy profile for the Norwegian
Cement cartel may have consisted of a quantity rule which included exports, or a price
rule which covered both domestic and export sales. Certain agreement types may
complement each other well when used together, whereas other agreement types may
act as substitutes for each other.
5.2.4. Multiple Simultaneous Agreement Types
From a simple theoretical viewpoint it may seem that many agreement types are mu-
tually incompatible, or at least redundant when applied together. However, cartels
frequently do use agreement types simultaneously. Some agreement types may apply
simultaneously to the same transactions, such as price fixing and quota allocation, and
some agreement types may be used by the same cartel in different circumstances, such
as price fixing in a spot market and bid rigging in an auction market for the same product.
van den Berg and Bos [2017] show that simultaneous price and quantity rules can
produce a more profitable outcome for a cartel’s members than a cartel which sets
price alone. The additional quantity rule allows the cartel to distribute output among
members in order to induce the smallest members to stay members, where they might
defect under a price agreement alone. Under certain circumstances (where firms produce
output in advance of sales, and demand is relatively price inelastic) the cartel is required
to set a price lower than the monopoly price. A price-quantity agreement also allows
the cartel to prevent overproduction by allocating output shares.
Sometimes different strategies are necessary for different customers. A cartel could
fix prices normally but need to rig bids when a customer chooses to buy using a auction.
Connor [2008] describes how the Vitamin C cartel functioned by customer allocation
for all buyers except Coca-Cola, which bought in such quantities that it was necessary
to allocate quotas among producers in order to satisfy Coca-Cola’s demand.
De [2010b] studies a similar sample of cartels sanctioned by the E.C., between 1990 and
2007, and discusses descriptively and narratively the use of various collusive technologies
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by cartels. She notes that cartels which used enforcement rules, such as compensation
payments or the threat of price wars, were likely to use only one such rule. There
are multiple explanations for this phenomenon. The use of multiple agreement types
may nullify the need for formal mechanisms to prevent or rectify deviation by fixing
choices which would normally allow a firm to violate an agreement, intentionally or
unintentionally.
Another important finding is that the incidence of certain collusive technologies is
very dependent on the existence of other collusive technologies. No cartels use bid
rigging or customer allocation as their only collusive technology and their use is strongly
correlated with each other, and with price fixing. When a single collusive technology is
used, that technology is almost always price fixing or territorial allocation.
5.2.5. The Development of Strategy Profiles
That certain combinations of agreement types are used by multiple cartels is observed
by Connor [2008] in his narrative of the global cartels in the markets for citric acid,
vitamins and lysine. He notes that all of these cartels used a distinctive system of
price fixing and quota allocation, followed by monitoring and corrective compensation
payments in order to maintain the quotas. He terms this the ‘Lysine strategy profile’.
A part of the reason the Lysine strategy profile was so closely replicated by these
cartels is that the structure was developed in the Japanese market for Lysine prior to
the entry of Archer Daniels Midland into the Lysine market, and was spread into the
other markets by firms which had observed the success of the strategy in other markets.
Connor refers to this process as ‘contagion’. Cartel contagion is also observed in the
dairy market by Balagtas and Sumner [2003] where collusion among milk producers in
the USA was observed to gradually spread to states which were geographically adjacent
to states which already contained milk cartels.
Levenstein and Suslow [2006b] argue that cartel strategies develop over time to
become more robust through a process of trial and error on the part of cartelists.
Contagion allows this process to be shortened within a given market by allowing a
strategy which is already known to be successful to be implemented, with only small
changes necessary for the individual markets such as the addition of another agreement
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type in order to cover part of the market. This was observed in the Vitamin C cartel
where the sales to the largest customers were divided among cartel members rather than
being allocated to a single firm, as in other markets. Zhou [2012] analyses a sample of
international cartels and finds that those cartels which use the Lysine strategy profile do
indeed have longer duration than those which use other strategies. The spread of cartel
strategies via contagion and the development of robust strategies via learning mean that
certain combinations of agreement types may be seen to be replicated in multiple cartels.
5.3. The Data and Descriptive Overview
The data set consists of 88 cartels sanctioned by the European Commission between
2001 and 2011. A total of 468 individual firms were members of these cartels. Firms
which participated in multiple cartels are counted multiple times in this data. Data
on market shares is available for 75 of the cartels studied: this is the set analysed in
section 5.4.
The European Commission’s decision documents enumerate the types of illegal conduct
observed in each cartel. This is the data source for the agreement types. Information
on the geographical scope of cartels and the number of member firms is also found this
way. Market share data is more complex to gather. Due to the need for secrecy with
some details of the firms involved in cartel proceedings, only approximate ranges for
firm market shares or output are given. The centre points of these ranges are taken as
being the value and the market shares calculated on this basis.
Table 5.2 shows the frequency of use for all five agreement types identified in use by
these cartels and the frequencies of all combinations of two agreement types, plus the fre-
quency with which each agreement type is used alone. The final column shows the total
number of cartels which used each agreement type, either individually or in combination
with others. This table does not capture all possible combinations of agreement types
because it is limited to two dimensions. 19 cartels used three agreement types, one cartel,
Gas Insulated Switchgear, used four agreement types and the Marine Hoses cartel used
all five agreement types. Note that quota allocation is never used alone, indicating that
Schmalensee’s finding that it is a weak agreement type when used alone may be accurate.
The correlations between the frequency with which agreement types are observed
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Bid Territorial Customer Quota No other
Total
rigging allocation allocation allocation agreements
Price
13 9 27 33 17 75
fixing
Bid
2 13 3 0 19
rigging
Territorial
4 5 5 14
allocation
Customer
7 2 35
allocation
Quota
0 33
allocation
Figure 5.2.: Frequency of agreement types being used together
Table 5.1.: Correlation between agreement types
Price Bid Territorial Customer Quota
fixing rigging allocation allocation allocation
Price
1
fixing
Bid
-0.2504 1
rigging
Territorial
-0.2582 -0.0745 1
allocation
Customer
-0.1881 0.3103 -0.0951 1
allocation
Quota
0.3175 -0.2296 -0.0122 -0.2847 1
allocation
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may be seen in Table 5.1. Positive figures indicate that two agreement types are likely
to be observed being used by the same cartel, whereas negative figures indicate that the
presence of one agreement type means the likelihood of observing the other is lower.
Most of the correlation coefficients are negative, indicating the tendency of most cartels
to use only one or two agreement types, rather than many. The two notably positive
correlations are between bid rigging and customer allocation and between price fixing
and bid rigging. Conclusions about whether these agreement types are complements or
substitutes may not be drawn from this matrix, however. These correlations could be
caused by agreement types sharing a common set of causal variables. A more detailed
analysis allows this problem to be solved.
5.4. Predicting the Use of Agreement Types
The objective of this analysis is to discover whether it is possible to predict which
agreement types are likely to be used by a cartel, based on that cartel’s structural
characteristics. Whether certain agreement types act as complements or substitutes to
each other is also of interest.
The correlation between collusive technologies means that the technique of Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) is likely to provide more efficient estimates than individual
OLS regressions. The residuals of the estimated predictors for different agreement types
may also be examined to see if they correlate with each other, indicating tendencies for
them to be used or not used alongside each other beyond those caused by the covariates
included in the model. However, the regressions produced by this technique will be
linear probability models which, despite having easily interpretable results, may produce
results outside of the interval of [0, 1]. A multivariate probit regression, estimating
an equation for each agreement type through simulated maximum likelihood, would
combine the most attractive attributes of both of these approaches. Unfortunately, the
above problem with certain variables predicting the outcomes of some observations
perfectly occurs and using a maximum likelihood approach is impossible. The process
of estimating SUR does not involve a likelihood function so the presence of some perfect
predictors does not prevent estimation using the full number of observations for which
there is data available. Large estimated coefficients should be anticipated for those
variables which are perfect predictors.
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Seemingly Unrelated Regressions models take the form of a set of individual regression
equations for different dependent variables combined with each other. A general form is:

y1
y2
...
yM
 =

X1 0 · · · 0
0 X2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · XM


β1
β2
...
βM
+

1
2
...
M

Where the y terms are dependent variables, the X terms explanatory variables, β
terms coefficients on the explanatory variables and  the residuals of the models. M is
the number of individual regression equations included in the system. In the particular
case where the explanatory variables used in all of the regression equations are identical,
the estimated coefficients on those explanatory variables are identical to those calculated
by performing Ordinary Least Squares on the individual regressions separately. The
residuals produced by the SUR model are of great interest. If the residuals of the
individual equations are found to be correlated with other then SUR is a more efficient
estimator than separate OLS. Also, the correlations between the residuals may be
examined and interpreted in order to reveal correlations between the outcomes of the
dependent variables beyond those implied by the common explanatory variables. In
the case of agreement types, a positive correlation indicates that the agreement types
in question are more likely to be observed together than implied by the explanatory
variables and a negative correlation indicates that the agreement types are less likely to
be observed together.
This approach does have clear flaws. Aside from the limitations of a linear prob-
ability model mentioned earlier, it is very difficult to see how anything other than a
reduced-form econometric approach to this question could be attempted. Also, some of
the independent variables are likely to be endogenous with respect to the agreement
type. This is most clear when it comes to the symmetry in firms’ market shares in
cartels which use quota allocation: manipulation of market shares is the central point,
especially when combined with price fixing. Whether the geographical scope of a cartel is
dependent on its agreement is arguable: it may be predetermined by the characteristics
of the product or the market or firms may be able to choose whether to compete or
collude in various markets.
Table 5.2 contains the results of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression predicting the use
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Table 5.3.: Correlation matrix of residuals from SUR model
Price Bid Territorial Customer Quota
fixing rigging allocation allocation allocation
Price
1
fixing
Bid
-0.1704 1
rigging
Territorial
-0.3488 -0.0346 1
allocation
Customer
-0.2170 0.3232 0.0195 1
allocation
Quota
0.0686 -0.1307 -0.0792 -0.2291 1
allocation
of the five agreement types identified in the sample with several structural characteristics
of the cartels, namely their geographical scope, the number of member firms they had
and the coefficient of variation of the members’ shares of cartel output. A matrix
showing the degree of correlation between the residuals of the SUR model for different
agreement types is in Table 5.3. An alternative specification, excluding market share
coefficient of variation from the model so that all 91 cartels may be used to estimate
the model, is in Table B.6 in Appendix B.
With the exception of the model predicting territorial allocation, the joint significance
(as indicated by the chi2 and p-values) of each of the models is high. The geographical
scope variables are the most consistently significant variables across all agreement types.
Logit Models
Logit models may be estimated for each agreement type in order to predict their use
individually. A problem with this approach is that some covariates predict the use
of certain agreement types perfectly. When a variable perfectly predicts the outcome
of some observations within a dataset it is not possible to calculate a likelihood func-
tion in order to obtain estimated coefficients. In order to estimate the model under
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such circumstances it is necessary to omit the observations for which prediction is
perfect. This causes sharp drops in the number of observations which may be used
to estimate certain model specifications. Only a single cartel of global scope did not
use price fixing, and this cartel does have market share data so is not included in the
set of observations used to estimate the main logit model. In the same model, all
cartels in the Chemicals sector used price fixing. Taken together, these omissions of
observations cause the number of observations able to be used to predict the use of
price fixing to only 37. Omissions are also made in the territorial allocation and quota
allocation models due to perfect prediction, reducing the number of observations used
to 59 and 79 — no cartels of national scope use territorial allocation and no cartel
of regional scope or classified as being in the ‘other’ industrial sector use quota allocation.
The results of the estimated logit models are in Table B.5 in Appendix B. Due to
the omitted observations and variables, the results should not be considered authorita-
tive. The results of the models estimated with larger numbers of observations may be
considered as robustness checks on the main results. The variables which are perfect
predictors of the use of agreement types are informative, however, and will be discussed
alongside the results of the SUR model.
5.4.1. Interpretation of Results
The table of observed results has many estimated coefficients. I shall discuss the models’
predictions for each agreement type in turn and then examine the importance each set
of explanatory variables across all agreement types.
Price Fixing
Price fixing is the most common agreement type in the sample, present in 82% of
cartels. That all cartels of global geographical scope in the sample was engaged in price
fixing is one indicator of this. Still, all of the coefficients associated with geographical
scope variables are significant, positive and large indicating that price fixing is relatively
uncommon in cartels of the baseline national scope. Cartels with a relatively large
number of firms are more likely to feature price fixing. Compared to agreement types
which require each firm being allocated a specific and discrete portion of the market,
price fixing may be easily scalable to a large number of cartel members. Cartels in
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manufacturing and metals industries are less likely to use price fixing than cartels in
the baseline industry of chemicals. Price fixing is also less common in industries which
fall into the ‘other’ category.
Cartels where the member firms have asymmetric market shares are less likely to be
observed using price fixing. This could indicate that price fixing is not as robust to
large differences in costs and capacities between firms as other agreement types due to
the necessity in a price fixing cartel that firms charge the same or similar prices. This
finding matches with the theoretical prediction that cartels with heterogeneous firms
will face allocation problems with price fixing that they will not with agreement types
which allow member firms to charge a price appropriate to their costs.
Bid Rigging
In contrast to price fixing, bid rigging is most common of all in cartels of national scope.
This reflects the fact that the most prominent users of auctions in order to purchase
products are national governments, so cartels targeting procurement auctions will be
limited to the country of the national government in question. Bid rigging is more
likely in cartels with more members, indicating that, like price fixing, it is an agreement
type which is compatible with a large number of cartelists. Cartels in manufacturing
industries are more likely than cartels in the baseline chemicals industry to rig bids.
Territorial Allocation
No cartel of national scope uses the territorial allocation agreement type, and it is
relatively likely to occur in cartels of global scope. The possibility of arbitrage be-
tween territories or consumers switching where they choose to purchase products make
territorial allocation ineffective as a means of restricting competition, whereas large
geographical separation between territories makes the localised monopolies or restricted
oligopolies created more effective. No other variables are found to be good predictors of
territorial allocation being found to be present in cartels’ strategies.
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Customer Allocation
The occurrence of customer allocation is also difficult to predict using the explanatory
variables included in the model. Customer allocation is substantially and significantly
less likely to be observed in cartels of global scope than cartels of national scope. No
other variables are found to be significant in the regression except the constant term.
Quota Allocation
Quota allocation is likely to to observed as a part of the strategy of global cartels,
compared to the baseline of national cartels. It is never observed in the sample in a
cartel classified as being in the ‘other’ industries group and is less likely to be observed
in cartels in the manufacturing industries than cartels in the baseline chemicals industries.
There is an observed link between the occurrence of quota allocation and cartel
symmetry: the more asymmetric a cartel, the more likely that cartel is observed to
have used a quota allocation system. This may seem counter-intuitive, since cartelists
with similar costs would seek to make their output shares as symmetrical as possible in
order to prevent the defection of the firm with the least profit from the firm. However,
if the cartelists have differing costs then a quota system may be necessary to allocation
a greater portion of profits to the low cost firms so they do not defect. Lacking a quota
system, the fact that all firms charge similar prices may lead to all firms having similar
levels of sales because of the indifference of consumers between the firms.
Individual Explanatory Variables
Some individual explanatory variables are consistently successful at predicting the use
of agreement types by cartels. Broadly, the geographical scopes of cartels in the sample
are the strongest predictors. The number of firms in each agreement and the asymmetry
of market shares between firms in the cartels are relatively weak predictors.
Cartels with greater numbers of firms are more likely to be observed using price
fixing and bid rigging in their agreements. Each additional firm in a cartel increases the
likelihood of price fixing being found in its agreement by 4% and increases the likelihood
of the presence of bid rigging by 3.6%.
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The coefficient of variation (CoV) of the member firms’ shares of cartel output is a
rather poor predictor of agreement type. The only significant coefficients are in the
price fixing and quota allocation models. These coefficients indicate that there is weak
evidence that more asymmetric cartels are less likely to fix prices and that there is
moderate evidence that more asymmetrical cartels are likely to use quota allocation.
The interquartile range of cartel share CoV for the sample is 0.4, so the marginal effect
of a movement from the most symmetrical quartile to the most asymmetrical quartile
for a firm is a 9.5% increase in the probability of that cartel using quota allocation.
The geographical scope variables are simple to interpret because the coefficients may
be interpreted directly as proportional differences in probability relative to the baseline
geographical scope of a national cartel. Global cartels have a strongly predicted set
of agreement types. Compared to national cartels, they are likely to use price fixing,
territorial allocation and quota allocation. They are unlikely to use bid rigging and
customer allocation. Europe-wide cartels are 30% more likely to practice customer
allocation and 43% less likely to rig bids. Regional cartels, those affecting a subset of
European countries, are 24% less likely to fix prices.
There is some evidence that the industrial sector a cartel is active in predicts the
agreement type they will use. Compared to cartels among chemicals companies, cartels
among manufacturing firms are less likely to use price fixing and quota allocation and
more likely to use bid rigging. Metals cartels and cartels in industries which do not fit
into the main categories are also less likely to use price fixing than chemicals cartels.
This indicates that price fixing is common among cartels in the chemicals sector.
Note also the large and significant constant terms accompanying price fixing and
customer allocation. This indicates that price fixing and customer allocation are common
agreement types among cartels.
Multiple Agreement Types
Examining the coefficients on the explanatory variables shows that some of the tenden-
cies for certain agreement types to be used in conjunction by cartels are explained by
the explanatory variables. For example, cartels of global scope are more likely to be
observed using price fixing, territorial allocation and quota allocation than cartels of
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national scope, but less likely to be observed using bid rigging or customer allocation.
Large cartels are more likely to use both price fixing and bid rigging than smaller cartels.
The matrix in Table 5.3 showing showing the correlation between the residuals is
different from the earlier correlation matrix in Table 5.1 in an important way – the effects
of the covariates included in the SUR are accounted for. Correlations between agreement
types in this matrix show the agreement types are complements and substitutes for
each other for reasons beyond sharing a common correlation with the explanatory
variables of the model. The correlation between price fixing and quota allocation is
particularly striking here: it is considerably lower in this matrix than in the earlier
matrix. This suggests that price fixing and quota sharing are not strong complements
in themselves, but rather they are both favoured by global cartels. In contrast, the
positive correlation between bid rigging and customer allocation is still present and
relatively high. This indicates that these agreement types complement each other for
reasons not accounted for in the regressions. Other strongly negative correlations may
be seen between price fixing and territorial and customer allocation, and between quota
allocation and customer allocation.
5.5. Conclusion
Variables about the structure of the market are found to be poor predictors of whether
certain agreement types will be observed in a cartel. Larger cartels are more likely to
use price fixing and bid rigging, suggesting these are agreements which may easily be
applied to large groups of firms compared to the agreement types which involve making
specific allocations to each member firm. Cartels with greater asymmetry among firms
are less likely to be using price fixing and more likely to be using quota allocation. This
may suggest that allocation-based means of collusion, especially quota allocation, are
more robust to asymmetry between cartel members than price fixing: this supports
theoretical predictions that cost-asymmetric firms will have difficultly fixing prices
because the desired cartel price will differ among firms.
Geographical scope is more consistent in predicting whether certain agreement types
are observed in cartels. Every cartel of global scope in the sample used price fixing.
No cartel of national scope used territorial allocation and no cartel of regional scope
allocated quotas. Other strong predictions from the model are made relative to the
124
On the Use of Collusive Agreement Types
baseline of a cartel of national scope. Global cartels are also likely to use quota alloca-
tion and territorial allocation but are less likely to use either bid rigging or customer
allocation. This set of strong predictions indicate that many global cartels use similar
strategy profiles. Predictions for other scopes are less strong, but both Europe-wide
and regional cartels are also less likely to use bid rigging than national scope cartel:
indicating that bid rigging is mostly the preserve of these cartels.
These common explanatory variables explain much of the correlation between the
appearance of some agreement types. Price fixing and quota allocation are strongly
correlated, indicating they are often observed together, but much of this correlation
disappears when the correlation between the residuals of the estimated model are exam-
ined. This indicates that both price fixing and quota allocation are agreement types
favoured by global cartels, but other than this are not strong complements. Bid rigging
and customer allocation remain strongly correlated when the residuals are examined,
indicating that cartels do favour the use of them both: it is possible to see that both
agreement types represent similar behaviour with respect to different types of buyer.
Other agreement types are mostly negatively correlated with each other indicating that,
outside of certain common strategy profiles, different methods of collusion broadly act
as substitutes for each other.
A policy implication of this research relates to the observed presence of distinct
strategy profiles. If the existence of these consistent strategy profiles is indeed due to
the spread via contagion of successful strategies then halting this spread is extremely
important. Policies such as Amnesty Plus in the USA, which encourages detected
cartelists to reveal the existence of other cartels they are involving in or have knowledge
of, could be an effective means of eradicating tried and tested cartel strategies and
eliminating the collective progress of the cartelists in developing strategy profiles.
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Appendix A.
References to cases in the Official Journal
of the E.U.
Case Reference
SAS / Maersk Air OJ L 265, 05.10.2001, p. 15 - 41
Graphite electrodes OJ L 100, 16.04.2002, p. 1 - 42
Vitamins OJ L 6, 10.01.2003, p. 1 - 89
Luxembourg brewing industry OJ L 253, 21.09.2002, p. 21 - 41
Belgian beer market OJ L 200, 07.08.2003, p. 1 - 58
Citric acid OJ L 239, 06.09.2002, p. 18 - 65
Bank charges - Germany OJ L 15, 21.01.2003, p. 1 - 34
Zinc Phosphate OJ L 153, 20.06.2003, p. 1 - 39
Carbonless paper OJ L 115, 21.04.2004, p. 1 - 88
Austrian banks OJ L 56, 24.02.2004, p. 1 - 75
Methionine OJ L 255, 08.10.2003, p. 1 - 32
Industrial and medical gases OJ L 84, 01.04.2003, p. 1 - 55
Fine art Auction Houses OJ L 200, 30.07.2005 p. 92 - 95
Plasterboard OJ L 166, 28.06.2005 p. 8 - 11
Methylglucamine OJ L 138, 10.02.2004 p. 18 - 46
Food flavour enhancers OJ L75, 12.03.2004, p. 1 - 31
Speciality graphite ∗ OJ L 180, 04.07.2006, p. 20 - 24
Concrete reinforcing bar ∗ OJ L 353, 13.12.2006, p. 1 - 4
French beef ∗ † OJ L 209, 19.08.2003, p. 12 - 41
Sorbates OJ L 182, 13.07.2005, p. 20 - 25
Electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products OJ L 125, 28.04.2004, p. 45 - 49
Organic peroxide OJ L 110, 30.04.2005, p. 44 - 47
Industrial tubes OJ L 125, 28.04.2004, p. 50 - 53
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Case Reference
Copper plumbing tubes OJ L 192, 13.07.2006, p. 21 - 24
French beer market OJ L 184, 15.07.2005, p. 57 - 59
Spanish Raw Tobacco ∗ † OJ L 102, 19.04.2007, p. 14
Needles OJ C 147, 27.06.2009, p. 23 - 25
Choline chloride OJ L190, 22.07.2005, p. 22 - 26
Monochloroacetic Acid OJ L 353, 13.12.2006, p. 12 - 15
Thread OJ C 21, 26.01.2008, p. 10 - 14
Italian raw tobacco ∗ † OJ L 353, 13.12.2006, p. 45 - 49
Industrial bags OJ L 282, 26.10.2007, p. 41 - 46
Rubber chemicals OJ C 353, 13.12.2006, p. 50 - 53
Hydrogen peroxide OJ L 353, 13.12.2006, p. 54 - 59
Methacrylates OJ L 322, 22.11.2006, p. 20 - 23
Bitumen Nederland OJ L 196, 28.07.2007, p. 40 - 44
Fittings OJ L 283, 27.10.2007, p. 63 - 68
Steel beams OJ C 235, 13.09.2008, p. 4 - 6
Synthetic rubber (BR/ESBR) OJ C 7, 12.01.2008, p. 11 - 14
Gas insulated switchgear OJ C 5, 10.01.2008, p. 7 - 10
Elevators and escalators OJ C 75, 26.03.2008, p. 19 - 24
Netherlands beer market OJ C 122, 20.05.2008, p. 1 - 3
Hard haberdashery: fasteners ∗ OJ C 210, 16.07.2011, p. 26-27
Bitumen Spain OJ C 321, 29.12.2009, p. 15-17
Professional videotapes OJ C 57, 01.03.2008, p. 10 - 12
Flat glass OJ C 127, 24.05.2008, p. 9 - 11
Chloroprene rubber OJ C 251, 03.10.2008, p. 11 - 13
International removal services OJ C 188, 11.8.2009, p. 16-18
Sodium Chlorate ∗ OJ C 162, 08.06.2012, p. 6-7
Aluminium Fluoride † OJ C 40, 9.2.2011, p. 22 - 23
Candle waxes OJ C 295, 04.12.2009, p. 17-21
Bananas OJ C 189, 12.8.2009, p.12-14
Car glass OJ C 173, 25.7.2009, p. 13 - 16
Marine hoses ∗ † OJ C 168, 21.7.2009, p.6-8
E.ON - GdF collusion ∗ † OJ C 248, 16.10.2009, p.5-6
Calcium carbide ∗ † OJ C 301, 11.12.2009, p.18-20
Concrete reinforcing bar ∗ † OJ C 98, 30.3.2011, p. 16 - 19
Power transformers ∗ † OJ C 296; 5.12.2009, p. 21-22
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References to cases in the Official Journal of the E.U.
Case Reference
Heat stabilisers ∗ † OJ C 307, 12.11.2010, p. 9-12
DRAM † OJ C 180, 21.06.2011, p. 15-17
Bathroom fittings & fixtures ∗ † OJ C 348, p. 12 - 17
Prestressing steel † OJ C 339, 19.11.2011, p. 7-11
Animal Feed Phosphates ∗ † OJ C 111, 9.4.2011, p. 15 - 18
LCD † OJ C 295, 7.10.2011, p. 8-9
Consumer Detergents † OJ C 193, 02.07.2011, p. 14 - 16
Exotic fruit (bananas) † OJ C 64, 3.3.2012, p. 10 - 11
CRT glass bulbs † OJ C 48, 18.02.2012, p. 18 - 19
Refrigeration compressors † OJ C 122, 27.4.2012, p. 6 - 7
All of these may be found at the website of DG Comp http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html
Some decisions (most notably Vitamins) detail multiple cartels which are treated as
separate in the analysis.
∗ Data on cartel share unavailable
† Data on cartel coverage unavailable
129

Appendix B.
Alternative and Unexpurgated Model
Estimations
131
Membership, Stability and Internal Institutions in European Cartels
Table B.1.: Probit models predicting early exit for firms with control variables included
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 (b) Model 3 Model 4
Early exit
Late entry 0.637∗∗ 0.595∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗
(0.204) (0.190) (0.203) (0.169)
Number of members 0.0771∗ -0.0117 0.0637∗ 0.0855∗∗ 0.00518
(0.0317) (0.0253) (0.0304) (0.0308) (0.0198)
Cartel coverage -1.635∗ -1.922∗∗
(0.706) (0.698)
Market share -1.074 -1.910∗∗ -1.032 -1.851∗
(0.708) (0.687) (0.660) (0.740)
Full leniency 0.287 0.199 0.259 0.241 0.317
(0.273) (0.246) (0.274) (0.285) (0.205)
Global 0.132 -0.0635 0.159 0.259 -0.237
(0.292) (0.256) (0.288) (0.299) (0.222)
Europe-wide 0.305 0.188 0.309 0.452† -0.00440
(0.264) (0.256) (0.270) (0.261) (0.207)
Regional -0.114 0.385 0.323 -0.0736 -0.0325
(0.395) (0.275) (0.312) (0.380) (0.254)
Food and agriculture 0.367 0.189 0.454 0.436 -0.254
(0.393) (0.376) (0.380) (0.417) (0.334)
Manufacturing 0.212 0.179 0.137 0.245 0.0702
(0.227) (0.199) (0.224) (0.229) (0.168)
Metals 0.619∗ 0.326 0.685∗ 0.646∗ 0.597∗
(0.309) (0.310) (0.313) (0.297) (0.239)
Other 0.296 0.338 0.425 0.265 0.394
(0.346) (0.325) (0.335) (0.350) (0.300)
Constant -0.332 -0.908∗∗ -1.715∗∗∗ 0.0711 -1.133∗∗∗
(0.731) (0.344) (0.396) (0.753) (0.237)
Observations 328 379 328 328 478
r2 p 0.184 0.124 0.172 0.155 0.0747
ll -136.7 -166.5 -138.7 -141.5 -223.1
chi2 57.87 52.23 60.14 48.78 40.19
Baseline for Geographical Scope is National Scope. Baseline for Industry is Chemicals
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.2.: Average Marginal Effects for models predicting early exit from cartels with
control variables included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Late entry 0.148∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗
(0.0451) (0.0443) (0.0451) (0.0429)
Number of members 0.0179∗ -0.00286 0.0149∗ 0.0206∗∗ 0.00134
(0.00720) (0.00618) (0.00704) (0.00723) (0.00513)
Cartel coverage -0.378∗ -0.463∗∗
(0.159) (0.163)
Market share -0.249 -0.467∗∗ -0.242 -0.446∗
(0.162) (0.165) (0.153) (0.174)
Full leniency 0.0664 0.0486 0.0605 0.0580 0.0823
(0.0630) (0.0599) (0.0641) (0.0688) (0.0530)
Global 0.0292 -0.0141 0.0349 0.0584 -0.0595
(0.0648) (0.0570) (0.0632) (0.0673) (0.0558)
Europe-wide 0.0717 0.0463 0.0718 0.109† -0.00121
(0.0620) (0.0626) (0.0625) (0.0612) (0.0571)
Regional -0.0231 0.102 0.0754 -0.0146 -0.00886
(0.0776) (0.0764) (0.0773) (0.0741) (0.0687)
Food and agriculture 0.0867 0.0448 0.112 0.108 -0.0545
(0.101) (0.0941) (0.103) (0.114) (0.0650)
Manufacturing 0.0473 0.0421 0.0299 0.0566 0.0176
(0.0515) (0.0471) (0.0498) (0.0537) (0.0420)
Metals 0.158† 0.0814 0.181† 0.171∗ 0.182∗
(0.0889) (0.0831) (0.0942) (0.0873) (0.0800)
Other 0.0681 0.0849 0.104 0.0618 0.112
(0.0847) (0.0879) (0.0885) (0.0862) (0.0931)
Observations 328 379 328 328 478
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.3.: Probit models predicting late entry for firms with control variables included
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Number of members 0.0476 0.0503∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0254) (0.0193)
Cartel coverage -1.991∗∗
(0.726)
Market share -4.898∗∗∗ -4.757∗∗∗
(1.088) (1.039)
Global 0.594† 0.624∗ 0.547∗
(0.326) (0.297) (0.268)
Europe-wide 0.754∗∗ 0.783∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.272) (0.244)
Regional 0.109 0.556† 0.627∗
(0.383) (0.300) (0.260)
Food and agriculture 0.177 0.318 0.0356
(0.439) (0.420) (0.373)
Manufacturing 0.300 0.170 -0.0412
(0.233) (0.207) (0.164)
Metals 0.279 0.365 -0.0462
(0.284) (0.259) (0.234)
Other -0.236 0.0255 -0.119
(0.380) (0.344) (0.309)
Constant 0.806 -1.039∗∗ -2.210∗∗∗
(0.789) (0.384) (0.308)
Observations 328 379 478
r2 p 0.232 0.247 0.183
ll -135.5 -159.8 -230.9
chi2 47.46 61.51 89.85
Baseline for Geographical Scope is National Scope. Baseline for Industry is Chemicals
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.4.: Average marginal effects for probit models predicting late entry for firms
with control variables included
(1) (2) (3)
Number of members 0.0112 0.0121∗
(0.00769) (0.00605)
Cartel coverage -0.467∗∗
(0.166)
Market share -1.149∗∗∗ -1.141∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.220)
Global 0.131† 0.137∗ 0.0729
(0.0704) (0.0615) (0.0522)
Europe-wide 0.173∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.0571) (0.0557) (0.0520)
Regional 0.0204 0.119† 0.406∗∗∗
(0.0730) (0.0652) (0.0760)
National 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Chemicals 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Food and agriculture 0.0410 0.0788 -0.134
(0.105) (0.108) (0.0848)
Manufacturing 0.0719 0.0407 -0.000588
(0.0567) (0.0501) (0.0482)
Metals 0.0666 0.0911 0.175∗
(0.0703) (0.0681) (0.0731)
Other -0.0483 0.00589 -0.158∗
(0.0740) (0.0797) (0.0669)
Observations 328 379 478
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
† p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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